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This thesis contributes to one of the main debates of British imperial history, the 
relevance of the Empire to British society. It examines a number of twentieth century 
imperial activist groups and discusses in detail the Junior Imperial League and the 
League of Empire Loyalists. It argues that the Junior Imperial League was an 
important imperially-minded organisation which gave valuable practical support to 
the Conservative party. It suggests that the imperialism of the League of Empire 
Loyalists had ideological roots in the imperialist ideas of the late nineteenth century 
has been overlooked by historians who have perceived it as relevant only to extreme 
right-wing politics. It suggests that both these groups have been given too little, or 
the wrong kind of, attention by historians.  The first has simply been overlooked and 
the second has tended to be subsumed into a search for British fascism rather than 
studied as a specifically imperial body. 
The analysis of these two groups, in the general context of imperial group activism, 
hints at a reading of British imperial consciousness that it more subtle than the one in 
much current literature. Imperialism was neither ubiquitous nor non-existent. A 
substantial number of activists in Britain in the first half of the twentieth century, 
estimated to exceed a million, cared about the Empire in various ways and with a 
range of intensity.  Members of imperial activist groups came from all classes, 
although the leadership of imperial activism was often upper-class. However, 
imperialism mattered most when it was most ‘banal’ and most intertwined with a 
broader political Conservatism. Members of the Junior Imperial League rarely saw 
their imperialism as controversial or something separate from their broader political 
vision.  They associated it with the governance of the Empire, its defence, trading 
relationships, education, and Anglo-Saxon feelings of ‘kith and kin’ 
The League of Empire Loyalists revealed a different pattern of imperialism at a time 
when empire had become much more contested.  The LEL mobilized people who 
saw empire as the salient feature of their own political identity. In many ways their 
central concerns were similar to those of the Junior Imperial League but their sense 
of their marginality revealed how far empire had moved from the mainstream of 
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The question of the importance of the British Empire to people living in 
Britain has been extensively addressed by historians. They have used diverse ways 
of doing so, exploring, for example, novels, school curricula, consumer products and 
advertising, cinema, theatre, radio, sexuality and religion. The list of topics is 
extensive and proposes a sense of the ubiquity of imperialism in Britain that has 
been contested by other historians who argue that the empire had a lesser, or even a 
minimal, impact on domestic society. This thesis engages with that debate the 
content of which is described later in the chapter. In doing so, it considers a perhaps 
somewhat neglected method by which the importance of Empire can be evaluated. It 
moves away from considering ways in which the British public were exposed to 
imperial propaganda and Empire products and from analyses of the imperial content 
of various cultural media, to seeking evidence about the imperialism of those who 
were actively committed to the Empire. This is the principal focus of this thesis.  It 
looks at a wide range of imperial activist groups in Britain in the twentieth century 
whose purpose was openly stated as imperial.  Examining their activities, objectives, 
ideology and membership can help to explain the extent of manifest awareness of, 
and caring about, the Empire in Britain.  
 
It is likely that those who belonged to imperial activist groups, giving time 
and money in doing so, were those people who were most zealous about the British 
Empire. Thus assessing the level of their commitment to imperialism can add a 
useful dimension to the extent to which empire mattered in Britain. If it were to be 
the case that imperial activists were not single-minded about their imperialism, might 
those less imperialistically active be even less concerned about the British Empire?  
Certainly, imperial activist groups were often both diverse and selective; individual 
groups were rarely interested in all aspects of the British Empire or in all its 
geographical constituent parts. It is important, therefore, to consider what was meant 
by the expression ‘the British Empire’, to identify the topics that interested members 
of imperial activist groups and describe how these varied over time. Nor is it 
necessarily the case that, in the context of their groups, people were solely concerned 
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with the Empire. They engaged, for example, in social activities, right-wing politics, 
relationships with the Conservative party, education, business activities and practical 
support for the defence of the country.  Such diversity might be seen to attenuate the 
view of some historians that British society was steeped in the Empire and their 
tendency to see the Empire in everything they examine.  Sometimes, perhaps, social 
activities, national defence or business matters were the prime interest of a group 
labelling itself as imperial.  
 
Furthermore, in discussing the importance of the British Empire to people in 
Britain it is also important to recognise the varying valency of feelings about the 
Empire. Thus, where imperialism was present, it can be expressed, at one extreme, 
subtly, in a commonplace way, and at the other extreme, openly and ‘hotly’. Michael 
Billig
1
 has described ‘banal’, or commonplace, nationalism and its counterpart ‘hot’ 
nationalism and this idea can be transformed to imperialism and its activists. In 
considering, therefore, the nature of imperial feelings, it is useful if one can identify 
their full gamut and weight.   
 
Much of the thesis, therefore, is devoted to two imperial activist groups who 
represent the respective limits of commitment to, and valency of imperialism, that is, 
the Junior Imperial League (JIL) and the League of Empire Loyalists (LEL). These 
two organisations represent two very different kinds of expression of imperialism. 
They are at two extremes of such activism; the JIL was relatively low key in its 
imperialism and the LEL virulent and disruptive, and thus together they delimit the 
range of the intensity of the varied imperialism of activist groups. They have, 
however, been given relatively little attention by historians, being merely mentioned 
in passing. By studying them in depth, in the context of other imperial activist 
groups, this thesis helps us to understand the different extents and varying ways in 
which people in Britain cared about the Empire. 
 
The thesis challenges the opposing arguments that the Empire was either 
pervasive in British society or of minimal interest to it. If one examines the ways in 
which imperial activist groups were constituted, the imperial matters that interested 
                                                 
1
 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism, (London, 1995), p. 43. 
8 
 
them, and how they were pursued, the resulting analysis challenges conclusions by 
some historians that the British Empire mattered little to domestic society, and by 
others that it was ubiquitous.   Furthermore, it is possible from the limited data 
available about individual organisations’ memberships, to quantify the total extent of 
imperial activism, an important factor in assessing how much the empire mattered to 
people in Britain. The same data can address the question of the class nature of 
interest in the empire. Imperial activist groups contained individuals of all social 
classes and there is sufficient evidence to suggest the relative strengths of the 
different classes.  
 
Simply to draw a conclusion about how much the empire mattered would 
leave unanswered other important questions that can be addressed by an analysis of 
imperial activist groups. Thus, why did the Empire matter and to whom? How did 
activist groups perceive the importance of Empire?  What policies and imperial 
themes for preserving and developing the Empire were proposed by groups? What 
was the social and political nature of the groups? What did groups mean by the 
‘British Empire’ and how did this change? What continuities were there in imperial 
activism? And how did the ‘imperial constituency’ change in the twentieth century? 
 
Historiography 
Andrew Thompson has observed that in the historiography of the impact of 
the British Empire on domestic society ‘[t]here are two widely circulating if perhaps 
equally flawed’ views. One holds that ‘most Britons were largely ignorant of or 
indifferent to the empire’ and the other ‘that Britain was… saturated by 
imperialism’.2 The former view has been called ‘the minimal impact thesis’3 and, in 
contrast, the latter may be referred to as the ‘maximalist thesis’. These two opposing 
theses form a strongly contested debate in imperial historiography. Stephen Howe 
includes it as one of a list of twelve main current debates in imperial history and 
describes it as displaying ‘stark polarity between… [the] utter marginality…and [the] 
                                                 
2
 Andrew S. Thompson, Imperial Britain: the Empire in British Politics c1880-1932 (Harlow, 2000), 
p. 3. 
3
 Stuart Ward, ‘Introduction’, in British Culture and the End of Empire, ed. by Stuart Ward 
(Manchester, 2001), pp. 1-20 (p. 4).  
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centrality and ubiquity’ of the empire in British domestic society. It is not a debate 




The minimalists have largely been concerned with the question of the 
apparent indifference of the British public to the loss of the Empire after the Second 
World War and their work precedes that of the maximalists. Stuart Ward has 
described how several historians have argued that imperial decline mattered very 
little to ordinary people. Although he concludes that the ‘minimal impact thesis’ has 
been broadly shared by British cultural historians dealing with the post-1945 era’, he 
recognises, writing in 2001, that it ‘is beginning to attract a degree of critical 
scrutiny’.5 These ‘scrutineers’ are the maximalists. They reject the idea that the 
Empire and Britain be treated as separate, disassociated, parts of imperial history and 
affirm the powerful salience of the Empire in British domestic society using 
expressions such as ‘permeated’,  ‘omnipresent’, ‘infused’, ‘core ideology’, ‘vital 
aspect’, ‘pervasive’, ‘major component’, ‘profound’, ‘fundamental’ and ‘deeply 
embedded’ to describe the effect of the former on the latter.6 These descriptors 
generally emerge from historians who are exponents of the ‘new imperial history’ 
which emphasises ‘cultural as opposed to political or economic aspects’ of the 
empire.
7
 It is a problematic approach because, in order to justify the thesis that 
Empire mattered greatly in British society, imperial values contained in cultural 
                                                 
4
 Stephen Howe, ‘Introduction’, in The New Imperial Histories Reader, ed. by Stephen Howe 
(London, 2009), pp. 1-16 (p. 11). 
5
 Ward, ‘Introduction’, in British Culture, pp. 4-5. Ward refers to Bernard Porter, David Cannadine, 
Kenneth Morgan, Arthur Marwick, A J P Taylor, George Boyce and Lord Beloff as exponents of the 
minimal impact thesis. Andrew Thompson refers to the emergence of the maximalist school in 1984 
when John Mackenzie’s Studies in imperialism series first appeared (‘Introduction’, in Britain’s 
Experience of Empire in the Twentieth Century, ed. by Andrew S. Thompson (Oxford, 2012), pp. 1-
32 (p. 2)).  
6
 Catherine Hall, ‘Culture and Identity in Imperial Britain’, in The British Empire: Themes and 
Perspectives, ed. by Sarah Stockwell (Oxford, 2008), pp. 199-218; At Home with the Empire: 
Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World, ed. by Catherine Hall and Sonja O. Rose (Cambridge, 
2006); John Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Popular Opinion, 
1880-1960 (Manchester, 1984); Imperialism and Popular Culture, ed. by John Mackenzie 
(Manchester, 1986); John Mackenzie, ‘The Popular Culture of Empire in Britain’, in The Oxford 
History of the British Empire: Vol. 4 The Twentieth Century, ed. by Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger 
Louis (Oxford, 1999), pp. 212-231; John Mackenzie, ‘The Persistence of Empire in Metropolitan 
Culture’, in British Culture and the End of Empire, ed. by Stuart Ward (Manchester, 2001), pp. 21-36; 
P. J. Marshall, ‘Imperial Britain’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 23:3 (1995), 379-
394; The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives, ed. by Sarah Stockwell (Oxford, 2008); 
Antoinette Burton, ‘Who Needs the Nation? Interrogating “British” History’, in Cultures of Empire: A 
Reader, ed. by Catherine Hall (Manchester, 2000), pp. 137-153; Wendy Webster, Englishness and 
Empire, 1939-65 (Oxford, 2005).  
7
 Howe, ‘Introduction’, in The New Imperial Histories Reader, p. 2. 
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media are sometimes assumed to be readily absorbed by audiences and readers,
8
 
about which I will say more later.  
 
The incompatible theses that the imperialism was either ubiquitous in or, on 
the other hand, almost entirely absent from, British culture, might be said to give 
insufficient recognition to the complexity of empire and society.  Andrew Thompson 
has argued that there ‘was never likely to be any single or monolithic imperial 
culture in Britain’. Britons were neither steeped in imperialism nor ignorant or 
indifferent to it; the Empire’s influences on British society were more complex and 
diverse than that.
9
  Thompson is therefore able to conclude that the ‘ways in which 
imperialism influenced the ‘domestic’ history of modern Britain’ were ‘diverse’ 
although he recognises that this is a minority view that ‘may be swimming against 
the historiographical tide’.10 It is a view, however, that is also held by Stephen Howe 
who has suggested that ‘imperialism and empire meant many different things in 
British political discourse to different people at different times’. Howe also, like 
Bernard Porter, warns against perceiving the ubiquity of empire: ‘things…may not 
necessarily be associated with Empire [but] could…exist quite independently of it’. 
11
  By analysing imperial activist groups, this thesis develops the argument that 
imperialism in British society was complex and diverse, not simply either pervasive 
or minimal. 
 
Imperialist activist groups have not received much attention from historians. 
Although a few historians have published work that deals with a number of groups, 
most who have written about imperial activist groups have looked only at single 
groups.  John Mackenzie and Andrew Thompson
12
 are in the former category and 
have used a broad approach. Reese has described relationships between the Royal 
Colonial Institute and other groups, such as the Imperial Federation League, the 
                                                 
8
 Jonathan Rose, The Intellectual life of the British Working Classes (New Haven and London, 2001), 
p. 322. 
9
 Andrew Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back?: the Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid-
Nineteenth Century (Harlow, Pearson Longman, 2005), pp. 4-5. 
10
 Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back?, p. 241. 
11
 Stephen Howe, ‘Empire and Ideology’, in The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives, ed. by 
Sarah Stockwell (Oxford, 2008), pp. 157-176 (pp. 161-2). 
12
 Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire; Thompson in Imperial Britain and ‘Thinking Imperially? 
Imperial Pressure Groups and the Idea of Empire in Late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain’ (PhD 
thesis, University of Oxford, 1994). 
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United Empire Trade League and the League of the Empire but does not analyse 
them per se.
 13
 Andrew Marrison’s interest is in ‘protectionist businessmen’ and 
empire and to do so he has examined, inter alia, the Tariff Reform League, the 
Empire Industries Association and the British Commonwealth Union.
14
 He argues 
that, even though it was growing in strength, ‘until 1929…business pressure was 
remarkably unsuccessful’ in bringing about tariff reform.15  Matthew Hendley 
analyses the changes wrought by the First World War on imperial activism and has 
written extensively about three groups: the League of the Empire, the Victoria 
League and the National Service League, using them to illustrate his argument that 
‘patriotic and imperialist’ organisations survived the First World War but they 
‘emphasized different characteristics from those displayed before the war’ by 
‘play[ing] a vibrant if reduced role’ that expressed ‘a gentler version of 
imperialism’.16   
 
Bernard Porter, in The Absent-Minded Imperialists, makes glancing reference 
to many of the earlier groups but does not evaluate them except to argue that they 
illustrate the burgeoning of imperial propaganda in the early years of the twentieth 
century. John Mackenzie, however, has analysed imperial propaganda much more 
closely than Porter and it is the theme of one of his considerable number of books 
and articles. In a chapter in Propaganda and Empire, he looks at what he calls 
‘imperial propaganda societies’ founded between the middle of the nineteenth 
century and the First World War.  It is the most wide-ranging survey of imperial 
activist groups in the literature of them and from it he concludes that ‘[a] whole 
range of propagandist imperial bodies, conventionally regarded as failures, in fact 
succeeded in diffusing their patriotic intentions and world view, if not their specific 
plans of action, through almost every institution in British life’17. This is an 
unequivocal statement about the extent of imperialist activity and one supported by 
maximalists such as Catherine Hall.  
 
                                                 
13
 Trevor R. Reese, The History of the Royal Commonwealth Society 1868-1968 (London, 1968). 
14
 Andrew Marrison, British Business and Protection 1903-1932 (Oxford, 1996). 
15
 Marrison, British Business and Protection, p. 23. 
16
 Matthew Hendley, Organised Patriotism and the Crucible of War: Popular Imperialism in Britain, 
1914-1932 (Montreal, 2012), p. 228. 
17
 Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire, p. 253. 
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In his important doctoral thesis, Thompson uses a detailed analysis of six 
groups
18
 active in the late Victorian and Edwardian periods, to argue that historians 
have been wrong to emphasise the importance of Britain’s dependencies in imperial 
matters; it was the white Dominions that activists saw as the main element of the 
British Empire. Thus we see that insofar as imperial activist groups have been looked 
at collectively at all, they have been used largely as part of a particular argument, not 
as a main theme. There has been no extensive examination of the ideology, 
membership and organisation of imperial activist groups throughout the period from 
the 1860s until after the Second World War. Despite this some historians have been 
able to reach conclusions about imperial activist groups. 
 
Porter’s argument is that ‘the empire made [an] uneven and generally 
superficial impression on British society’ but he does not closely examine the role of 
imperial activist groups in reaching this conclusion, that is, whether they magnified 
or reduced it.
 19
   However, he regards Mackenzie’s book as particularly important in 
the debate about the importance of the ‘imperial factor in [Britain’s] domestic 
history’, even though he dissents from Mackenzie’s conclusion that imperial activist 
groups’ propaganda was effective.20   
 
In his thesis Thinking Imperially?, Thompson is more circumspect about the 
impact of imperial activist groups, preferring to use the word ‘influence’, the 
assessment of which he regards as ancillary to his thesis. Discussing in detail the 
affairs of the Navy League, the Tariff Reform League, the Imperial South Africa 
Association, the Emigration Committee of the Royal Colonial Institute, the British 
Committee of the Indian National Congress and the Fabian Society, he nevertheless 
concludes that ‘it was the smaller organisations, which operated as special publics 
[sic], which probably had the most influence on the process of [government] policy 
formation’.  (Thompson defines ‘special publics’ as groups whose membership was 
                                                 
18
 Although Thompson includes the Navy League in his survey of imperial pressure groups, arguably 
he is wrong to do so. The Royal Navy was clearly an important element of the British Empire but the 
purpose of the Navy League was not directly imperial. It was concerned with the scale and 
deployment of naval resources, not with imperial matters per se, and is therefore not included in the 
survey in this chapter. 
19
 Porter, Absent-Minded Imperialists, p. 318. 
20
 ibid., p. 6. 
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relatively small but who had detailed knowledge and expertise directly relevant to 
the group’s purpose.)21 In fields other than forming government policy, such as 
political debate and party politics, the influence of activist groups is difficult to 
assess, according to Thompson.
22
 However, in evaluating the nature of public 
opinion about the empire, Thompson observes that what it actually was and what 
imperial activist groups said it was, were not always the same thing, thus 
complicating any assessment. He questions the validity of the perception of imperial 
activist groups themselves, that the ‘British public was apathetic and indifferent 
towards its empire’.23  He firmly concludes, for example, that ‘[i]t is almost certain 
that Britain witnessed a spectacular although short-lived period of imperial sentiment 
during the late 1890s’.24 This sentiment ‘flagged’, however, at the end of the Boer 
war to the extent that it was no longer all-absorbing at the time of the general 
election of 1906,
25
 a conclusion that is contestable when one considers the 
proliferation of new imperial pressure groups in the period 1901 to 1918. Indeed, 
Thompson seems to modify his conclusion by quoting, in his later work, Harris, who 
wrote that ‘popular…serious public discussion of politics in Edwardian Britain was 
larger in proportion to population than at any time before or since’. 26 If this be so, 
Thompson says, then Edwardian extra-parliamentary [imperial] movements ‘must 
take some credit’ in the ‘public debate about Empire’. Thompson argues that in this 
period the enthusiasm of imperialists created extra-parliamentary organisations that 
increased public discussion of the British Empire, allowed women to participate 
more fully in politics and brought greater celebration of Britain’s imperial 
achievements. Thus the Empire was a catalyst for creating ‘an extra-parliamentary 
political culture’.27 Arguably, then, the full blooming of popular imperial activism in 
Britain lasted throughout the period from the 1890s until the First World War. It is 
important, however, to be aware that this late-Victorian and Edwardian proliferation 
of imperial pressure groups may be a consequence of an initial catching of the flood 
                                                 
21
 Thompson, ‘Thinking Imperially?’, p. 85 and p. 55.  
22
 Thompson, ‘Thinking Imperially?’,  p. 87. 
23
 ibid., p. 331. 
24
 ibid., p. 344. 
25
 ibid., p. 345. 
26
 Thompson, Imperial Britain, p. 59, quoting J. Harris, Private Lives, Public Spirit: Britain, 1870-
1914 (London, 1994), p. 196. 
27
 ibid., p. 191. 
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tide of imperial enthusiasm and subsequent attempts to stem its retreat, rather than a 
crescendo of public interest in imperial matters.  
 
One can conclude from this historiographical survey that in approaching the 
assessment of how domestic society in Britain was affected by the empire, historians 
have often mistakenly adopted a binary approach: the empire was either largely 
irrelevant, or it was pervasive. On occasion, this dichotomy has been 
uncompromisingly expressed. Thus, for example, Antoinette Burton has dismissed 
Porter’s The Absent-Minded Imperialists as ‘not “worth arguing with or about”‘28.  
This illustrates that there is in the debate insufficient recognition that a valid 
approach to the issue needs to be more subtle: various parts of society were 
interested in the empire in different ways that varied over time. It is an argument of 
this thesis that one of the ways this can be explored is by examining imperial activist 
groups. However, although a number of historians have written about particular 
groups and drawn useful conclusions, none has considered imperial group activism 
as a complete social and political phenomenon capable of providing evidence of the 
attitudes of people in Britain towards the empire. 
 
Methodology and Sources 
We will turn, in Chapter 1, to the specific details of individual imperial 
activist groups but, before doing so, it is useful to outline a methodological 
framework that helps in understanding and categorising them. In particular, 
understanding what imperial activists meant when they referred to the British Empire 
is crucial in any discussion about imperial pressure groups. As Sarah Stockwell has 
observed, it is an important commonplace that there were several British empires.
29
 
The result of this is that when imperialists used the expression ‘British Empire’ they 
were not expressing a uniform, universal meaning.   Thus, for example, according to 
Koebner and Schmidt ‘when people spoke [in the 1880s] of the unity of the [British] 
Empire, they invariably meant the relation between Britain and all her colonies and 
                                                 
28
 Bernard Porter, ‘Further Thoughts on Imperial Absent-Mindedness’, The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 36 (2008), 101-117. 
29
 Sarah Stockwell, ‘Ends of Empire’, in The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives, ed. by Sarah 
Stockwell (Oxford, 2008), pp. 269-293 (p. 271).  
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dependencies’ (emphasis added).30  By 1909, however, Lord Esher declared at the 
Imperial Press Conference that ‘the term “Empire” now referred primarily to Great 
Britain and the white Dominions’.31 In 1945, the white Dominions were still a 
recognised category of the Empire, along with ‘the informal empire of the Middle 
East… and the… dependent empires in Asia, Africa, the Mediterranean and 
Caribbean’.32 We need to be aware of these shifting meanings and the loose usage of 
the expression ‘the Empire’ by activists. For the purposes of this thesis, therefore, 
the compartmentalisation of the British Empire will be taken to be the dependencies, 
India, and the white Dominions (sometimes referred to in the early part of our period 
as the self-governing colonies). It will be argued later in this thesis that, until after 
the Second World War, imperial activists were not much concerned with the 
dependencies. India was a major concern between the two wars; the white 
Dominions were the continuous theme throughout the period and it is they who were 
the ‘British Empire’ in common parlance. Such an interpretation may help to explain 
how it was that Britain divested itself of its dependencies so readily, and 
uncontroversially in domestic politics, after the Second World War; the 
dependencies had never mattered much to the British public. They mattered more to 
historians of the British Empire who, as Andrew Thompson has pointed out, ‘have 
grown accustomed to thinking about the British empire, and popular responses to it, 
in dependent terms’, rather than as the ‘settler colonies’.33 
 
The second element is the six main topics that preoccupied imperial activist 
groups: governance and unification; defence; trade; emigration; imperial sentiment, 
or ‘kith and kin’; and resisting independence. We shall see in the discussion that 
follows in Chapter 1, that most groups specialised in one, sometimes two, of these 
topics; few were comprehensively active in all of them. In addition, it is interesting 
to examine their relevance to the various parts of the Empire. Such an analysis may 
throw light on the different meanings of the British Empire to people in Britain. 
Thus, if one asks whether the Empire mattered to people, and if so, how much it 
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mattered, we can only answer meaningfully if we are clear about what a particular 
group meant by ‘Empire’ and the particular topic  that interested them. Those, for 
example, who were concerned to prevent the independence of India, did not of 
necessity also have to promote, let us say, emigration to Canada in order to be 
classified as imperial activists. It may well be that to many activists it was only 
aspects of Empire that mattered, not its totality. This thesis, in surveying imperial 
activist groups, addresses this question. 
 
The third element describes the principal characteristics of activist groups. In 
his thesis, Thompson, by considering the different strategies used by activist groups 
in promulgating their ideas, defines four types: popular pressure groups, such as the 
Navy League and the Tariff Reform League, who used public opinion to influence 
government policy; groups who lobbied members of parliament; ‘collaborative’ 
groups, for example, the Imperial South Africa Association, who worked closely 
with relevant officials; and the ‘special publics’, previously mentioned.34  These are 
useful categories but they concentrate on groups’ methods of communicating with 
those whom they saw as important in formulating imperial policy. There are broader 
ways of categorising imperial activist groups; for example, some of them sometimes 
exhibited more of a social ethos than a political one and yet were relevant to the 
formation of public sentiment about the British Empire. As Thompson has observed 
in Imperial Britain, ‘Britain’s political process was undoubtedly influenced and 
modified by its imperial involvement…for this to be fully appreciated we must look 
beyond Westminster and Whitehall’35 to other activities including those of activist 
groups. However, this approach still places exclusive emphasis on the political 
nature of activist groups and overlooks other characteristics of them. In looking at a 
wide range of activist groups, therefore, it will provide a more complete picture of 
them if we consider a number of spectra of activist group characteristics. Thus: to 
what extent was a group social or political in its activities; general or specific in its 
ideology and objectives; popular or elitist; small or large; and more of an interest 
group than a pressure group? These are the characteristics that will be considered in 
this thesis. In discussing them, evidence will be drawn from primary sources, such as 
                                                 
34
 Thompson, ‘Thinking Imperially?’, pp. 43-61. 
35
 ibid., p. 190. 
17 
 
the periodicals of the various groups, and from the secondary sources that form the 
historiography of imperial activist groups both collectively and individually.  
 
Another aspect of the methodology of the thesis is concerned with the 
relative importance of empirical evidence and commonly accepted but unconscious 
notions of empire. Catherine Hall has described how historians ‘have explored the 
place of empire in metropolitan culture and identity through a wide variety of 
sources and with different methods’.36  They have researched ‘visual 
culture…exhibitions…poetry…travel writing…the press, theatre and music hall’ and 
have used sources such as ‘parliamentary documents…the missionary press…[and] 
business papers’. Different sources’, she argues, ‘reveal different discourses’.37  Hall 
also argues that the presence of Empire in metropolitan consciousness cannot be 
analysed solely by examining narrow empirical evidence in the way that Bernard 
Porter has done. It must also, she believes, consider subtle feelings about the Empire 
that arise from ‘background assumptions’ about it and ‘the common sense of the 
period’ that ‘is never explicitly stated’.38 To exemplify this she discusses William 
Thackeray’s novel Vanity Fair and concludes that although ‘it is not an imperialist 
novel, in the sense that it actively promulgates imperial expansion’, it ‘is one in 
which empire…[is] simply part of everyday social experience’.39 Hall’s assessment 
of the novel, however, does not tell us how contemporary readers reacted to it and 
what their views about the Empire were even though they may have readily 
understood Thackeray’s imperial references. Arguably, popular though the novel 
was, it tells us as much about the nature of Thackeray’s awareness of Empire as that 
of his readership. One needs to understand the author’s audience as well as the 
author himself and the context of his work. A speech delivered alone in front of a 
mirror, and the same speech made to a cheering audience in the Albert Hall are 
identical historical documents but differ greatly in how they should be interpreted. 
The point here is that if we wish to understand the importance of the Empire to the 
British people, we need to consider as fully as possible their manifest imperial 
activities. If we place too great an emphasis on the commonplace, almost incidental, 
proponents of imperial ideas such as novelists, poets, and music hall artists, at the 
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expense of those directly active in imperialist matters, an incomplete picture is 
created of the intensity of feeling about the Empire. Bernard Porter, on the other 
hand, may indeed, as Hall argues, have over-emphasised empirical evidence.  A 
balance between the two approaches can be achieved by discussing a range of 
imperial feelings that includes those, at one extreme, that were subtle and 
understated as well as those, at the other extreme, that were powerfully expressed 
and clearly manifest. A valuable and neglected means of doing so is provided by 
researching the many imperial activist groups that existed in the twentieth century. 
They contain a range of expressions of caring about the British Empire. It is a range 
in which the case studies of the Junior Imperial League and the League of Empire 
Loyalists determine the two extremes of imperial consciousness between which all 
other groups can be set. Why, however, are imperial activist groups a valuable 
source? 
 
 If one is to attempt to establish the extent to which the Empire mattered in 
Britain, why it mattered and to whom, it is useful to construct what might be termed 
a hierarchy of popular imperial consciousness. This extends downwards from those 
who cared about the Empire and took action, to those who cared about the Empire 
but were passive about it; those who were merely aware of the Empire and 
indifferent to it; and those who were unaware of the Empire. It is very likely that 
members of imperial activist groups fell into the first two of these categories and 
were absent from the latter two. By joining the groups they were actively 
demonstrating that the British Empire mattered to them, albeit in varying degrees. 
Thus if one is to attempt to answer the question of to what extent the British Empire 
mattered to domestic society one can do so by assessing the total number of those 
engaged in imperial activism in Britain. One can also consider the activities and 
nature of the members of the groups to attempt to answer the other questions posed 
earlier in this chapter. Thus, by evaluating the totality of collective imperialist 
activity, this thesis fills an important gap in the historiography of the importance of 
the Empire to people in Britain. As Hendley has observed, ‘careful study of three 
separate patriotic and imperial groups from 1914 to 1932… [brings]attention to a 
neglected but crucial part of British culture during this time’, i.e. ‘organised 
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patriotism and imperialism’. 40  By studying twenty seven groups over a greater 
timespan, this thesis brings a more extensive analysis of organised imperialism and 
fills gaps in the historiography of the debate about how much the Empire mattered to 
the British people. It is, however, necessary to define a number of key terms. 
 
The term ‘imperial activist group’ has been used in this thesis to encapsulate 
two types of group: ‘pressure group’ and ‘interest group’. It is used to denote a group 
that is concerned, not principally with the broader concept of imperialism, but 
specifically with the British Empire. Imperialism is essential to its reason for 
existing, but its attention is focused tightly on the British Empire. Members of 
imperial activist groups are actors, not those who are acted upon by, for example, 
writers, propagandists and advertisers of consumer products of the Empire. One 
might use the expression ‘British Empire activist group’ but this is clumsy and 
therefore the term ‘imperial activist group’ has been adopted.  Pressure groups seek 
actively to change, or sometimes preserve, some aspect of the affairs of the British 
Empire. By various means of conveying their objectives, they try to apply pressure 
to politicians, decision makers and the general public as they campaign for change. 
Academics are broadly in agreement on a definition of a pressure group. Hamer 
refers to ‘the organisation of electoral power …for persuading political parties… to 
promise legislation’; Watts refines this by stating that such a group is not a political 
party; Grant’s definition is broad, describing a pressure group as ‘an organisation 
which seeks…the formulation and implementation of public policy’; and Coxall says 
that a pressure group ‘aims to influence public policy…by lobbying rather than 
standing for office’.41 The pressure groups discussed in this thesis all fall within 
these definitions, although the Empire Crusade, exceptionally, resulted in the 
formation of a party, the United Empire Party.  
 
Interest groups are not much concerned with change. They are generally 
content with the Empire as it is (as they understand it), and simply want to celebrate 
it, learn about it and be its imperial evangelists. The word ‘interest’ is used here to 
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mean being concerned about the Empire, not in the sense of seeking some personal 
or other return or benefit.   This distinction between ‘pressure’ and ‘interest’ is 
important in assessing how much the Empire mattered. It is not the case, however, 
that groups were either wholly pressure groups or wholly interest groups; elements 
of both could coexist in the same group. The same can be said of another 
categorisation: ‘political’ and ‘social’.  
 
Nevertheless, imperial activist groups were mostly political organisations 
campaigning for a particular issue and seeking to persuade politicians, as well as the 
electorate, to support their cause. The British Commonwealth Union is an example 
of this type of group, as will be evident later in this thesis. Other groups, such as the 
Overseas Club, had a social ethos and eschewed politics. (The word ‘social’ is used 
here not to mean the provision of some kind of service to society – although some 
groups did indeed do that – but to define a group’s internal nature and activities as 
non-political.) Some groups, such as the Primrose League and the Junior Imperial 
League, contained both political and social activities and can therefore be 
particularly useful in exploring the wide-ranging nature of imperial activism.  Those 
activists who applied pressure for political purposes had a different view of the 
British Empire from those who socialised to express a common interest and delight 
in the Empire. This thesis explores these differences. 
 
The twenty-seven groups discussed in this thesis are an extensive 
representation of people interested in the British Empire and provide an analytical 
resource that is focused on the activities of individuals who cared about the Empire. 
A major thrust of the thesis is to examine the activities of these individuals, as 
imperially minded adults, acting collectively and independently of government, in 
seeking to strengthen, protect or celebrate the British Empire. Imperial groups 
comprising corporate members, such as the British Empire Producers’ Association 
and the British Imperial Council of Commerce, have therefore been excluded, as 
have groups whose members were solely children.  Governmental bodies, such as the 
Empire Marketing Board, have also been excluded.  
 
There are, however, few secondary sources that have looked in detail at 
imperial activist groups. In books and journals, authors usually refer to them 
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incidentally and do not probe in depth at the nature of them. Exceptions are found in 
Hendley’s book and in Andrew Thompson’s published work. Thompson has also 
written a PhD thesis and May and Riedi have also written theses on the Victoria 
League and Round Table respectively.
42
 Primary sources used in the general survey 
of imperialist activist groups in Chapter 1 include a number of brief first-hand 
accounts of early groups in United Empire and contemporary reports of activities of 
the groups in The Times. 
 
Historians have largely ignored the Junior Imperial League and the League of 
Empire Loyalists and therefore this thesis has relied heavily on primary sources. A 
large body of JIL documents in the archive of the Conservative party at the Bodleian 
Library has been examined and analysed, providing a valuable source of 
information. It contains minute books of the all main governing committees of the 
JIL as well as other useful material. The JIL periodicals, The Imp, and its successor, 
Torchbearer, are also useful primary sources. Accessible archival material of the 
League of Empire Loyalists is much sparser. Use has been made of the limited LEL 
archive at the University of Bath which contains correspondence and other 
documents about the League’s affairs. Chesterton’s publications, such as Sound the 
Alarm and Why I Left Mosley have been useful, and the LEL’s periodical Candour 
provides much information about the LEL’s activities and beliefs. Candour is still 
published from premises in Hampshire and it may be that there is useful archival 
material there. There was no response, however, to a request to examine it.  The 
Beaverbrook papers at the House of Lords Record Office contain references to 
Chesterton and to the League of Empire Loyalists and have been consulted. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 1 is a survey of twenty-seven imperial activist groups from their 
earliest origins in the latter part of the nineteenth century.  It considers which parts of 
the British Empire they were interested in; the imperial themes on which they 
focused; and their objectives, activities and membership. The range and 
characteristics of imperial activism are thus established and some general 
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conclusions are made about imperial activism in Britain in the twentieth century so 
that detailed discussion of two groups, the Junior Imperial League and the League of 
Empire Loyalists, can be placed in context.  
 
The richness of the primary sources allows a detailed description and analysis 
of the Junior Imperial League. Its importance in the context of imperial activism 
derives from its foundation in the early years of the twentieth century when public 
interest in the Empire was arguably at its peak. Chapter 2 explores these early years 
and describes the JIL’s growth to 100,000 members by 1914, its claim to be an 
effective force and the low-key nature of its imperialism. Chapter 3 deals with the 
governance and membership of the JIL, describing the growth, decline and class 
structure of its membership in the inter-war years as well as its relationship with the 
Conservatives, the party of Empire, and how it reflected the social and political 
changes of the period. The League’s activities, ideology and impact form the content 
of Chapter 4 in which its imperialism and its usefulness as a Tory party resource are 
discussed. 
 
Chapter 5 describes the membership, ideology and activities of the League of 
Empire Loyalists, including its relationships with the right-wing of the Conservative 
party and the methods it used to publicise its strong support for the British Empire.  
Because of Chesterton’s pre-war association with Mosley’s British Union of 
Fascists, the LEL has generally been seen by historians and other writers as a fascist 
organisation. Chapter 6 discusses this and argues that such a conclusion should not 
be allowed to mask its strongly, and actively, held imperialist beliefs. 
 
In any discussion about how much imperialism mattered the question of what 
is meant by ‘British Empire’ is an important one and this is dealt with in Chapter 7 
using as a structure for doing so , Imperialism by Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan 
Schmidt, a valuable and yet neglected source.  
 
Chapter 7 also examines the changing nature of imperial activism in Britain 
in the twentieth century in terms of its political and social nature, the geographical 
areas of the Empire favoured by activists and the principal themes of imperial 
governance, defence and trade. It also addresses a number of general issues about 
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imperial activist groups: the social classes that cared most about the British Empire; 
the specific imperial themes that were important to activists and how they changed 
over time; and the declining prevalence of imperial activism. The chapter also argues 
that the JIL and the LEL lie at the extreme ends of the range of imperial activist 
groups: the former displaying ‘banal imperialism’ and the latter ultra-imperialism.  
Thus, the JIL was an imperial interest group that enjoyed and celebrated the Empire, 
expressing its imperialism in loyal, commonplace ways in the context of the 
Conservative party; the LEL was an imperial pressure group whose public activities 
consisted of heated and disruptive events designed to draw attention to its out-dated 
view of the Empire. The JIL and the LEL, therefore, form the bulk of the thesis 
because they delimit the range of imperial activist groups and yet have remained 
unexplored by historians.  If we are able to understand more fully the nature of these 
two extremes of imperial activism, a better insight into imperial activism in general 




Chapter 1. Loyal to the Empire: a survey of some twentieth century British 
imperial activist groups  
 
The main content of this thesis focuses on the Junior Imperial League and the 
League of Empire Loyalists, two organisations neglected by historians but which 
throw important light on the nature of imperial activism in the twentieth century. An 
examination of them in isolation, however, would fail to locate them in the overall 
context of imperial activism. Such context is the subject of this chapter: the 
description and analysis of twenty-seven imperial activists and thus the identification 
of their perceptions of empire, the aspects of empire that concerned them, and the 
nature of their membership, enable some general conclusions to be drawn about 
imperial activism. Thus the JIL and LEL, in the ensuing chapters, can be 
contextualised and compared with other imperial activist groups.    
 
Although we are concerned in this chapter with twentieth-century imperial 
activist groups, the origins of British imperial activism lie in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and to understand more fully imperial activist groups in the 
twentieth century these origins need to be considered. Furthermore, some activist 
groups established in Victorian times, such as the Royal Colonial Institute and the 
Primrose League, survived throughout the twentieth century and are thus fully 
relevant to this thesis.  In the period from 1868, when the Royal Colonial Institute 
was established, until the end on the Victorian era in 1901, nine imperial activist 
groups were founded in Britain. In the seventeen years from 1902, at the close of the 
Boer War, until the end of the First World in 1918, a further ten emerged and in the 
twenty year inter-war period, six more came into existence. None was created during 
the Second World War and only two in the post-war period. A survey of these 
twenty-seven groups forms the substance of this chapter.  A full list of the 
organisations with the dates that they were active (where known) is shown in Table 
1.  
 
One can see from this brief summary that the most intensive and fertile 
period for the creation of imperial activist groups was in the period 1902 to 1918 and 
that it followed the steady build-up of groups in the late Victorian era.  The inter-war 
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years saw a decline in the rate of formation of new groups, and in the post-war years 
new groups were a rarity. Imperial activist groups were not generally long-lived 
institutions; only about a third of the groups listed in Table 1 survived for more than 
twenty years.  
 
It is unsurprising, perhaps, that this pattern of growth and decline is 
correlated with that of the British Empire itself. At times of high imperial interest, 
millions of people were members of imperial activist groups; in 1910, the Primrose 
League, for example, claimed to have over two million members. After the Second 
World War, when fewer than ten groups were active, membership had greatly 
declined in a period in which Britain was losing its Empire.  These individuals and 
their organisations, therefore, are very relevant to understanding attitudes to, and 





Table 1. British imperial activist groups (listed chronologically by date of 
foundation) 
 
Royal Colonial Institute 1868-present  (Renamed Royal Empire 
Society in 1928 and Royal 
Commonwealth Society in 
1957.) 
Primrose League  1883-2004    
Imperial Federation 
League  
1884-1893     
United Empire Trade 
League     
1891-  
Imperial Federation 
(Defence) Committee  
1894-1906     
Imperial South African 
Association  
1896-1910      
British Empire League  1895-1955    (Merged with Empire 
Industries  Association in 
1947.) 
Victoria League  1901-present     
League of the Empire  1901-present     
Empire Day Movement  1903-1963     
Tariff Reform League  1903-early1920s     
Imperial Cooperation 
League 
1906-1914 (Formerly Imperial 
Federation Defence 
Committee.) 
Junior Imperial League  1906-1946      
Round Table Group  1909-1981     
Overseas Club  1910-1922  (Amalgamated with 
Patriotic League in 1922.) 
Empire Parliamentary 
Association  
1911-present     
Patriotic League of Britons 
Overseas  
1914-1922  (Amalgamated with 
Overseas Club in 1922) 
Empire Resources 
Development Committee  
c.1916-c.1920      
British Empire Union  1915-c.1960s    
Women’s Guild of Empire  1920s-1930s    
Empire Industries 
Association  
1923-1976    
Empire Crusade  1929-late 1930s  (Included the United 
Empire Party.) 
Indian Empire Society  1930-1940s    
India Defence League   1933-late1930s    
British Federal Union   1938-?     
League of Empire 
Loyalists  
1954-1967     
Expanding 
Commonwealth Group   




Historians have mostly written about individual imperial groups and not, 
therefore, drawn general conclusions. In discussing their work and, at the same time, 
adding information obtained from primary sources (principally drawn from 
periodicals such as United Empire and Round Table, for example) it is useful to 
consider imperial activist groups in chronological order by date of foundation (see 
Table 1). This approach to examining imperial groups illustrates and clarifies the 
changing nature of imperial activism throughout the period under discussion. During 
the latter part of the nineteenth century the emphasis was on finding closer unity of 
the governance of Britain and the settler colonies through federalism. The question 
was not simply what form this should take but how it should be attempted. Two 
mechanisms were identified: trade and defence. During the Edwardian period, after 
the manifest failure of federalism (discussed later in this chapter), many activists 
divided into separate campaigns in these two areas. Alongside this specialisation, 
however, groups such as the Victoria League and the Junior Imperial League sought 
principally to celebrate and support the Empire rather than reform it. In the inter-war 
years this trend continued. The idea of formalised, integrated imperial defence 
weakened and activists with specific imperial interests concentrated on trade and 
Indian self-government. After the Second World War, and with the issue of Indian 
independence resolved in 1947, there remained as major activist issues only imperial 
trade (as an alternative to the European Economic Community) and (very limited) 
opposition to colonial independence.  In summary then, the chronology can be 
divided into four, named, periods: the mid-late Victorian, which, as far as the 
sustained emergence of imperial groups is concerned, is from 1868 to 1900; the 
Edwardian (1901-1918); the inter-war years (1919-1939); and the Second World 
War and post-war decolonisation (1939-c.1967). 
 
 In the Victorian period there were three major groups that exhibited 
substantial interest in the British Empire: the Royal Colonial Institute; the Imperial 
Federation League (from which three other groups emerged in the 1890s); and the 
Primrose League. For the former two organisations the Empire was their raison 
d’être; for the latter the British Empire was not its sole purpose but was closely 
linked to its objectives and activities. All three provide valuable evidence about the 




The Royal Colonial Institute was founded in 1868 by a group, led by the 
Liberal Member of Parliament, Viscount Bury, who felt the need for gentlemen to 
have a ‘colonial association’ in London. Reese has described its wholly male 
membership as mainly aristocratic, upper class and drawn from the armed services, 
professions, clergy, and landed gentry.
1
 John Mackenzie places a different emphasis, 
describing it as ‘middle class and elitist’ at least until 1914.2 Women were admitted 
in 1909 as part of a more general campaign that eventually brought membership to 
10,915 by 1915 when ‘the tide of Imperial patriotism [was] running so strongly’3. 
Total membership in 1918 was 13,700, a substantial growth rate from only 3,775 in 
1892 and 4,527 in 1909
4‘. This growth came at the end of a period between 1890 and 
1909 that had seen ‘signs of decay’ and passivity in the activities of the Institute.5 
The Institute’s activities were strictly non-political and non-commercial and its 
objects had an academic aura: the reading of papers; a library and reading room; 
discussions ‘upon Colonial and Indian subjects…and scientific, literary, and 
statistical investigations in connection with the British Empire’.6  One may conclude 
from this brief summary that the Institute, in the Edwardian period, can be 
characterised as an elite, medium-sized imperial interest group with social and 
academic preferences.  
 
The Primrose League was very different. For example, whereas the Royal 
Colonial Institute was criticised in 1909 for being slow to establish branches outside 
London, the League, founded in 1884, had formed 2645 branches (or habitations) by 
1910 with a total membership, it claimed, of over two million people.
7
 Nor could it 
be described as elitist, in the sense that it was predominantly aristocratic or upper 
class because soon after it was founded, the League introduced Associate 
membership. Associates were working- and lower-middle class; in the organisational 
hierarchy they sat beneath the upper and middle class members, called Knights and 
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Dames, and by 1886 made up 90% of the League’s membership.8 It is clear, 
therefore, as Robb has observed, that ‘imperialism was by no means a purely upper 
class movement’.9 Although the Primrose League’s formally stated object was ‘the 
promotion of Tory principles--viz. the maintenance of religion, of the estates of the 
realm, and of the “Imperial Ascendancy of Great Britain”‘10, it stood apart from the 
Unionist party (in a similar way to the Junior Imperial League, as we shall see in 
Chapter 4). All members had to declare formally that they accepted these principles. 
Its sense of independence from the Conservative Party did not prevent it from 
campaigning on its behalf at elections and, in its earlier years, it was a vehicle for its 
unenfranchised women members to express actively their interest in politics.
11
 The 
League offered its members a mixture of social activities, such as garden parties and 
lantern slide lectures, and politics; the latter is exemplified by its instruction in 1886 
that members should whole-heartedly support parliamentary candidates who sought 
the unity of the Empire.
12
 The year is significant because the question of Home Rule 
for Ireland galvanised the League and came at the beginning of six years of rapid 
growth in membership. The ‘Irish issue [also] awakened an interest in the Empire as 
a whole’.13 The League, however, tempered its politics: although they formed part of 
local activities, ‘detailed policies were simply regarded as out of bounds’.14 The 
League, nevertheless, was social and political. It was an effective populariser of 
imperial sentiment across all classes in a way that made it more an imperial interest 
group than a pressure group, and was echoed by the Junior Imperial League in the 
inter-war years, a time when the Primrose League had entered decline.  
 
The Imperial Federation League was a strongly political imperial pressure 
group with a highly specialised imperial purpose but, unlike the RCI and the 
Primrose League, it was short-lived: founded in 1884, it disbanded less than ten 
years later. Although led initially by a Liberal MP, W.E. Forster, it was 
predominantly Conservative and supported by aristocrats and members of the 
political elite such as W.H. Smith MP, Sir Henry Holland MP and Lord Rosebery, it 
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did not engage effectively with working-class people
15
 but it sought, by drawing on 
‘the support of men of all political parties’, ‘to secure by Federation the permanent 
unity of the Empire’.16 Seventy MPs sat on its general committee in 1886. Although 
it did not explicitly explain what it meant by ‘Empire’, it is clear that this was not 
simply the ‘white’ Dominions; branches were set up Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Barbados and Gibraltar as well as in Cape Town, Montreal, Christchurch, Melbourne 
and elsewhere.
17
 To bring about this integrated governance of the Empire, the 
League campaigned for regular imperial conferences (‘a Council of the Empire’); the 
integration of imperial foreign policy and the common defence of the Empire; and 
the introduction an imperial tariff. Its policies were, however, incoherent
18
 and it was 
content that, in the words of Lord Carnarvon, speaking at a meeting of the City 
branch of the IFL in November 1889, it ‘had always acted wisely in formulating no 
form of scheme [for Imperial federation]’.19 Since 1887 the League had been unable 
to reach an internal consensus ‘over the question whether federation should be a 
matter primarily of trade or defence’.20 Nevertheless, a report attempting to deal with 
these questions was laid before Gladstone in 1893. He rejected it. This was a second 
prime ministerial rebuff; Salisbury had argued in 1891 that a conference of the self-
governing colonies, proposed by the League, would be inappropriate without a clear 
purpose and this dual failure caused an existential review. In November 1893 a 
meeting of members voted to bring the operations of the central Council of the 
League to a close.
21
 Some, however, did not see it as the end of their involvement in 
organised imperial activism; federation may have been elusive, but trade and defence 
remained practical issues of imperial importance.  
 
Two organisations emerged directly from the demise of the IFL: the Imperial 
Federation (Defence) Committee in 1894 and the British Empire League a year later. 
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The Committee was ‘a rather small’ organisation22 whose ‘ultimate object’ was ‘the 
permanent unity of the British Empire by means of Federation’.23 It sought to pursue 
this by distributing pamphlets and lobbying government ministers on matters of 
imperial defence: naval; and subsequently, at the beginning of the South African war 
in 1900, military. It eschewed any interest in fiscal policy; it believed that the 
federation of defence was sufficient to lead to unification of the Empire, by which it 
meant the self-governing colonies. By 1904, the Committee believed that it was ‘a 
fair way to attain[ing]’ its purpose and that ‘the need for pressure no longer existed’. 
In 1908, largely through the initiative of its Honorary Secretary, Howard d’Egville, it 
therefore ‘thought fit…to change its name to the Imperial Cooperation League and 
somewhat to alter its scope and activities’.24 This decision can be understood in the 
context of the incoherent diversity of ideas about how imperial federalism was to be 
achieved and how various groups of imperial activists sought to organise themselves. 
As Duncan Bell has observed, ‘[m]ost contemporaries viewed the movement for 
imperial federation as a failure…and it…divided among competing interest 
groups’.25 Indeed some individuals associated with the Imperial Federation 
(Defence) Committee even took the view that a formal organisation was undesirable. 
Thus Frederick Pollock, seeking in 1904 to revive the work of the Imperial 
Federation League along ‘more practical lines’, argued that neither the Committee, 
nor the British Empire League, nor the Royal Colonial Institute were capable of 
doing so. It was more effective, he argued, not to create a formal organisation at all 
with ‘rules or even a name’.26  His informal group pursued the idea of a consultative 
Imperial Council of representatives of the self-governing colonies supported by a 
permanent secretariat. It promulgated these ideas in a number of letters to The Times 
and included among its members the Duke of Devonshire, the Duke of Rutland, the 
Earl of Lytton, Lord Milner, Lord Avebury, Sir Charles Trevelyan, A.V. Dicey and 
Gilbert Parker, chairman of the Imperial South Africa Association. Thus the group 
can be described as an informal gathering of influential aristocratic and upper-class 
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men desirous of the greater constitutional cohesion of Britain and the self-governing 
colonies. 
 
Avebury and the Duke of Devonshire were also leading figures in the 
creation of the British Empire League in 1894 out of the City of London branch of 
the defunct Imperial Federation League and it continued to exist until it merged with 
the Empire Industries Association in 1947. Its purpose was to seek imperial unity in 
a ‘less ambitious’ way than the Imperial Federation League.27 This meant that it was 
more interested in promoting imperial trade (throughout the Empire, not simply the 
self-governing colonies), and in co-ordinating defence, than in constitutional issues. 
It sought to inform and educate the public mind and it was open to ‘the support of 
men of all shades of political opinion throughout the Empire’.28 The early leadership 
of the League was aristocratic, strongly political, entirely male and remained so into 
the 1930s. In 1936 under the presidency of the Duke of Devonshire and 
chairmanship of the Earl of Stradebroke, the League’s vice-presidents included 
dukes, earls, marquesses, maharajahs and leading commoners such as Winston 
Churchill, Lloyd George, Austen Chamberlain, Jan Smuts and L.S. Amery. The 
council and executive committee were largely made up of knights and military men 
alongside agents-general and high commissioners of the settler colonies. This elite 
membership, with its royal patronage, used prominent national venues to signify its 
status: its first official meeting was held at the Mansion House and presided over by 
the Lord Mayor; and the inaugural banquet for its social arm, the British Empire 
Club in St. James’s Square, was held at the Guildhall in July 1909.  
 
The United Empire Trade League (UETL) drew its membership from those 
in the Imperial Federation League who believed in imperial preference leading to 
‘commercial union within the empire’.29  Founded in February 1891, before the 
demise of the Imperial Federation League, it is further evidence of how divided were 
those who campaigned for some form of imperial federation. The two principal 
founders of the UETL were Tory MPs. James Lowther, a cousin of the fifth earl of 
Lonsdale and ‘a rare survival of old toryism’ was chairman; and Howard Vincent, 
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later in 1895, chairman of the National Union of Conservative Associations, was 
honorary secretary. There was a strong political flavour to the League and its 
leadership was upper class though it seems not to have had the same degree of 
aristocratic support as the British Empire League. The United Empire Trade League 
argued for a policy of imperial autarky and that by achieving it, it would ‘have gone 
a long way towards federation’, according to Sir Thomas M’Ilwaith, Chief Secretary 
of Queensland.
30
 Sir Thomas was one of about 300 members, of the total 
membership of over 5000, who served in the legislatures of various parts of the 
Empire, according to Lowther, speaking at the League’s annual meeting in 1892.  
 
The Imperial South African Association (ISAA) was founded in 1896 at, 
according to George Wyndham, his house in London ‘by five gentlemen’31, one of 
whom was Dr Jameson.  It was firmly placed ‘in the first days of Lord Milner’s 
labour in South Africa as High Commissioner’, its President, the Duke of 
Westminster, explained at the Association’s annual general meeting in 1908.32 
‘Everyone present’, the Duke declared to cheers, ‘[is] a faithful supporter of 
[Milner’s] work in South Africa’. These references to Milner capture the 
fundamental ethos of the association. As Andrew Thompson succinctly observes, 
‘the ISAA was Milner’s organisation’ whose ‘leading figures… revered [him]’.33 
Those leaders included Lord Windsor (later the earl of Plymouth and a founder 
member of the Junior Imperial League), the duke of Marlborough, Lord Lovat, Lord 
Winterton MP and several other MPs and knights. The Association was aristocratic, 
upper-class and political. Although it claimed to be ‘non-party’34, its General 
Council in the period 1895 to 1905, contained forty-six Conservative MPs, ten 
Liberal Unionists and only one Liberal MP. It was also active in campaigning 




The ISAA’s stated purpose was ‘to maintain British supremacy, and promote 
good government in the various Colonies of South Africa, with the view to the 
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establishment of a Dominion of South Africa under the British flag’.36 This closely 
echoed the primary principle of the South Africa League, founded in the Cape 
Colony in the same year as the ISAA, that  ‘[t]his League affirms most strongly its 
unalterable resolve to support the existing supremacy of Great Britain in South 
Africa’.  Indeed, the Manchester Guardian, in an editorial in June 1900, described 
the ISAA as ‘virtually the English branch of the South Africa League’.  
 
It promulgated its policies by producing leaflets and pamphlets explaining to 
the British public what was happening in South Africa and thus seeking its support 
for their kith and kin in South Africa. Ten and a half million were distributed 
between 1896 and 1908 and during the same period, the ISAA  held 2,200 meetings, 
in the local branches of political parties and in working men’s clubs throughout the 
country, attended by over a million people.
37
 This self-proclaimed level of activity 
contradicts Thompson’s description of the ISAA as an inconspicuous pressure group, 
even if it did not have a large membership.
38
 Whatever its size or popularity may 
have been,  the distribution of large amounts of information, through either the 
written or spoken word, did not necessarily mean that it was effective propaganda. 
However, the Association, at least in its own estimation, believed that its principal 
imperial objective had been achieved. Thus in June 1910, at its last annual general 
meeting, a resolution was passed ‘winding up the Association in view of the 
accomplishment of the aims for which it had laboured culminating in the unification 
of South Africa’.39 
 
The Victoria League, like the ISAA, had origins in an imperialist response to 
the situation in South Africa at the turn of the century but it was very different from 
it in several respects. Not least, after initially concentrating on the social 
consequences in South Africa of the Boer war, it was interested in all the self-
governing colonies, not just South Africa. Its activities were mainly about social 
welfare, hospitality and education, not the federal governance matters in South 
Africa that monopolised the ISAA’s activities. In addition, it was, notwithstanding 
                                                 
36
 Letter from Duke of Westminster, president, and Gilbert Parker, chairman, The Times, 29 
December 1905. 
37
 Speech by George Wyndham reported in The Times, 22 May 1908; letter from Duke of 
Westminster, president, and Gilbert Parker, chairman to The Times, 29 December 1905. 
38
 Thompson, ‘Thinking Imperially?’, p. 64. 
39
 Manchester Guardian, 16 June 1910. 
35 
 
the substantial presence of women in the Primrose League, the only imperial interest 
group in the Victorian and Edwardian period that was ‘predominantly female’.40 It 
was founded in May 1901 by twenty-five women who ‘represented Britain’s social 
and political elite’ and its ‘first committee was composed solely of women’.41 
Membership, however, was open equally to men and women, in contrast to the 
League’s associated organisations (also founded in 1901), the Daughters of the 
Empire, in Canada, and the Guild of Loyal Women, in South Africa. Membership 
grew from 148 at the outset, to 6,500 by 1915 but in spite of efforts to recruit 




The League claimed to be non-party in pursuing its purposes but, according 
to Riedi, whereas it avoided close association with the Tories,
43
 it was political 
because it promoted ‘Milnerite imperialism’.44 However, arguably it was not 
political in the same sense as the contemporaneous groups discussed in this chapter 
who actively campaigned for changes in imperial governance, trade or defence. The 
League did not assert itself politically in the way that these groups did. It was 
‘social’ to an extent because it founded the Ladies’ Empire Club in London (with 
1050 members in 1915)
45
 but perhaps the word that describes its ethos best is 
‘charitable’, at least during the Edwardian period, if not thereafter. Thus, it had an 
education committee, a hospitality committee to welcome overseas visitors to 
Britain, and raised funds to help families affected by the Boer war and for the 
maintenance of war graves in South Africa. Eliza Riedi captures the nature of these 
activities of the League by describing its imperialism as relying on the ‘organisation 
of sentiment’.46 This sentiment, however, related almost entirely to ‘kith and kin’ 
because, like many other imperial groups, its main emphasis was on the self-
governing colonies, not on the totality of the British Empire and, in particular, it 
found it difficult to include even a major component of the Empire, India, in its 
purview.  
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The League of the Empire, like the Victoria League, had female origins and 
governance. It was sufficiently complementary and similar to the Victoria League 
that it entered into negotiations, early in 1908, to merge the two organisations but 
these collapsed, with some acrimony, the following year because of irreconcilable 
differences over governance. The League was established in 1901 by Mrs Ord 
Marshall, the widow of a senior civil servant. She was the League’s honorary 
secretary from its inception until her death in 1931 and its ‘guiding spirit and 
indefatigable organiser… entirely’ responsible for its success, according to her 
obituarist in The Times.
47
 The purpose of the League arose from a belief that there 
was a strong link ‘between educational reform and the survival of the British 
Empire’.48 Thus the League aimed to develop, through educational relationships, an 
active interest in the Empire in young people especially in Britain and the 
Dominions. In doing so, the League became ‘a private Society with a semi-official 
standing’ according to Professor Albert Pollard.49 By 1915 the League had, 
according to its president, Frederick Pollock (formerly of the IFL), ‘flourishing 
branches throughout the Empire numbering in some cases a membership of many 
thousands’.50 A major achievement was to initiate, in 1907, a series of conferences 
attended by representatives of educational departments from the Dominions and 
colonies. At the conference it was agreed to hold such meetings every four years and, 
accordingly, a conference in 1911 was convened by the British government. After 
the First World War, when the League fully resumed its activities, the emphasis 
moved from government education departments to teachers from various parts of the 
Empire and they met at conferences in 1921, 1924, 1926 and 1928. The League also 
arranged a scheme of reciprocal exchanges of teachers and supplied materials for 
illustrated lectures to ‘a great number of schools’.  Although the League planned to 
engage with elementary schools, it appears to have had a stronger relationship with 
public schools in England including Winchester, Haileybury, Sherborne, Repton, 
Rugby and Tonbridge. This perhaps shows a bias towards an upper middle-class 
ethos, although some of its events were presided over by peers such as Lord Grey 
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and Lord Strathcona, and it included Meath, Curzon and Selborne among its vice-
presidents thus providing it with aristocratic endorsement. There was, however, a 
popular aspect of the League of the Empire: it was closely involved in organising the 
celebration of Empire Day, an idea first mooted in 1894 by Thomas Robinson, a 
member of the Royal Colonial Institute living in Canada, 
51
 which was subsequently 
pursued by Lord Meath and his Empire Day Movement which he founded, several 




From its inception, until 1913, Meath ran the organisation without a 
committee because he believed that the organisation would work more efficiently 
under his single-handed direction. 
53
 Meath stood down from overall leadership in 
1921 and it passed successively to various upper-class or aristocratic men including  
Sir Lawrence Wallace, Lt-Col. Sir William Wayland, Lord Jellicoe and Earl 
Beatty
54
. Meath’s main aim was to get official recognition of Empire Day in Britain 
‘by fixing one day of the year in which the attention of all men, women and children’ 
could be focussed on ‘the importance of acquiring a thorough knowledge of…the 
great Empire to which they belonged’55  thus fostering ‘a justifiable and heartfelt 
love of the Empire’.56 Particular emphasis was laid on doing so in schools and 
colleges. The movement grew substantially: in 1905 ‘6000 schools throughout the 
Empire were said to have participated’ in observing Empire Day and by 1922 this 
had ‘grown to 80,000’57. Although the annual celebration was extensive it is, 
however, less clear how many subscribing members there were in the Movement 
during this period.  From 1922 until 1945 the Empire Day Movement was affiliated 
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The Tariff Reform League (TRL) was a highly political imperial pressure 
group which placed great emphasis on electoral activities as a means of campaigning 
for ending Britain’s free trade policy and introducing tariffs on foreign imports in 
order to facilitate imperial preference. It claimed to be a non-party organisation but 
was closely associated with the Unionist party and caused divisions within it. 
According to Anne Summers the League was founded in July 1903 by Joseph 
Chamberlain
59
 but W.E. Dowding’s version of events disagrees with this. The TRL’s 
origins, he has argued, lie in a meeting, on 14 May 1903 at the House of Commons, 
that founded the Protection League, subsequently renamed in the course of the next 
few weeks, first to the Imperial Tariff League, and then to the Tariff Reform 
League.
60
 Motivated, coincidentally, by Chamberlain’s Birmingham speech the 
following day in which he expressed ideas that matched those of the new 
organisation, members of the League contacted him. In September 1903, Joseph 
Chamberlain, who had been Colonial Secretary since 1895, resigned the post thus 
allowing him to campaign for the League as its protagonist.  He argued for tariff 
reform as a ‘basis for [imperial] preference, and he advocated preference for imperial 
union’.61  Sydney Zebel agrees with Sykes: a ‘basic… concern [of Chamberlain was] 
with effecting closer imperial integration’.62 Specifically, according to the League’s 
mandate, tariff reform would be used ‘to consolidate and develop the resources of 
the Empire, and to defend the industries of the United Kingdom’.63  
 
The TRL’s inaugural meeting, presided over by the Duke of Sutherland, took 
place on 21 July 1903 and was well attended. A few peers and twenty-nine MPs 
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 and the social class of those attending appears to have been upper 
middle-class rather than aristocratic. The executive committee, exclusively male, had 
eleven MPs in its complement of twenty-one and only one peer, the Duke of 
Westminster.  As Thompson has observed peers were often only figureheads
65
 and 
the Duke exemplifies this.  In 1907, it was announced that there were no fewer than 
184 peers who were vice-presidents of the League, and given the plethora of vice-




The TRL had created 250 branches by 1905, 600 by 1910 and 800 by 
1913.
67
Assuming that branches had on average several hundred members
68
 (and that 
branches remained extant) this would suggest a total membership in excess of 
200,000 by 1913. A women’s section was formed and the League was eager to 
recruit working-class members.  It found this difficult; its trade union section, 
TUTRA, had ‘pretty well 10,000 members’ by November 190969 but Summers states 
that in 1910 TUTRA had only ‘31 branches and 1,000 members’.70 Even the higher 
figure is a very small proportion of the TRL’s membership and miniscule when set 
against total trade union membership of 2,477,000 in 1910.
71
 Perhaps Lord Hardinge 
was right when he told a TRL meeting in 1905 that ‘the only way to get hold of the 
working man was to hold entertainments in public-houses’.72  
 
In its early years the TRL was strong financially; the secretary, T. W. A. 
Bagley, ‘estimated that nearly £160,000 had been received in subscriptions and 
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donations over the period 1903-10’73 but income declined sharply from 1911. In 
October 1922, a statement announcing the closure of the TRL, whilst claiming that 
the principles of the TRL had received ‘definite expression’ in recent government 
budgets and legislation, stated that there was a lack of funds to continue the work of 
campaigning for a broader policy of imperial trade and consolidation. Fortunately, a 
recently formed organisation, the Empire Development Union, was better able to 





Within the chronological survey of imperial activist groups that forms the 
structure of this chapter, the next group is the Junior Imperial and Constitutional 
League, the beginnings of which occurred in 1905 when the debate about tariff 
reform was in full spate. Those who assembled to decide the purpose of the League 
drew inspiration from Joseph Chamberlain, as will be seen in Chapter 2. Chapters 3 
and 4 discuss the League in detail and place it within the context and characteristics 
of imperial interest groups in general. Detailed comment on the League is therefore 
deferred until then but the League will be set in the general context of imperial 
interest groups towards the end of this chapter. 
 
The Round Table and its eponymous quarterly publication were created by a 
closely-knit group of about fifteen young men, collectively known as ‘the 
Kindergarten’, all alumni of public schools and Oxford, who worked with Lord 
Milner in South Africa and subsequently in London.  The founders were exclusively 
peers and upper-middle class men. One member of the Kindergarten, Lionel Curtis, 
had played a significant role in bringing about the unification of South Africa by 
drafting the Selborne memorandum, a catalyst for the unification of South Africa in 
1910. Curtis had already expressed the view, three years earlier to Lord Selborne, 
that the unification of South Africa could be seen as a microcosm of the unification 
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of the self-governing Dominions. Supported by Milner, Curtis was able to arrange 
the meeting in September 1909 that inaugurated the Round Table movement for 
imperial unity and appointed him its general secretary. It was attended by several 
members of the Kindergarten and by a number of peers: Milner, Lovat, Howick and 
Wolmer. Although soon augmented by others such as Leo Amery, Edward Grigg, 
John Buchan, Arthur Steel-Maitland and Waldorf Astor,
75
 the ‘core of the group 
remained, until the Second World War, the Kindergarten’.76  
 
This long period of continuity of the founders’ involvement is perhaps the 
reason for what May has called their tenacity ‘in clinging to the idea of Imperial or 
Commonwealth unity’.77 What this meant was never clearly defined.  Hodson, who 
edited The Round Table from 1934, recalled in 1981 that the ‘master theme…was the 
imperative need for a central authority to conduct foreign policy and defence of the 
whole Empire in which the self-governing Dominions would play a full democratic 
part’. The founders, however, he believed, ‘were never corporately committed to it in 
any precise way’ and would rather develop their ideas privately at their meetings 
(which they referred to as the Moot) than discuss them publicly.
78
 Consistent with 
this was their plan to publish a quarterly journal which would have a ‘small elite 
circulation among influential people’ whilst not ‘advocating any definite plan of 
imperial union’.79 It would be wrong, however, to over-emphasise the reticent elitism 
of the group. The young historian Lewis Namier gave a series of lectures about the 
Empire on behalf of the Round Table to trade unionists and the Workers’ 
Educational Association and his experience contains useful evidence about working-
class awareness of the Empire. He was shocked at their ignorance which was, he 
said, ‘as complete concerning the white as the dark Empire’.80  
 
Round Table groups were founded in the Dominions in the years leading up 
to the First World War and they too had a membership drawn from ‘an elite 
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minority’ but they failed to achieve the longevity of the metropolitan group and by 
the 1930s had become largely inactive. The main group, however, persisted in the 
inter-war years in its ‘remarkably optimistic’ 81 belief that imperial unity could be 
achieved. Alex May argues that it was not until the 1940s that the ‘idea of Imperial 
unity in defence and foreign policy was …rejected’.82 After the Second World War, 
and the passing of the last surviving founder member, Robert Brand, the group’s 
publication, the Round Table, was reformed in1966, becoming a more academic 
journal that no longer pursued any particular imperial policy and it continues to be 
published to the present day.  
 
The Overseas Club, founded in 1910, and the Patriotic League of Britons 
Overseas, founded in 1914, were very similar organisations and illustrate the 
fragmentation and overlapping activities of imperial interest groups. Their merger in 




The Club was founded by Evelyn Wrench, a journalist working for Lord 
Northcliffe, whose imperial enthusiasm had been inspired by a visit to Canada in 
1906 and a subsequent tour of the Empire.  It was a resolutely non-political 
organisation that pledged, ‘as citizens of the greatest Empire in the world, to 
maintain the heritage handed down to us by our fathers’.  To do so, members were 
entreated to pursue the ‘four chief objects of the Club…to help one another; to 
render individual service to our Empire; to maintain our Empire’s supremacy upon 
the seas; to draw together in the bond of comradeship, British people the world 
over’.84 The Club saw itself as having no class distinctions; it was ‘one vast 
brotherhood of British subjects pledged to maintain our Empire’.85 Its leadership, 
however, had a substantial aristocratic element. Northcliffe was its president and he 
and Lord Grey helped with the establishment of the Club.  Vice-presidents included 
Selborne, Bryce and Meath, ubiquitous imperialists.  Most notably the king, George 
V, was patron and this royal connection was steadfastly maintained so that by July 
1931 the Prince of Wales had become its vice-patron and the duke of York its 
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president. In 1959 the Club became the Royal Overseas League and still exists at the 
time of writing. 
 
The Club operated at two levels. In its home and overseas branches, which 
were expected to meet at least monthly, banquets, concerts and patriotic 
demonstrations ‘on such occasions as Empire Day [and] the King’s birthday’ were 
held.  At a more centralised level, funds were raised during the First World War to 
supply tobacco to servicemen and also provide military equipment. By September 
1915 ‘fifteen aeroplanes [had been funded] and delivered to the Royal Flying 
Corps’.86  It was this patriotic fund-raising activity that brought together the Club 
and the Patriotic League of Britons Overseas (PLBO) to form the Overseas League.  
The PLBO, with Selborne as its chairman, aspired, as its main object, to ‘present an 
addition to the armed forces’ deciding that the ‘most suitable gift would be a war-
ship’. Those who subscribed, it was hoped, would then form a permanent society 




The extent of support for the Overseas Club is unclear because of confused 
terminology and geography. According to Evelyn Wrench, the membership of the 
Overseas Club in 1914 was only 800 but by 1931 this had grown to 45,000.
88
  Reese 
states that there were 26,000 ‘subscribers’ in 1919 and 170,000 ‘supporters’, mainly 
in the Dominions.
89
 Richard Jebb, in 1915, refers to 130,000 British subjects 
overseas as having ‘enrolled’. 90 Finally, an earlier report in United Empire speaks of 
10,000 members in foreign countries’,91 i.e. not part of the British Empire. One may 
perhaps conclude from these figures that the (subscribing) membership in Britain 
increased from a few hundred in 1914 to two or three tens of thousands by the 1930s. 
Furthermore, the interest and membership of the League was mainly, as Mackenzie 
has written,
92
 in the Dominions where there were hundreds of branches. 
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The Empire Parliamentary Association (EPA), founded in 1911, was the 
result of an initiative by members of the Imperial Cooperation League (ICL) led by 
its Honorary Secretary, Howard d’Egville, a young barrister, who became, for almost 
fifty years, the dominant force in the EPA.
93
 Inspired by the opportunity to invite 
members of parliament from the Dominions to the coronation of George V, a 
committee of members of the ICL, who were also MPs at Westminster, identified 
strong parliamentary support for the establishment of the association.  Accordingly it 
was resolved, in June 1911, to establish ‘an association …having branches in the 
United Kingdom parliament and the Parliaments of the overseas Dominions, so that 
mutual intercourse and exchange of information should be facilitated’.  The 
following month, at a conference attended by members of the parliaments of the UK 
and Dominions, it was resolved to create a ‘permanent [administrative] machinery’.94 
In the London branch, which was responsible for the overall management of the 
Association, the Lord Chancellor and Speaker were joint Presidents with Lord Grey 
as Chairman and d’Egville as Honorary Secretary. Membership was confined to 
individuals in the legislatures of Britain and the five Dominions; the rest of the 
Empire was deliberately excluded.
95
 It allowed members from the Dominions to 
enjoy parliamentary privileges; to attend Speaker’s levees; to gain entry to London 
clubs such as the Reform and Carlton; and to enjoy hospitality at lunches, teas and 
dinners when visiting London.
96
 There were reciprocal arrangements for members 
visiting the Dominions. 
 
The EPA was not, however, simply a social organisation; it had close ties 
with the UK government and received an annual grant from the Exchequer from 
1916. It saw itself as having an important role in maintaining political links within 
the Empire particularly as the governance of Dominions became increasingly 
independent of Britain in the inter-war period. Howard d’Egville remained the 
driving force of EPA during the inter-war years and was instrumental in eventually 
introducing membership to colonies with their own representative government, such 
as Malta, Southern Rhodesia, India and Ceylon, so that by 1939 there were twenty 
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branches whose representatives attended regular conferences that provided a forum 
for them to express political ideas. He remained Honorary Secretary until 1960 and 
the organisation he established still exists at the time of writing, now called the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. 
 
Howard d’Egville was also an important figure in the Empire Resources 
Development Committee (ERDC) and worked ‘unstintingly’ for it.97 The initiator, 
however, of the ERDC was Moreton Frewen, a Unionist MP and imperial federalist, 
who had been Joseph Chamberlain’s ‘most vivid apostle in the cause of tariff 
reform’.98 He organised a meeting of nineteen of his friends in October 1916, 
presided over by Milner, to which were invited a number of peers, MPs, and others, 
such as Lord Plymouth, Lord Selborne, Page Croft and Alfred Bigland, also a 
Unionist MP and tariff reformer, who later chaired the (unofficial) British Empire 
Development Parliamentary Committee which emerged from the ERDC, in July 
1920, to reinforce its work.
99
 The principal object of the ERDC was to conserve and 
develop the natural resources of the Empire in order to ‘give the [British] State an 
adequate share of the proceeds’.100 These proceeds were to be used to help reduce 
the British War Debt. Although, in principle, the interests of the ERDC ranged over 
the entire Empire, it concentrated its attention on Canada, Southern Africa and West 





The Parliamentary Committee claimed a membership of 216 MPs and 
therefore, according to Bigland, was ‘able to create an atmosphere in the House on 
all Empire questions which gave confidence to the Government’.102 It worked on 
proposals in a number of imperial economic areas and made proposals to 
Government ministers but little came of them. As Bigland observed in 1926: ‘the 
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numerous discussions which took place during the three years our Committee was at 
work did not show any great results…’.103 
 
The British Commonwealth Union (BCU) was initially dedicated to tariff 
reform. It was established in December 1916 and, like the ERDC, had a specific 
policy of attempting to gain, in pursuit of its objectives, the sustained support of 
imperially-minded MPs. It had the ‘avowed purpose of promoting “a powerful 
Industrial Party in the House of Commons”‘104 and exemplifies what Andrew 
Marrison has described as the increasing involvement of businessmen in parliament 
in a general way rather than in a  manner that addressed a particular industrial sector, 
such as coal-mining or the railways.  The BCU sought ‘a monopoly of business-
government communication’.105 Its founder members were eight senior businessmen, 
acting as private individuals and not as representatives of their companies, and the 
Conservative MP for Hammersmith, Sir William Bull, who were dissatisfied with 
the non-political policy of the Federation of British Industry. Initially the group 
called themselves the London Imperialists, confining their campaign to London 
parliamentary constituencies, and sought, but failed to gain, the cooperation of the 
FBI because the latter did not wish to be seen ‘[tak]ing direct Parliamentary action in 
its corporate capacity’ .106 However, by June 1917, even though the interests of the 
group widened beyond London, membership was still only about twenty mainly 
comprising men who were also members of the FBI. The group decided to call itself 
the Industrial and Agricultural Legislative Union and a constitution was agreed: 
 
To endeavour, by Parliamentary action, to safeguard and promote the agricultural and industrial 
interests and adequate defences of the British Empire…To promote and develop the natural and 
commercial resources of the Empire, and the close association among all British Dominions and 
Dependencies…To encourage by all possible means the trade of the Empire. 
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Having failed to gain the support of the FBI, the BCU sought closer ties with 
other organisations including, for example, the Engineering Employers’ Federation 
(EEF), the Shipbuilding Federation and the British Workers’ National League (who 
were also active in supporting the ERDC).
107
  Financial support was received from 
Dudley Docker, a Birmingham industrialist and tariff reformer who founded the 
Federation of British Industries in 1916. In June 1918, by now calling itself the 
British Commonwealth Union, the organisation created a complete governance 
structure and Patrick Hannon
108
 was appointed its general secretary. The Union now 
addressed its main purpose: to secure the election of a group of MPs that would 
argue for tariff reform. Andrew Marrison, however, has shown that the new 
structure, with its influx of fresh leadership, led to an ‘equivocal, ambivalent and 
essentially limited approach to Tariff Reform’.109     
 
The BCU participated in the general election in December 1918 by selecting 
and financing parliamentary candidates, recruiting political organisers and 
employing paid speakers to support them. According to Turner, the BCU claimed to 
support twenty-four candidates
110
 of which eighteen were elected but, he states, ‘it is 
difficult to assess the effectiveness of the BCU’.111 Whether or not the BCU was 
effective, there was, according to its own evaluation, a significant minority of MPs 
supporting its policies. Hannon declared in May 1919 that ‘there is today an 
Industrial Group…comprising in its definite membership one tenth of the House’.112 
Nevertheless, the BCU did not prevail for long as an independent body; by 1926 the 
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BCU had been absorbed in the newly-formed Empire Industries Association.
113
 Its 
weakening support for Tariff Reform and imperial preference, its adoption of 
aggressive anti-labour policies and its narrow industrial focus had brought about a 




The British Empire Union (BEU), founded in April 1915, survived much 
longer, until after the Second World War and long enough to change its name to the 
British Commonwealth Union (perhaps confusingly).
115
 Its original name was the 
Anti-German Union (with no connection to the Anti-German League) but in March 
1916 it decided to call itself the British Empire Union in order to be ‘more 
expressive of its greatly enlarged aims and activity’. It had now become ‘national 
and imperial’116 and aimed to develop a ‘spirit of British nationalism based on a 
patriotism which recognised the ideals of this great Empire’.117 ‘The Union’, it 
declared, ‘has for its objects the Consolidation of the British Empire, the 
development of Trade and Commerce within the Empire and with our allies, and the 
elimination of German influence from our political, financial and social life’.  
 
Despite this broadened remit, its early propaganda concentrated extensively 
and virulently on anti-German and anti-alien themes. Thus, for example, 
immediately after the Versailles settlement it described Germans, in its monthly 
publication, as ‘a nation of savages, thieves, liars, and murderers, unworthy of 
intercourse with civilised people’.118 In domestic politics, it called for ‘British work 
for British people’ and campaigned in support of the Aliens Bill that was essential, it 
believed, ‘for dealing with the alien from within’.119  
 
The BEU was unrealistically ambitious in its membership targets, declaring 
that 100,000 would bring ‘influence’ and five million, ‘success’. By 1917 it had 
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thirty-seven branches, predominantly in London and the south-east, but also in 
Belfast, Edinburgh, Manchester and Harrogate. A few branches occasionally 
reported membership numbers in the Monthly Record and, although growth in 
numbers was sometimes rapid, they suggest that typical branch membership was in 
the hundreds. It seems unlikely, therefore, that in 1919 the total membership of the 
BEU was more than about 20,000.
120
 The Union was, however, ‘throughout its 
existence…supported by a…number of corporate members’121 (twenty-seven are 
listed in a display advertisement in The Times
122
 and ‘at least fifty’ in annual reports) 





Although there is some evidence that the Union had working-class 
members
124
, it was, like many imperial interest groups, led by an elite. The prime 
ministers of Australia, New Zealand and Newfoundland were patrons and Lord Leith 
of Fyvie, a politically obscure, landed, Scottish peer with connections to the Navy 
League, TRL and the Empire Day Movement, was the president. The forty vice-
presidents included four Conservative and Unionist MPs but most were peers or 
senior army officers. The thirteen-strong executive committee, however, was without 
rank or title with the exception of Lady Leith, Sir John Harrington and, as its 
chairman, Lt-Col. Sir Mervyn Manningham-Buller, a grandson of the Earl of 
Leicester.
125
 The elitist content of the Union continued during the inter-war years 
and was perhaps even grander: the Duke of Grafton, Lord Carson, the Earl of 




The specific objects of the BEU included imperial preference and the use of 
domestic fiscal policy to facilitate trade and commerce with the Dominions but 
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despite this it does not appear initially to have vigorously pursued imperial issues. In 
April 1918, H.S.A. Foy, the acting honorary treasurer wrote that the British Empire 
Union did not really deserve its name.
127
 Over time, however, anti-German rhetoric 
was replaced by imperial propaganda. Mackenzie has described the content of the 
latter in the inter-war years: for example, the importance of imperial trade; wider 
acceptance of Empire Day; the teaching of the history of the Empire in schools; and 
the encouragement of emigration to the Empire.  Its belief in the importance to 




The BEU continued to be active after the Second World War and was 
conservative in its outlook. As the Empire continued its transformation into the 
Commonwealth, it campaigned against the change of name of Empire Day to 
Commonwealth Day
129
 and yet such change was inevitable; the Union itself replaced 
‘Empire’ in its name with ‘Commonwealth’ in 1960.  The British Commonwealth 
Union was probably wound up in, or shortly after, 1967.
130
 Thus ended the existence 
of one of the most long-lived and right-wing imperial interest groups, variously 
labelled by historians as ‘extremist’, ‘ultra-nationalist’ and ‘a British radical right 
group’.131 
 
John Mackenzie refers to women who formed activist groups in the early 
twentieth century in order to pursue ‘class conciliation through an emphasis on 
patriotic and imperial concerns’ and specifically to one such feminist group, the 
Women’s Guild of Empire, which was founded, ‘about the time of the First World 
War’.132  It grew to ‘40,000 members in more than thirty branches at its peak in 
1925’.133  Flora Drummond and Elsie Bowerman, former suffragettes, initiated the 
                                                 
127
 British Empire Union Monthly Record, 2 (April 1918), 55.  
128
 Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire, p. 157. 
129
 The Times, 24 May 1958. 
130
 DANGO asserts that the records of the BEU have been lost but lists details of them taken from 
Chris Cook, Sources in British Political History 1900-1951, Vol. 1 (London, 1975), which show 1967 
as the last recorded date of an AGM .  
131
 By, respectively: J. O. Springhall, ‘Lord Meath, Youth, and Empire’; David Cesarani, ‘The Anti-
Jewish Career of Sir William Joynson-Hicks, Cabinet Minister’,  Journal of Contemporary History, 
24 (July 1989), 461-482 (p. 465); Stephen Cullen, ‘Four Women for Mosley: Women in the British 
Union of Fascists, 1932-1940’, Oral History, 24 (Spring 1996), 49-59 (p. 58). 
132
 Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire, p. 159. 
133
 ODNB, entry for Flora Drummond. 
51 
 
movement. It was pro-Conservative and anti-fascist
134
 and is particularly of interest 
in the context of this chapter because it unambiguously shows that working–class 
people were interested in the Empire. Drummond and Bowerman were themselves 
working-class and their organisation sought to bring ‘a sense of patriotism to 
working-class women’.135 The Guild’s imperialism was the medium through which it 
expressed its feminism. Although little is known of its activities, one campaign is 
recorded in which it fought to make uniform throughout the Empire, legislation 
defining the nationality of British women who married aliens, thus demonstrating 
what one historian has argued to be an example of ‘[a]ctivist women creat[ing] a 
collective identity and common cause grounded in their membership in the 
Empire’.136 The Guild had, according to Mackenzie, ‘a general belief in the role of 
the Empire in British domestic affairs’.137 
 
The Empire Development Union (EDU) emerged in July 1922
138
 but it was a 
short-lived organisation which was absorbed by the newly-established Empire 
Industries Association in 1925. The creators of the EDU were W.A.S. Hewins, 
acting chairman of the TRL when it was dissolved in October 1922, and Sir Vincent 
Caillard, president of the FBI in 1919 and of the Tariff Commission in 1920. Their 
initial idea of a merger with the BCU and TRL was unsuccessful. Marrison has 
suggested that the EDU’s policy on tariff reform was more slanted towards an 
imperial view rather than the BCU’s domestic emphasis of the issue.139 Although 
Marrison does not say so, this difference may have been a contributory factor to the 
breakdown of merger talks. In any case, the failure caused them to the form their 
own organisation, the EDU. Lord Long, a former Conservative MP and Secretary of 
State for the Colonies (1916-18), was appointed its president.  
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The principal aim of the EDU was ‘the promotion of trade relations of the 
United Kingdom within the Empire’ and it was inspired by resolutions passed at the 
Imperial Conferences of 1917 and 1918 which the leaders of the EDU summarised in 
a statement made in July 1922: 
 
 ‘the British Empire must approach the [economic] problem with a united mind…[including] the 
development of Empire resources by joint action, the organisation of supplies of raw materials, the 





In common with almost all imperial activist groups, an early and vital task 
for the EDU was the raising of funds to finance its activities. To do so, the Union 
approached a number of titled individuals and leading, imperially-minded, 
businessmen for donations, offering them membership of a mooted Council. The 
response was poor and Marrison suggests that this was because ‘the accession of 
Labour destroyed any immediate prospect of extended [imperial] preference’.141 The 
ability of the EDU to promulgate its propaganda was thus severely hampered and it 
relied heavily on the Beaverbrook press. Its membership remained tiny and its 
meetings were attended only by its few founder members. Like the BCU, the EDU 
was absorbed by the Empire Industries Association (EIA).  
 
The origins of the EIA are traced by Henry Page Croft to a meeting attended 
by Lord Milner, Leo Amery, Neville Chamberlain and their supporters, shortly after 
the defeat of the Conservative government at the general election of December 1923, 
a rejection by the electorate of Baldwin’s argument that tariffs should be introduced 
to protect the domestic market. Their intention was ‘to [form] an organisation for 
educating the country on the subjects of protection and imperial preference’142and 
thus ‘maintain the momentum of Tariff Reform in the aftermath of Baldwin’s 
election defeat’.143 There was little momentum initially, however. Although W.A.S. 
Hewins worked in the background compiling statistics for the use of industrialists 
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sympathetic to the cause of tariff reform, there was little conspicuous progress until 
the appointment of a provisional executive committee in July 1925. The committee 
was chaired by Lord Hunsdon, a city businessman and chairman of the City of 
London Conservative Association. In deciding on its policies, two important issues 
were considered by the committee; the relative emphases to be placed on 
safeguarding of industry and imperial preference; and, more controversially, how to 
gain the support of socialists. To this latter end, four Labour politicians were 




Several months of discussion in the committee failed to reconcile differences 
between the Tory and socialist views of what the Association should be trying to 
achieve and in April 1926 the Labour members withdrew. Marrison has summarised 
the situation: ‘[t]he Unionist members…insisted that the introduction of tariffs and 
preference must form the “principal plank” of EIA policy’. Even if the Labour 
members of the committee accepted this, however, they ‘could not hope to gain any 
volume of support from the Labour party’.145 Page Croft, a Conservative MP with an 
‘unflagging zeal for and faith in the British imperial heritage’,146 thought the whole 
process had been a waste of time and, with the socialists now gone, in July 1926 he 
agreed to become chairman of the Association on condition that there should be no 
further negotiations with the socialists and that he had ‘a free hand to undertake 
propaganda at once on the widest possible scale’147. The appointment of a council 
followed in October.  
 
The EIA lacked financial strength and its membership appears to have been 
narrowly based with only a small number of individuals and companies providing 
funding for its activities. We can, however, obtain some idea of the social nature of 
the Association from the membership of its council. The leadership of the EIA in the 
1920s appears to have been predominantly upper middle-class; Marrison describes 
the EIA council as comprising ‘landowners, statesmen, and imperialists among 
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whom lesser and provincial industrialists might feel uneasy’. It also included 




Using his experience with the Tariff Reform League, Page Croft eschewed 
the setting up of an expensive network of branches. Instead he created a group of 
trained speakers and persuaded kindred organisations, such as Conservative Party 
Associations, the Junior Imperial League and the Primrose League, to allow them to 
speak at their meetings. Page Croft claims that they spoke at many hundreds of 
meetings a year, reaching the impressive number of almost 3,000 in the year leading 
up to the general election in October 1931.
149
 The EIA’s propaganda was also 
disseminated widely by its press and publicity department and by a weekly news 
service. In 1929, for example, the EIA issued four million pamphlets and also 
received ‘extensive press coverage’.150 In addition to its propaganda activities the 
EIA sought the support of the National Union of Conservative and Unionist 
Associations by proposing policies at its annual conferences. Thus in 1929, for 
example, the conference accepted an EIA resolution that ‘our leaders shall place the 
policy of Empire development…in the forefront of the Party programme’151. The 
EIA saw that influencing Conservative policy in this way was essential, but ‘by far’, 
the most important aim of the EIA was to recruit to its cause Conservative members 
of the House of Commons and prospective parliamentary candidates. According to 
Page Croft, ‘[o]ver 280 Back Bench members of the Conservative Party belonged to 
the EIA in the 1924-29 Parliament’, a very high proportion.152 This success was a 
fulfilment of the expectation that the inability of the Association to work with 
Labour would mean that the EIA and the Conservative Party were linked by an 
‘umbilical cord’.153 This relationship, however, was not unique: the Junior Imperial 
League was similarly connected to the Conservative Party.  
 
In 1932 the EIA saw, at last, the introduction of a tariff and thus, although it 
is difficult to assess the contribution it had made, it can still be reasonably described 
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by Marrison as ‘arguably the most successful pressure group in the history of tariff 
reform’154. The EIA continued to exist until well after the Second World War and 
campaigned in the 1960s against Britain joining the Common Market and for 
expansion of trade with the Commonwealth, led by Tory parliamentarians such as 
Derek Walker-Smith, Robin Turton and John Biggs-Davison. It amalgamated with 
the British Empire League in 1947, changed its name to Commonwealth Industries 
Association in 1958, and was wound up in 1976, four years after Britain’s entry into 
the European Economic Community, after the last of the major imperialist activists’ 
themes of the twentieth century, imperial preference, had finally withered. It was a 
theme that had reached its apotheosis in the early 1930s and to which Lord 
Beaverbrook made a notable contribution when he launched his Empire Crusade in 
June 1929.  
 
Beaverbrook’s crusade sought imperial unity through a protectionist policy 
that he called ‘Empire Free Trade’. This was defined, in an advertisement in national 
newspapers in December 1929, as  
 
‘[t]o develop the industries and resources of all parts of the British Empire to the fullest 
extent, and for that purpose to make of the Empire a single economic unit, removing as far as possible 
all obstacles of Freedom of Trade between its constituent parts…To erect such Tariffs between the 




The advertisement also called upon members of the public to register their 
names and addresses if they supported the campaign. No subscription was called for. 
Within a few weeks 250,000 ‘founder members’ had enrolled and in February 1930 
the lists were closed. 
 
According to Gossel the Executive Committee in December 1929 included 
Beaverbrook, Patrick Hannon, Viscount Elibank, C.A. McCurdy, R.D. Blumenfield, 
Lord Melchett and Sir Hugh Cunliffe-Owen.
156
 By March 1930 Melchett, 
Blumenfield and even Beaverbrook were no longer members of the Committee and 
had been replaced by Lord Islington, Lord Lovat, J.R. Remer MP, Col. Grant 
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 suggesting some fluidity in the early leadership of the 
Crusade. It was Beaverbrook, however, who was the driving force: ‘[f]rom the first 
[he] alone provided the drive and organisation’ in his ‘one-man campaign’158 and 
‘made all the decisions himself’.159He was also energetic in conveying the message 
of the Crusade by making speeches frequently and publicising them in his 
newspaper, the Daily Express. Further propaganda was distributed in October 1929 
in the form of 275,000 copies of a pamphlet, Empire Free Trade. 
 
Beaverbrook sought to persuade Baldwin of the merits of his campaign and 
to gain his acceptance of a common imperial trade policy. He wanted Baldwin to 
agree to allow members of his Empire Crusade to be official Conservative party 
parliamentary candidates and to be given the opportunity to persuade Tory 
frontbenchers ‘to declare for Empire Free Trade’.160 Baldwin rejected these ideas and 
on 18 February 1930 Beaverbrook announced the formation of his United Empire 
Party. There followed a brief period in which Beaverbrook attempted to find 
common ground with Baldwin and believed that he had done so, but Conservative 
Central Office immediately publicly opposed food taxes and Beaverbrook 
considered that he had been ‘swindled’.161 In response, Beaverbrook attacked 
Baldwin in his newspapers and called on Conservative supporters to transfer their 
subscriptions to his campaign. He also intervened vigorously in seven by-elections, 
between April 1930 and March 1931, campaigning for candidates who supported 
Empire Free Trade whether or not they were the official Tory candidate. In the last 
of these, at St George’s Westminster, Baldwin made his famous allusion to the 
irresponsible use of the power of the press. The Conservative candidate defeated his 
United Empire opponent and Beaverbrook sought reconciliation with Baldwin and 
his party. The campaign had ‘[run] out of steam’. It had been a ‘power struggle 
between Baldwin and Beaverbrook’ in which the issue of imperial preference had 
eventually been subsumed into questions about the ‘political role of the press’.162 
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The origin of the Indian Empire Society in March 1930 was rooted in a 
reaction to Lord Irwin’s recommendations, made six months earlier, about the future 
governance of India. Lord Sydenham, a former governor of Bombay, initiated 
discussions with other individuals with experience of India and this led to its 
inaugural meeting in July. Leading figures at the meeting included Lord Sumner, a 
Tory die-hard and former appeal judge; Field Marshal Sir Claude Jacob, a former 
Chief of Staff in India; Sir Alfred Knox, MP, late of the Indian Army; Sir Michael 
O’Dwyer, former Lieut-Governor of Punjab; and Lord Meston, former Lieut-
Governor of United Provinces. In addition to these and other retired officials, the 
Society eventually included a number of Tory backbenchers as well as members of 
the general public.
163
 It was a small, active group; by January 1933 it claimed 1400 
members led by a committee consisting ‘with one exception…of men, including four 
MPs, with long and often recent Indian experience gained in the various Services, or 
as business men’.164 
 
The Society was principally concerned about the nature and pace of the 
proposed changes to the governance of India, claiming to be ‘not in the least opposed 
to the political advancement of India provided there are proper safeguards’ that 
preserved law and order and protected British interests.
165
 This, however, perhaps 
understates the Society’s position. At a meeting in December 1930 a resolution was 
passed without dissent declaring that there was a need to ‘awaken public opinion…to 
a sense of the grave danger with which our Empire in India is 
threatened…paralysing the commerce and industry of both Great Britain and India’. 
Winston Churchill, who was a member of the IES, spoke at the meeting of the need 
to crush Gandhism and to make clear that Britain would not give up India. To do so 
would ‘mark…the downfall of the British Empire’.166  A few months later Churchill 
spoke at a mass meeting of the IES at the Albert Hall in March 1931, referring to the 
‘so-called Irwin-Gandhi Treaty’ as ‘a hideous act of self-mutilation’. A number of 
Tory MPs also spoke. The IES also attempted to influence parliament by providing 
its members with specimen letters to send to their MPs, one of which declared 
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emotionally: ‘I hope you are making a stand with Mr Churchill against our 
Government giving away in India all that Clive and Warren Hastings…fought for 
and won’.167 In an attempt to gain Tory grassroots support, the Society wrote to local 
association chairman suggesting that they pass resolutions in their constituencies 
urging the government to slow the pace of reform of Indian governance. Despite 
these activities, and the publication of its periodical Indian Empire Review, Gillian 
Peele argues that the Society was unsatisfactory in bringing the issues to public 
attention and believed that it needed to coordinate its work with other imperial 
activists.
168
 It therefore moved its operations to premises in London occupied by the 
India Defence League, an organisation formed in June 1933.   
 
According to Page Croft the creation of the IDL was a ‘direct outcome of the 
activities of the UBI [Union of Britain and India]’,169 an organisation created by 
officials of Conservative Central Office to support the government’s India policy, 
and whose efforts the IDL sought to frustrate. The IDL was led by a council 
consisting of fourteen peers, four knights and five military officers. Lord Sumner 
was its president, Lord Wolmer its chairman and, with Winston Churchill and Claud 
Jacob among its vice-presidents, for example, there was considerable overlap of 
leadership with that of the IES, whose members were offered ‘honorary membership 
without further subscription’.170 IDL membership, however, was much greater than 
that of the IES. Page Croft claimed in the House of Commons that ‘we are in touch 
with…thousands of men recently returned from India who have joined the [IDL]’171 
and The Times referred to the League having ‘more than 50 groups, and each of these 
has a membership of from 50 to 500’.172 
 
The IES and the IDL ‘conduct[ed] an integrated campaign against the 
government’.173 In particular, the IDL was successful in influencing opinion in Tory 
constituency associations and this caused friction within the party. For example, Sir 
Edward Campbell, secretary of the Conservative India Parliamentary Committee, 
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accused the IDL of using tactics that were underhand and ‘not quite cricket’. This 
self-contradictory outcome of seeking to win over Tory party members and yet at the 
same time alienating others was also characteristic of the League of Empire Loyalists 
(LEL), as we shall see in later chapters. Sometimes constituency officials, such as 
Lord Hereford, president of the eponymous Tory party division, were made to resign 
because of their association with the IDL and this too resonates with the resignation 
of the Tory candidate for Bournemouth in 1958 when he was found to be consorting 
with members of the LEL.  
 
The IDL opposed federal government in India and, like the IES, argued that 
the introduction of democracy should proceed very cautiously. It was vigorously 
active in its opposition to government policy and went so far as to support Randolph 
Churchill, a member of the Junior Imperial League, who stood as an independent 
Conservative in the Wavertree by-election in February 1935. By doing so, he split 
the Tory vote and let in the Labour candidate and at least one Tory MP resigned 
from the IDL as a protest against the IDL’s tactics. Somewhat inconsistently the IDL 
decided not to intervene in the Norwood by-election a few weeks later. In 
parliament, however, MPs who were members of the IDL tabled a large number of 
amendments to the third reading of the India Bill. Notwithstanding its campaigning, 
and with the imminent passing of the Bill, the IDL appears to have accepted defeat in 
a practical way by proposing in April that its name be changed to the Imperial 
Defence League and by drafting a new constitution.
174
 In what form the IDL 
continued is not clear but its companion organisation, the IES, closed the offices it 
shared with the IDL when war came in 1939 and it was run from the home of its 
secretary, Sir Louis Stuart. As The Times observed, ‘the day of controversy at home 
over India had passed’.175 And so too, with the notable exception of the League of 
Empire Loyalists after the war, had group imperial activism in general. 
 
Except for the Expanding Commonwealth Group (eighteen upper-middle 
class backbench Tory MPs who formed the group in response to the rejection at the 
Conservative party conference in 1954 of a resolution to extend imperial preference) 
the only imperial activist organisation to appear after 1945 was the League of 
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Empire Loyalists. Its imperial interests have been largely overlooked by historians in 
favour of its perceived fascist connotations. This and other aspects of the League are 
discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
The brief descriptions of imperial groups in this chapter provide a basis for 
attempting to draw some general conclusions about imperial activism in Britain in 
the twentieth century. (Table 2 summarises the characteristics of the imperial groups 
that have been discussed and will be used as the basic data in the discussion that 
follows.) The two groups that form the main body of this thesis, the Junior Imperial 
League and the League of Empire Loyalists, can thus be placed within the context of 
those conclusions and their relevance to imperial activism discussed in detail.  
61 
 
Table 2. An analysis of the characteristics of imperial activist groups 
Organisation Founded Social/political? General/specific? 
Geographical 
interest? 






1868 Non-political General 
Whole Empire? 
Elite Medium Interest 




Popular with elite 
leadership 




1884 Political Specific; 
governance. 
Dominions plus. 





1894 Political Specific; defence 
Dominions. 
Elite Small Pressure 
British Empire 
League 
1895 Political Specific; defence 
Whole Empire? 
Elite Medium? Pressure 
United Empire 
Trade League 




1896 Political Specific; 
governance of SA. 
South Africa. 
Elite Small Pressure 
Victoria League 1901 Social(welfare) General. 
Dominions and 
SGCs. 
Elite Medium Interest 
The League of 
the Empire 
1901 Political Specific; education. 
Dominions mainly. 
Elite Medium Pressure 
Empire Day 
Movement 
1903 Social Specific; mainly 
education. 












1906 Socio-political General. 
Dominions mainly. 
Popular with elite 
and middle-class 
leadership 
Large Interest with some 
pressure activities 
especially in the inter-
war period. 




Elite Small? Pressure 
Overseas Club 1910 Social Specific; kith and 
kin. 
Dominions mainly. 




1914 Social Specific; kith and 
kin. 
Dominions mainly. 




1911 Socio-political General. 
Dominions plus 
some SGC’s later. 





1916 Political Specific; trade. 
Mainly Canada, SA 
and W. Africa. 




1916 Political Specific; trade. 
Whole Empire. 
Elite Small Pressure 
British Empire 
Union  
1915 Political General. 
Whole Empire? 
Elite leadership Medium Pressure 
The Women’s 
Guild of Empire 




1922 Political Specific; trade Elite Small Pressure 
Empire Industries 
Association 
1925 Political Specific; trade Elite Small Pressure 
Empire Crusade 1929 Political Specific; trade. 
Dominions mainly. 
Elite leadership 




1930 Political Specific: 
governance of 
India. 
Elite Small Pressure 
India Defence 
League 
1933 Political Specific: 
governance of 
India. 
Elite Medium Pressure 
League of Empire 
Loyalists 
1954 Political General. 
Whole Empire. 




1950s Political Specific; 
governance. 
Whole Empire. 





The imperial activist organisations discussed in this chapter are 
predominantly pressure groups, that is, as discussed in the Introduction, groups who 
apply pressure to politicians, decision makers and members of the general public, in 
pursuit of their imperialist objectives. Interest groups, who are not seeking change 
but simply wish to enjoy and celebrate the Empire, are a small minority. It is 
interesting to note that interest groups were formed in the early years of imperial 
activism; no interest group was founded after the end of the First World War. This 
might suggest that there was a decline in general interest in the Empire or simply that 
the existing organisations were sustained and therefore satisfied this general need. 
Indeed Gillian Peele has suggested that ‘in the inter-war period…empire…was 
simply accepted as a part of the existing order of things…like the monarchy and the 
weather’.176 This could imply that groups between the wars were only formed when 
a specific imperial issue arose, such as trade preference or the constitution of India. 
In spite of their early emergence, however, interest groups have generally enjoyed 
greater longevity than pressure groups; for example, at the time of writing, the Royal 
Colonial Institute and the Victoria League still exist. This may be because their 
raison d’être enabled them to adapt to changing circumstances and they were not tied 
to a specific, and thus more transient, economic or political objective.  Interest 
groups’ adaptable, recreational, relatively non-political interest in the Empire was an 
important factor in their long-term survival. They were for people who wished to 
celebrate and enjoy the Empire rather than attempt to change it. The Junior Imperial 
League, which existed for forty years, helps to illustrate this but it is unusual in 
combining characteristics of both pressure and interest groups.  
 
Pressure groups tended to address a single interest or narrow range of 
interests. Only the British Empire Union, the Women’s Guild of Empire and the 
League of Empire Loyalists were pressure groups with general, wide-ranging 
imperial concerns. Because pressure groups sought change and actively campaigned 
for it, they were also more political than interest groups. The specific imperial 
concerns of the groups were usually political integration, defence, trade and 
education. All of these matters expressed a desire for some form of increased 
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imperial unity and this in its many, often vague, forms was the essential motivating 
force of imperial activism. Ideas, however, were often incoherent or lacked clarity 
and political realism.  
 
The multiplicity of imperial activist groups, comprising both pressure and 
interest groups, also demonstrates the fragmented and perhaps cliquish nature of 
imperial activism. To overcome this, groups sometimes merged, or more often, tried 
(unsuccessfully) to do so. In 1933, for example, the Dominions Office instigated 
negotiations between a number of groups, including the Royal Empire Society, the 
Overseas League, the British Empire League, the Victoria League, the League of the 
Empire and the Empire Day Movement with a view to more closely co-ordinating 




Although groups often claimed to embrace the entire Empire, or a large 
proportion of it, Empire usually meant, in practice, just the Dominions, sometimes 
with the addition of self-governing colonies such as Rhodesia. Imperial activist 
groups were thus racially based in the sense that they prioritised relations with the 
‘white’ Dominions and colonies. For many years after the racially unifying idea of 
‘Greater Britain’ was mooted and subsequently failed to come about, it lingered in 
the minds of imperial activists. Even after the Second World War during the process 
of granting independence to Britain’s colonies, few, except the League of Empire 
Loyalists, cared much about the (non-white) dependencies.  This analysis therefore 
supports Andrew Thompson’s view that it is wrong for historians to conclude that 
the Empire was primarily about the dependencies. It was the Dominions on which 
imperial activists generally concentrated their attention. 
 
The leaders of the groups were almost always from the right-wing of the 
political spectrum (notable exceptions are the Women’s Guild of Empire and the 
British Workers League) and it is a reasonable assumption therefore, in the absence 
of membership lists, that this was also largely true of individual members of the 
groups. It would be wrong, however, not to be aware that the Primrose League, the 
British Empire Union and the Junior Imperial League had (probably right-wing) 
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working-class members, the first of these in substantial numbers. The Empire 
Crusade membership may also have done so, if Beaverbrook’s recruitment campaign 
was successful with his Daily Express readers. Many organisations claimed to be 
non-party but the Primrose League and the Junior Imperial League were very closely 
associated with the Conservative party whilst claiming to be independent of it. 
Several of the groups worked closely with Tory MPs by persuading them to argue 
their case in parliament or by campaigning on their behalf. Also, as has already been 
noted, members of parliament, predominantly from the right, were members of 
imperial pressure groups. The Junior Imperial League campaigned extensively for 
Tory candidates and was progressively integrated into the Conservative party 
organisation. One may reasonably conclude from these facts that, unsurprisingly, 
imperial activism was very largely, but certainly not exclusively, a right-wing 
phenomenon and included support from all classes. Richard Price may be right to 
argue that the working-class did not care much about the Empire at the very 
beginning of the century
178
 but some of them clearly did during its first half even 
though, as already discussed, the TRL found recruiting working-class people 
difficult, and, as we shall see, the Junior Imperial League also had problems with 
working-class membership.  
 
A much less ambiguous picture can be painted of the class composition of the 
leadership of the groups. Aristocrats were active in all the groups in the period up to 
the beginning of the First World War and in many of them thereafter. Often, 
however, they seem to have been figure-heads appointed, for example, as vice-
presidents who would thus make a financial contribution to the organisation. Elite 
names on headed notepaper could also appear to add gravitas to an organisation, a 
point that A. K. Chesterton understood in creating the League of Empire Loyalists. 
After the First World War businessmen emerged more strongly in leadership roles. 
This may have been a combination of the increasing professionalisation of society, 
the emergence of a larger middle class (which McKibbin has described)
179
 and the 
shift in imperial activism away from governance of the Empire (at the end of the 
nineteenth century) and imperial defence (in the two decades before the First World 
War) towards greater emphasis on imperial trade (in the inter-war years). Generally 
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throughout the period (upper) middle-class men managed the affairs of the groups 
with individuals such as Patrick Hannon and Frederick Pollock being involved in 
several of them. 
 
It is sometimes difficult to establish a clear picture of the membership 
numbers of the various organisations.  With the notable exception of the Primrose 
League, organisations did not generally have more than a few tens of thousands of 
members. There is perhaps a correlation between size of organisation and the 
narrowness of its objectives, that is to say, the more focused it was the smaller its 
membership. Thus pressure groups were generally smaller than interest groups. 
Overall one might conclude that the level of active interest in the Empire in Britain 
was not great. 
 
The survey of imperial interest groups contained in this chapter has relied 
heavily on the published work of historians who have written selectively about them. 
None has completed a ‘full’ survey and attempted to draw general conclusions about 
imperial activism. Furthermore, in being selective, they have almost entirely ignored 
any extensive analysis of two important groups that are relevant to the question of 
who cared about the British Empire: the Junior Imperial League and the League of 
Empire Loyalists. The next five chapters address this omission beginning with a 




Chapter 2. The Junior Imperial League 1905-1918 
  
The founding of the League    
Youth, Unionism, and Empire were the key themes at the inaugural public 
meeting of the Junior Imperial and Constitutional League (JIL) which was held on 
Wednesday, 19 December 1906 at the Queen’s Hall in Langham Place, London. 
Accompanied by other members of the nobility, Lord Castlereagh was in the chair. 
He was a twenty-eight year old army officer who had been ‘cajoled’ into politics by 
his father, the marquess of Londonderry
1
, and elected Unionist MP for Maidstone at 
the general election earlier that year. This aristocratic leadership presided over a 
‘good attendance’, according to The Times,2 that included several young, middle-
class men who aspired to political careers. The Unionist credentials of the League 
were demonstrated by the presence at the meeting of the chairman of the National 
Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations, H.M. Imbert-Terry, and its 
secretary, A.E. Southall. They represented an older generation of politics than the 
word ‘Junior’ in the League’s title might suggest, having been born in the middle 
years of the nineteenth century but they demonstrated public recognition of the 
League by the party’s administrators. 
 
The political leadership of the party also gave support. Letters received from 
Arthur Balfour, the leader of the Unionist party, and from Austen Chamberlain, were 
read to the meeting. Their content gives an important insight into leading Tories’ 
perceptions of the League. Balfour referred to ‘enlist[ing] the services of the younger 
generation on behalf of the Conservative and Unionist cause’ which had ‘Imperial 
and Colonial ideals’ and to a policy of social reform that were ‘attractive to the youth 
of the nation’. Chamberlain, who had been Chancellor of the Exchequer for the last 
two years of the Balfour administration that had ended in December 1905, believed 
that the participation of young men in the work of the Unionist party was ‘of the first 
importance to our future success’ not only in social reform at home but ‘to realize 
the universal aspiration of the British race for closer union---commercial, political 
and defensive’ of the ‘great [British] Imperial edifice’. In concluding the meeting, 
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Lord Percy, MP for South Kensington, explained that the purpose of the League was 
to persuade young men of the importance of participating in politics.
3
   
 
Percy (1871-1909), an established politician and the eldest son of the seventh 
duke of Northumberland, was a member of parliament from 1895 until his death.  He 
had served as parliamentary under-secretary, first for India in 1902, and then next 
year at the Foreign Office. Another aristocrat present was Lord Wolmer (1887-
1971), at that time secretary of Oxford University Conservative Committee. He was 
heir to Lord Selborne and the grandson of Lord Salisbury, prime minister until 1902, 
and was to be an MP from 1910 until 1940, supporting Winston Churchill in his 
opposition to the India Bill in 1935. Percy and Wolmer were young men 
representative of long-standing Tory aristocracy but, as already noted, their 
colleagues at the inaugural meeting were a group of young middle-class men. It was 
they who had undertaken the preliminary work necessary to make the inaugural 
meeting possible. 
 
Although the meeting took place at the end of a year in which the 
Conservatives had experienced  a major defeat at a general election, it should not be 
inferred that that defeat initiated the desire to organise Tory youth. The first 
intimations of this occurred in 1905, six months before the general election. On 28 
June, the idea of such an organisation was discussed at the Junior Carlton Club at a 
meeting of ‘about twenty young…candidates for Parliament and the [London] 
County Council’,4 organised by Albert Southall. Except for Danford Thomas, later 
treasurer of the League, it is not clear who was present. He recalled in February 1930 
that the meeting was influenced by Joseph Chamberlain’s belief in imperial 
preference; some present at the meeting therefore declared that ‘we must be 
imperial’. Others were concerned with the Irish question which they regarded as 
unsettled. The constitution was therefore of considerable importance to them: ‘for all 
time Conservatives and Unionists alike would maintain what is known as the 
Constitution’.5  These views of those present give only an outline sketch of political 
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priorities but it is possible to paint a somewhat fuller picture of the social 
characteristics of the League’s founders.   
 
On 1 November 1905, sixteen individuals, whose names have been listed in 
the League’s records, attended a ‘preliminary meeting’ at the Junior Constitutional 
Club. Examination of the biographical details of the sixteen suggests their common 
characteristics. Those present were: Arthur du Cros (in the chair), R.E. Belilios, 
W.B. Boyd-Carpenter, Spencer Brett, J.B. Caldwell, G. Cartwright, Lewis Hunter, 
J.H. Lambert, J. Seymour Lloyd, W.J. Marshall, A. Moy, M.M. Shattock, Percy 
Simner, with G.W. Borwick and A.E. Southall as honorary secretaries. Letters of 
apology were received from E.R. Bird, P. Elgee and Wilfred Evans.
6
  To these can 
be added F. Danford Thomas, C.E. Renouf and S.J.M. Sampson, the latter two being 
present at the Queen’s Hall meeting in December 1906. It would be unwise to draw 
firm conclusions about the homogeneity of the entire group from the sparse personal 
details of these individuals extracted from The Times, the 1901 census and the 
Dictionary of National Biography but we can, however, draw some tentative 
conclusions. 
 
First, the founders were exclusively male. H.I.P. Hallett, who was honorary 
secretary of the League from 1909 to 1939, later recalled that initially the League 
had  no female members until 1914 and even then very few.
7
 However, a Miss Bond, 
a member of the Reading branch, spoke at the League’s annual conference in April 
1913
8
 but that is the only reference to a woman in the League’s extant minute books 
for the period before the Great War. The League was clearly reluctant to involve 
women even in its social activities. At a meeting of the executive committee in July 
1908, members were encouraged to invite guests to a forthcoming dinner but the 
minute was subsequently amended to make clear that this meant male guests.
9
 The 
group also comprised a particular historical cohort: those for whom dates of birth 
have been established were not youths but young men, aged between 25 and 38 
years, whose adolescent years occurred during a period of high Victorian 
imperialism and before British industrial and military prestige was perceived, in the 
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early years of the new century, to be threatened by foreign powers. They were also 
firmly middle class; some had private means and others earned a living through the 
professions, trade and industry. They were typical examples of what Ross McKibbin 
has called the ‘old’ middle class whose members entered ‘the church, the law, 
medicine or the armed services’ and governed the empire. They were largely 
members of professions that were ‘pre- or non-industrial’10 (although du Cros and 
Borwick certainly represented a technical and industrial middle class that was to 
become dominant in the nineteen-thirties). Importantly for them, their political 
interests and activities enabled them to meet the nobility not simply politically but 
socially as well. For example, Raphael Belilios dined with Lord Farquhar at his 
residence in March 1909 alongside peers, MPs and members of the London County 
Council.
11
 They were militarily conscientious, several of them serving in peacetime 
volunteer regiments and also in the Great War. Finally, they were urban and 
predominantly metropolitan. All lived in London or nearby at addresses such as 
Piccadilly, Princes gate, Westminster and Philbeach gardens, Kensington.
12
 This 
metropolitanism is to some extent reflected in the constituencies they contested in 
pursuit of their most pervasive and salient common characteristic, political ambition. 
Table 3 is an analysis of these constituencies.    
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Table 3. Percentage of Unionist vote at general elections 1900-1910
13
  
(An asterisk indicates when and where a JICL member stood as a candidate.) 
     




Newington West 41.8 35.3* 47.5 46.4* 
Newington Walworth 58.1 43.1 48.6* 48.0 
Tower Hamlets 
(Limehouse) 
55.8 40.2 45.9* 45.4 
Tower Hamlets  
(Poplar) 
41.6 33.0* 42.7 35.1 
Tower Hamlets  
(Bow and Bromley) 
63.3 46.4* 41.9* 44.4 
Rochdale 50.1 44.3 44.9* 48.1 
Blackburn 61.3 50.1 43.4 47.3* 
Liverpool (Scotland) 42.1 28.5 20.9* 21.9 
 
The five metropolitan constituencies were all in working class areas of East 
London. This geographical affinity between a particular part of London and the 
earliest members of the League is strengthened further by the two founder members 
who fought London County Council seats in Hackney and Shoreditch and by two 
politicians who joined the League’s Council in 1907; Claude Hay who was elected 
MP for Hoxton in 1900 and again in 1906, and H.S. Samuel who lost his Limehouse 
parliamentary seat in the latter year. The pattern of results in Table 3 also suggests 
that, with the exception of Bow and Bromley in 1906, the Unionist candidates were 
minor politicians learning their political trade rather than being given safer Unionist 
seats which would have given them a strong chance of entering parliament at the first 
attempt. The seats that they fought were working class constituencies that were, 
more than usually, inclined to vote Conservative. (The presence of three Lancashire 
constituencies in Table 3 is perhaps explained by the fact that such constituencies 
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were concentrated in ‘Lancashire, in Birmingham, [and] in East or South London’.)14 
In sum, the socio-political portrait of these founder members of the League shows a 
group of young Edwardian middle-class men, led by the aristocracy, attempting to 
build the foundations of their political careers by persuading the urban working class 
of the merits of Unionism. But why was it felt necessary to organise younger 
Unionist politicians in this way at this particular time?  
 
The answer to that question may lie in two main areas. First, the beginnings 
of a more general process of the organisation of young people both politically and 
more generally. Martin Pugh has referred to it as the ‘current fashion’.15 However, 
the recollection of Hallett in 1939 was that: ‘[i]t was considered an impertinence for 
young men to take part in politics in [those] days’, but nevertheless ‘Arthur Balfour, 
Bonar Law, and Sir Alexander Acland-Hood…Chief Whip, recognised more than 
the rank and file the necessity of a strong youth movement in the Party…’. 16  Other 
political parties agreed. The League of Young Liberals was founded in 1903 and it 
was also a time when socialists were seen to be making rapid progress in educating 
young people in radical principles.
17
 There were also a number of junior Unionist 
and Conservative associations already in existence and in 1910 the League of Young 
Conservatives was formed under the presidency of the diehard Lord Willoughby de 
Broke, later a vice-president of the League. The second causal factor was the state of 
the Tory party, both politically and organisationally; it was not conducive to 
successful electoral campaigning and reform was desirable and necessary. 
 
The Unionists formed the party of imperialism but their enthusiasm for 
empire was tempered by the Boer War which had demonstrated that Britain had had 
more difficulty in dealing with its opponents than was commensurate with its 
geopolitical power and prestige. The desire, therefore, to renew Britain’s imperialism 
was expressed by Joseph Chamberlain , the colonial secretary, in a major speech in 
Birmingham in May 1903 in which he called for imperial preference. He and Leo 
Maxse then set up the Tariff Reform League in July 1903 to press for imperial fiscal 
reform. The policy was, however, fissiparous and the Conservative party divided into 
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a faction that supported Chamberlain; those who opposed his ideas and argued for 
free trade; and a central group that attempted to bridge the two arguments and who 
were loyal to Balfour, the prime minister.
18
  Although by 1905, most Tories were in 
favour of tariff reform of some sort, the split in the party proved electorally 
damaging and a number of defeats in by-elections were suffered in 1903, 1904 and 
1905. Furthermore it seemed likely that the different factions would try to gain the 
support of various local party associations thus further exacerbating divisions in the 
party. By late 1905 there were expectations of a general election that were fulfilled 
in January 1906, immediately after Balfour’s resignation as prime minister in 
December. Despite these expectations, the party organisation was weak and Balfour 
received advice from his Parliamentary Secretary, J.S. Sandars that agents 
throughout the country were desperately calling for more time to prepare for an 
election.
19
  To add to these organisational difficulties, the ‘main issue [at the 
election] was undoubtedly Free Trade’20 and consequently the divided Unionists 
were heavily defeated. Such a defeat was a catalyst for re-organisation of the party.  
 
It may be over-stating the case, however, to say that ‘it was then [after the 
election] that the demands [for reorganisation] began’.21 Even the League itself 
forgot its own history, recording in its journal in 1928 that it was after the general 
election of 1906 that ‘with the spirits and hopes of the Party at their lowest ebb, that 
a number of enthusiastic Juniors decided to form the…League’.22  In fact, demands 
had been made before the election; but it was only after it that words turned into 
deeds and organisational reform began. Before the defeat, in November 1905, at the 
party conference at Newcastle, a resolution had been passed calling for the 
‘strengthen[ing of] the central management of the business of the Conservative party 
by the addition of a popular representative element in close touch with the 
constituencies…’.23 This was followed, in February 1906, by a letter to the 
constituencies signed by the president, chairman and divisional chairmen of the 
National Union referring to ‘the defects which exist in our organisation [that] must 
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be remedied and the political machinery improved or renewed in all its branches’.24 
Leo Maxse observed at a meeting of the National Union of Constitutional and 
Conservative Associations in July 1906, that ‘the machinery of the party was 
antiquated’ and that the Newcastle resolution would have been ignored had it not 
been for ‘the catastrophe of the general election’.25 That the necessity to implement 
change was manifest before the election is also demonstrated by the fact that the 
founders of the Junior Imperial League held a ‘preliminary meeting’ initiating the 
definition of its objects and membership in the same month as the Newcastle 
meeting.
26
 This is not coincidental because Albert Southall was present at both 
events and would have been aware of how a policy of popular representation and 
greater involvement in party matters might be applied to a group of young politicians 
in London. The close relationship between the nascent League and the senior 
organisation is also apparent in H. H. Cannell’s recollection that in 1905 he ‘had 
been consulted by headquarters of the National Union in drafting rules and making 
suggestions in connection with the “aims and objects” of a junior organisation’.27 A 
further example of the close relationships between the senior organisation and the 
early members of the League can be seen in the fact that Castlereagh’s father, Lord 
Londonderry, was a member of the Re-organisation Liaison Committee set up by the 
Newcastle resolution. It would be reasonable to infer that the formation of League 
was part of a wider effort to make the Conservative party a more effective electoral 
machine that recognised the importance of influencing younger men. This, wittingly 
or not, anticipated the expansion of the electorate in 1918 to include all men over the 
age of twenty-one. In 1906 only about half of adult men had the vote. 
 
Albert Southall was a major figure in the formation of the League. It was he 
who convened the early, exploratory meetings of the proposed organisation. This 
does not necessarily mean that the original idea was his or that he was acting on his 
own initiative independently of the Unionist party but there is no reference, in the 
minutes of the National Union executive committee at the time, to any plan to create 
the League.
28
 Southall certainly had the standing and contacts in the party to be able 
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to take such an initiative. He had been secretary to the National Union since 1884 
and was widely respected in the Unionist party having been presented by Balfour in 
June 1904 with an award for twenty years’ service as secretary of the NUCUA. He 
was an experienced and mature political administrator, based in London, with a wide 
range of connections within the party. At various times he had been secretary of the 
metropolitan division of the National Union, divisional officer of the metropolitan 
division and a member of the political committee of the Junior Constitutional Club. 
Important though his work was in the early days of the League, it was short-lived 




A second meeting in November 1905 of the League’s founders took the form 
of a provisional committee. The full name of the League was agreed, the Junior 
Imperial and Constitutional League, and the objects of the League were decided. 
These were: 
 
To create a practical interest in political work and organisation among the younger members of the 
Conservative and Unionist Party, by forming a centre in the Metropolis, with branches to co-operate 
with existing Conservative and Unionist bodies, with a view to advancing the cause of Imperial Unity, 
uphold[ing] constitutional principles, and actively further[ing] the Unionist cause. 
 
The terms ‘metropolitan’, ‘practical’ and ‘co-operate’ convey a desire for a 
non-theoretical, business-like approach to politics focused on London and its 
surrounding areas. For example, Sir Alexander Acland-Hood, the Unionist party 
chief whip, agreed to write to constituency ‘chairmen and secretaries in the 





The League was not intended to be merely a debating society but a political resource 
to be used within the party to which it was loyal, in pursuit of imperialism and 
constitutionalism. (Members were required to declare their belief in, and support for, 
Unionist principles.) It is worth noting the use of the word ‘younger’ rather than 
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‘young’ suggesting an uncertainty about what any upper age limit for members 
should be. As we have seen, some of the founders were approaching middle age.  
 
The early growth of the League 
The League saw the expansion of its membership as a key objective and it 
pursued it by individual officials writing to the chairmen and secretaries of local 
party associations. The League’s policy was to encourage the setting up of branches 
and the affiliation to the League of existing junior associations. A resolution was 
passed at the annual general meeting in 1908 calling for the latter to affiliate and 
‘thus bind together the Junior Associations throughout the British Isles’.31  
 
It is difficult to construct an accurate picture of the growth of the League in 
its early years because although new branches and affiliations were routinely 
recorded in the minutes of Council meetings it was not done comprehensively. The 
first record of specific branches is in July 1907 when Bath Junior Conservative 
Association and Bedford Junior Unionist Association affiliated.
32
 There were, 
however, six branches by the end of 1906 only one of which, the Central Hackney 
Unionist Pioneers, can be identified from the records. Its formation coincided with, 
but was quite separate from, that of the League but to which it immediately decided 
to affiliate.
33
 Table 5 lists the early branches formed by about the end of 1908 that 
can be identified from the records. Table 4 shows the overall growth in the number 
of branches between 1906 and 1914. 
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Table 4. Growth in number of League Branches 1906-1914 




December 1906   6   
December 1908  28 (est.)   
January 1909  30  Torchbearer 
March 1939 
September 1909  40 12,000 CCO 506/1/1 
January 1910  30 (sic) 3,000 (sic) Letter from Hon. 
Sec. March 1911 
July 1910 117  CCO 506/1/1 
March 1911 180 Over 45,000 CCO 506/1/1 
January 1912 280 70,000 CCO 506/1/1 
November 1912 330  CCO 506/1/1 
April 1913 350 Over 100,000 CCO 506/1/1 
February 1914 356  CCO 506/1/1 
 
There are two striking features about the membership of the League from its 
inception to the Great War. First, its slow initial growth: it took over three years for 
forty branches with a total membership of 12,000 to join the League. Secondly, from 
the beginning of 1910 until the beginning of 1912, it grew very rapidly adding an 
average of ten branches each month. Growth continued in the next two years but 
much more slowly, averaging only about three new branches each month. We should 
perhaps be cautious about accepting uncritically the number of reported branches. 
The figures were published by the leaders of the League and might, therefore, have 
been overstated for the purposes of good publicity. Certainly the Coventry branch 
failed in 1908
34
 and at the Annual General Meeting in 1912 it was reported that some 
‘branches had fallen into an unsatisfactory state’ and needed to be revived.35 It may 
also be significant that the sole example of an internal document stating the figures 
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(in January 1910) shows fewer branches and a much lower average branch 
membership. However, if we accept the total membership figures at face value, the 
average branch membership was about 250. By comparison, the Primrose League 
average membership in its early days in the 1880s was 237 in the twenty-five 
constituencies where the first Junior Imperial League branches existed (See Table 5). 
The Primrose League also had 259 Juvenile Branches with 65,000 members by 
1913, an average membership of 250.
36
  It would appear, therefore, that the strengths 
of branch membership of the two Tory organisations were very similar although the 
Primrose League would have had a greater potential for membership than the Junior 
Imperial League because it drew its members from both men and women. 
 
The nature of the early impetus of the growth of the League can be assessed 
to some extent by the data in Table 5. This lists the first twenty-five branches of the 
League, as far as they can be determined from the records, up until April 1909. It 
correlates reasonably closely with the total of thirty branches by January 1909 shown 
in Table 4. (The data on voting, social categories and geographical regions have been 
taken from Pelling’s work on elections.)37 Nineteen of the branches (75%) were in 
the London area or its immediate environs. No social class predominated: four 
branches (26.7%) were predominantly middle class, six (40.0%) were mainly 
working class and five (33.3%) were of mixed social class. Almost three-quarters of 
the branches were in constituencies lost by the Tories in the 1906 election, only three 
in constituencies they successfully defended and two in constituencies that were not 
held by a Tory at either election. In comparison, 245 Tory candidates out of a total 
parliamentary strength of 670 MPs lost their seats in the 1906 election, that is to say 
36.6% of the total.  
 
The slow initial growth in membership may have had administrative causes. 
Its early years were difficult for the League. In December 1909 it still had ‘no 
headquarters, no staff and no organisation’ according to its newly appointed 
honorary secretary, H.I.P. Hallett.
38
  In July 1907 the League had lost its secretary, 
                                                 
36
 Pugh, The Tories, p. 41. 
37
 Pelling, Social Geography of British Elections.  
38
 Torchbearer, 3 (March 1939), 11. 
78 
 
Albert Southall, and its chairman Arthur du Cros
39
; both had resigned through ill 
health. An attempt to appoint the new secretary of the National Union, Thomas Cox, 
as secretary of the League, thus continuing the close relationship between the two 
organisations that had been personified by Southall, was rebuffed by the National 
Union. Cox reported to the National Union executive committee that he had been 
advised by the League that ‘the position did not involve any actual work[!]’ but 
nevertheless the committee did not approve of any official connection between Cox 
and the League.
40
 Without  a chairman or secretary the effectiveness of the League 
was attenuated. 
 
The League’s finances 
In December 1907, Imbert-Terry (1854-1938) agreed to become chairman of 
the League. He was a member of ‘an ancient French family whose records go back to 
the days of the Knights Templar’.41 He was educated at Charterhouse and his interest 
in politics led him to stand, although unsuccessfully, for election to parliament four 
times between 1882 and 1892. His appointment greatly strengthened the relationship 
between the senior organisation and the League; he was chairman of the National 
Union of Conservative Associations between 1906 and 1908 and served as chairman 
of the Junior Imperial League for twenty-five years. He was quickly into his stride 
by late 1907. At the Council meeting in February 1908 he announced that the League 
was unable to meet its financial obligations and could not afford the services of its 
paid full-time organising agent, H.H. Cannell, who had been appointed in February 
1907. Attempts by the League to raise funds for its activities had not been successful. 
The fifty founder members had been asked to contribute £1 each
42
 but by July 1907 
only twenty-one had done so and the acting chairman, Percy Simner, had taken the 
line that there were ‘sometimes special circumstances where…members…should not 
be burdened with a Monetary obligation’.43 It is difficult to draw the conclusion from 
this cryptic remark that middle class founders with aspirations to enter right-wing 
politics could not afford the subscription. It suggests, rather, a lack of full 
commitment on their part to the League’s affairs. 
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The League’s annual subscription structure called for five shillings from 
ordinary members (reduced in March 1908 to 2s.6d), £1.1.0 from honorary members 
and £5.5.0 from vice-presidents (of which there were three)
44
. Branches paid an 
affiliation fee of 10s. 6d. (reduced from February 1910 to 5s.). These reductions 
recognised the unattractiveness of the original subscription structure. By comparison, 
the Primrose League subscriptions ranged between 3d and 2s.6d depending on the 
grade of membership.
45
 In addition to these obligatory payments, Council members 
were encouraged to approach friends for donations but in June 1907 it was decided 
not to approach members of the two houses of parliament ‘for the present’.46 The net 
result of these diffident efforts, and of expenditure incurred, was that by October 
1907, after almost two years since its public launch, the League had received 
£161.19.0, made payments of £118.16.10 and owed £112.0.0, a shortfall in funds of 
about £70. These sums are miniscule when compared with, for example, the Tariff 
Reform League which by January 1904 ‘had already spent £50,000’ since its 
inception the previous year,
47
 or with the Primrose League whose ‘central 
organisation functioned, at the end of the nineteenth century, on a fairly modest 
income of around £7000’.48 Between 1906 and 1918 the League’s available funds 
never exceeded £1500 at any one time.
49
 Even as late as 1936, the approximate cost 
of running the League was reported as being only £6,234.
50
 Lack of financial 
resources was therefore both a chronic and an acute problem, as illustrated by the 
remark of Cuthbert Morley Headlam, chairman of the Durham county Conservative 
organisation, in November 1937 that: ‘without more money the League can never be 
of much more value than it is at present and it appears that the money is not 
forthcoming’.51 Such financial straits were not untypical of the Tory party at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. In 1907, for example, the National Union 
reported liabilities of £3,886 and cash at the bank of only £129, a situation alleviated 
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by the generosity of Sir Alex Acland-Hood MP who offered to provide £8,500 per 




Although a finance committee was appointed in November 1906 there are no 
records of its meetings until May 1910 so it is difficult to establish complete details 
of the League’s financial activities during that period. The resignation of the 
treasurer, C.H. Hoare, in December 1908, not simply from office but from the 
League as well, may be indicative of financial problems. At the end of the financial 
year, the new treasurer was unable to produce the accounts for 1909 because the 
‘finances had not been sufficiently disentangled’.53 Whatever Hoare’s shortcomings 
may have been, fundraising was clearly an issue. In February 1910 at the annual 
general meeting, Imbert-Terry announced that an ‘immediate grant of money 
would…be made to the League to keep it going’.54 The money came from Acland-
Hood who had also agreed to pay certain office expenses and the salary of a part-
time secretary. In April 1910, Castlereagh at last wrote to MPs, peers, candidates and 
agents, and raised about £330 from their donations. In addition, annual subscriptions 
amounted to fifty-five guineas and affiliation fees brought in £25. As a result, with 
‘£500 in hand’ the League’s financial position was said to be ‘much improved’.55 
However, this improvement was not to last. Many of the branches failed to pay 
amounts due to headquarters and following a thorough investigation the Finance 
committee regretted ‘how large and how much overdue some of the amounts 
were’.56 
 
By late 1911 the crisis was manifest. At meetings of the executive committee 
and Council on September 13, Imbert-Terry once again drew attention to the grave 
financial situation of the League. He had, however, a proposal to put to the meeting 
which would alleviate the League’s lack of resources. Arthur Steel-Maitland, 
appointed chairman of the Conservative party in June 1910 with responsibilities that 
included party finance and organisation,
57
 had offered to make available office 
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accommodation at Central Office. Although the League would now become ‘part 
and parcel’ of Central Office, the new arrangements ‘would [not] affect the League’s 
liberty of opinion’. It would still be possible to ‘differ from the official policy’ of the 
party. Rejection of the offer, Imbert-Terry explained, would mean the continuation 
of the League’s financial difficulties. Despite these misgivings about the autonomy 
of the League, the Council decided unanimously to accept Steel-Maitland’s offer.58  
 
Why was the League so weak financially? It may have been because the 
League’s central organisation lacked commitment to the general management of its 
affairs. Another factor may have been that the branches were seen as the principal 
fundraisers but using local funds for local activities. This was certainly the case in 
the Primrose League.
59
 Central costs included cost of a small staff (partly funded by 
central office), the supply of literature, lantern-slide lectures and the attempted 
production of a regular publication. The failure of even its own founder members, 
middle class men of financial substance, to meet their financial obligations to the 
League; the weakness of the central organisation in not pursuing more vigorously for 
subscriptions; and the reliance on donations from the central organisation of the 
party, all suggest the League’s leaders were not wholeheartedly committed to the 
League’s objectives much beyond encouraging the formation of new branches. The 
League lacked a strong, central and national message, unlike, say, the Tariff Reform 
League which attracted large sums of money to support its campaign. It also had no 
well-known leader to compare with Joseph Chamberlain whose very presence 
attracted financial resources. After his incapacitating illness in July 1906 the Tariff 
Reform League’s finances weakened. It may well be that only a strong, nationally 
recognised leader with a clear message is capable of securing good financial backing 
for a political cause. 
 
The League now entered a period of financial stability, receiving regular 
payments from the National Union of Conservative Associations amounting to 
several hundred pounds a year. The treasurer, Danford Thomas, was able to report at 
the AGM in April 1913 that the League was in a ‘sound financial position’.60 By 
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February 1918, with its expenditure much reduced by the suspension of activities 
during the war but with its subscriptions and other sources of income still at pre-war 
levels, the League was able set aside £1000 by the purchase of War bonds. Even so, 
we should not lose sight of the fact that its financial resources were inadequate for an 
institution that had ambitions to organise the right-wing youth of the country in 
pursuit of Unionist political knowledge and power. The achievement of its objectives 
was often constrained by lack of money.  
 
If the years between 1908 and 1912 were especially difficult ones for the 
League financially, it was not helped by simultaneous turbulence in its 
administrative arrangements at the beginning of that period. The difficulties appear 
to have included the failure of the League’s committees to meet and to act on 
decisions taken. At the annual general meeting in February 1910, Imbert-Terry was 
asked if the actions agreed at the previous annual meeting had been acted upon and 
replied that they had not. He was also asked how many times the Executive 
committee had met in the last twelve months. It had met only three times whereas it 
had been agreed that it should meet each month except August and September. 
Clearly the League was not functioning properly and was seen by some members as 
autocratic and over-cautious. However, the appointment as secretary in December 
1909 of H.I.P. Hallett, Imbert-Terry’s nephew, resolved the administrative problem 
in the long term; he remained in the post until February 1939.
61
 The League had now 
entered a long period of continuity of its major office holders. The chairman (Imbert-
Terry), secretary (Hallett), treasurer (Danford Thomas) and organising secretary 
(Cannell) all held their respective offices continuously until well after the end of the 
First World War. 
 
The ideology of the League 
The League emerged during a time of significant social and political changes. 
There had been a growing interest in the British Empire in the closing years of the 
nineteenth century which had been tempered by the difficulties of the Boer War. For 
some, however, such as Joseph Chamberlain, the contributions made to the war by 
the self-governing colonies demonstrated not just the geo-political importance of the 
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British Empire but the vital need to draw the self-governing colonies and Britain 
together to create a counter-balance to perceived economic and military threats from 
other nations and empires. 
 
The Edwardian period was also a time when there was a growing 
participation of the middle classes in politics. Their ‘rapprochement’ with the 
aristocracy needed to be recognised and encouraged by Conservative party leaders.
62
 
The Primrose League reflected this need in the last years of the Victorian period as 
did the Junior Imperial League in the Edwardian years. In both organisations there 
were good opportunities for different classes to mix together, or at least to be in each 
other’s presence, for a common purpose. 
 
Socialism and the electoral activities which brought Labour candidates into 
parliament were seen by Conservative politicians and voters as a potential threat to 
the stability of society and to the upper class and middle class domination of politics. 
It needed to be constrained by more effective organisation within the Conservative 
party. Part of the re-organisation was the need to bring to active politics the young 
men of the nation and Empire. More generally in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, and not necessarily within the realm of politics, youth was 
beginning to be organised: the Boys’ Brigade in 1883, the Primrose [League] Buds 
in the 1890s and the Boy Scouts in 1907 are examples of this trend. Of particular 
contemporary political relevance to initiatives to organise Tory youth were the 
founding of the Young Liberals in 1903 and, earlier, the socialist Sunday schools.  
 
Although one might argue that the founding members of the Junior Imperial 
and Constitutional League were hardly youths but more exactly younger men, the 
League did recruit youths to its ranks as it expanded. Herbert Williams’ experience 
in Tipton in 1909 provides evidence of this. He had already organised young boys 
between 12 and 16 years old to act as canvassers’ scouts before he had heard of the 
League and when he became aware of it he formed them into one of its branches. It 
was not necessarily easy to deal with such a wide range of ages in inculcating Tory 
politics in the young. Williams drew attention to the difficulty when he observed in 
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1910 that ‘in some constituencies the members had to be younger than in others and 
consequently there had to be a watering down of politics’.63 Even if electoral work 
was effective in the political motivation of young people the League’s leadership 
was to an extent middle-aged and this drew criticism. One member expressed the 
view  that the ‘Executive should consist of young men and that politics should be 
kept well in sight by branches,’64 The evidence suggests that this was so and that the 
League did  ‘create [the] practical interest in political work and organisation among 
younger members’ that its formal statement of objects called for.65 The League was 
chronically ambiguous about the appropriate ages its members and, on the evidence 
of its central bodies, did not have clearly defined lower and upper limits. However, it 
was less uncertain initially about deciding what to call itself. 
 
When a group of individuals comes together to initiate a new political 
organisation, it ought to be a fundamental requirement that it must give a name to the 
organisation that succinctly conveys the purpose of that organisation. The name 
decided upon and the specific words selected may be taken to indicate how the 
organisation sees itself and wishes to be seen by others. Thus in choosing the name 
‘the Junior Imperial and Constitutional League’, we see immediately its primary 
interests. It might reasonably have called itself ‘the Junior Unionist League’ or a 
neutral more abstract name but it did not. In choosing to include ‘imperial’ and 
‘constitutional’ in its name, the League’s founders recognised and associated 
themselves in a supportive way with two of the most important contemporary issues: 
the desire for imperial unity and the need to retain Ireland within the polity of the 
United Kingdom and thus oppose Home Rule. The naming of the League thus had a 
certain fashionableness about it in directly acknowledging these salient 
contemporary political questions. The choice of ‘imperial’ was inspired by an 
affinity for Chamberlain and his policy of imperial preference. The League was 
strongly supportive of tariff reform even after the electoral defeat of the Tories in 
1906 when the issue had been at the centre of the electoral campaign. A resolution 
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was passed at the annual general meeting in 1929 calling on the party not to allow 




Notwithstanding its managerial and financial issues and its uncertainties 
about its youthfulness and name, to what extent did the League sustain its ideology 
and achieve its objects? In April 1913, Imbert-Terry claimed that the League ‘had 
more than vindicated the objects of those who had founded it…’67 but he did not 
elaborate or refer in detail to the objects. In assessing Imbert-Terry’s assertion, the 
formal statement of the League’s objects can be divided into two parts: first, the 
actual aims or ends to be achieved and secondly, the means by which those ends 
were to be reached. The latter comprised inter alia the setting up of branches and 
close relationships with the senior organisation and there is ample evidence, some of 
which has already been discussed, to assess the success of the League in those 
respects. The former aspect is more difficult to evaluate because there is a lack of 
information in its records relating to the League’s unionist, constitutionalist and 
imperial purpose. The minutes of the various meetings of the League are generally 
inward looking and deal largely with administrative matters, and only occasionally 
with political issues. For example, there were no political resolutions at the annual 
general meetings in 1909, 1910 and 1911. In 1912 and 1913, the general meetings 
were followed immediately by an annual conference but only the latter was, 
reportedly, extensively political in content. Furthermore, if coverage in The Times is  
accepted as a valid yardstick, the League received very little publicity in the press 
about its political activities
68
 and it lacked its own means of regular publicity until 
May 1913, when it introduced an insert in Our Flag. However, the relatively rare 
occurrence of recorded political discussion may mean that, when it did occur and 
was recorded in the League’s official records, it was because the subject was of 
exceptional importance to members. As might be expected from an organisation 
closely bound up financially and organisationally with the Tory party, it did not 
dissent from official Unionist policy. 
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At the first annual general meeting of the League in April 1908, a resolution 
was passed unanimously ‘supporting Balfour and his Unionist policy; in opposing 
[the Liberal government’s] …education Bill which ignores the rights of parents; … 
[and its] attempt to abandon the two Power Standard of Naval Strength’.  It is worth 
noting that the principal speakers supporting the resolution were Sir R. Hermon-
Hodge (1851-1937), Sir Harry Samuel (1853-1934) and Herbert Nield MP (1862-
1932) none of whom could have been accurately described as younger members of 
the party and who convey a sense of blimpishness. Nield, a xenophobic die-hard 
Tory, and Samuel, a dedicated supporter of tariff reform, were members of the 
League Council at the time. Hermon-Hodge, who, like Samuel had lost his 
parliamentary seat in the 1906 general election, was a soldier and freemason whose 
‘chief delights’ were horse-racing and hunting.69 The resolution itself and the 
unanimity with which the meeting accepted the principal speakers’ arguments 
suggest an atmosphere of militarism. Mixed with militarism was xenophobia; 
Nield’s was consonant with the League’s defence of Britishness. For example, in 
January 1914 the Executive committee fashionably, and in the context of German 
spy fever, agreed unanimously, in an expression of nationalism, ‘that only British 
waiters should be employed’ at the League’s forthcoming annual dinner.70 The 
caterers complied. 
 
It was not just foreigners to whom the League showed its chauvinism; 
women were also expected to know their station. The annual general meeting in 
1912 resolved ‘by a considerable majority’ that parliament should ‘oppose any 
measure extending the Parliamentary Franchise to women until it has been approved 
by a majority of the Electors of the United Kingdom’.71 This opposition was in 
accordance with Balfour’s policy but the League, or at least its Executive committee, 
were divided on the question, as were the party. H.G. Williams, a member of the 
committee, criticised Unionist MPs who were supportive of women’s votes declaring 
that they were ‘acting in a manner hostile to the best interests of the party and the 
Empire’.72 At the next committee meeting he proposed that enfranchising women 
would be ‘an outrage’. Several members opposed the resolution but it was passed by 
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eight votes to five.
73
 The importance of the issue to the League is evident in the fact 
that this was the only recorded occasion in the period before the First World War 
when a political issue was formally debated by the Executive committee and put to a 
vote.  
 
Williams’ references to ‘party and empire’ without mention of ‘nation’ or 
‘United Kingdom’ are arguably typical expressions of the League’s priorities. 
Loyalty to party was a sine qua non and unity of the United Kingdom and of the 
Empire its main purpose. These two unification campaigns combined at the meeting 
of the Executive committee in April 1912. Once more agreeing unanimously, it was 
resolved ‘to invite all Branches to meet on Empire day…and pass a Resolution 
against the Home Rule Bill’. The resolutions were then to be sent to the prime 
minister.
74
  The Executive committee was pleased with the branches’ response; ‘at 
least eighty had written promising to pass the resolution’.75 The League continued to 
oppose Home Rule vigorously and deplored its constitutional impact. Branches were 
encouraged to obtain signatures from their members declaring that to pass the Bill 
into law without a referendum was unconstitutional and pledging that if the Home 
Rule Bill were enacted individual members would be ‘justified in taking or 
supporting any action that may be effective to prevent it being put into operation’.76 
 
The League’s emphasis on imperialism can also be seen in its choice of 
slogans from the earliest days of its existence that were intended to inspire young 
men. They were quotations from past and present Tory leaders and were included in 
an eight-page booklet launching the League’s activities: ‘The Commerce of a great 
Country like this, will flourish under the shadow of Empire’ (Salisbury); ‘What we 
are aiming at is the Consolidation of the British Empire’ (Balfour); and most pithily, 
from Joseph Chamberlain, ‘Learn to think imperially’.77  Empire and trade, then, 
were themes given priority and illustrate the traditionalism of the League. 
Contemporaneous imperial activist groups such as the Tariff Reform League and the 
United Empire Trade League also made trade with the Empire their main concern. In 
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the JIL, the Empire and its defence were evident: it recorded its ‘appreciation for the 
splendid manner in which the dominions are coming to the aid of the Mother 
Country by undertaking to share a portion of the Naval Defence of Empire’.78 Again, 
the JIL was not alone among imperial activist groups in supporting integrated 
imperial defence: The Imperial Federation (Defence) League and the British Empire 
League are contemporaneous examples. And tradition, with its emotional 
companion, nostalgia, was present in the closing remarks of the last annual report 
before the Great War: ‘…the youth of the Unionist party possess in the fullest degree 
the same spirit of patriotism that was shown by their fathers in similar periods of 
national danger’.79 Imperialism, militarism, tradition were the threads that wove the 
fabric of the League’s beliefs. It is no surprise, therefore, that early in 1914 the 
League approached Rudyard Kipling to write an ‘Ode to the League’. However, for 




The League’s meetings are not the only source in which its ideological 
priorities can be seen. It also produced leaflets and lantern slides. An educational 
sub-committee was set up in May 1911. It decided not to publish its own political 
literature nor to deal directly to the electorate. However, lists of books and leaflets 
(‘not confined to NU publications’) that dealt with the most important political 
topics were to be compiled and sent to branches. The topics comprised tariff reform, 
socialism, Home Rule, House of Lords reform, the Royal Navy, old age pensions 
and Conservative policy and record.
81
 It is not clear if these lists were ever compiled 
and promulgated because the Executive committee deferred consideration of the 
matter
82
 but they do identify the League’s political priorities, whether they were 
produced or not. The annual report for 1914 reveals the League’s consistent political 
purpose; first, in the use of lantern lectures that had been made available to branches 
on the British Empire, Home Rule, and tariff reform and imperial preference, as well 
as ‘The Life and Times of Lord Beaconsfield’; and secondly, in thanking a number 
of organisations to which it was indebted for literature and speakers: the Union 
Defence League, Primrose League, Tariff Reform League, London Municipal 
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Society, Imperial Maritime League, Anti-Socialist Union, Church Defence 
Committee, and ‘other similar organisations’. The Junior Imperial League felt a 
particular affinity with the Primrose League when it asked permission to use its song 
book.
83
 Imperialism was a feature of both organisations, a shared raison d’être. 
Comparison of the two Leagues helps any attempt to locate the JIL in the spectrum 
of imperial activist organisations. 
 
Martin Pugh has argued that the Primrose League emerged partly as a result 
of ‘the apprehension of Conservative leaders’ about the potential of the National 
Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations, founded in 1867, to contest 
official party policy. The Primrose League was created by a group of Tory 
parliamentarians who saw the Tory leadership as lacking dynamism. It was ‘a party 
within a party’84  with the object of rectifying the ‘the failure of the Conservative and 
Constitutional Associations to suit the popular taste or joining all the classes together 
for political objects’. 85 Anyone who was not an atheist or enemy of the British 
Empire was eligible to join and had to declare ‘that I will devote my best ability to 
the maintenance of Religion, of the Estates of the Realm, and the unity [and Imperial 
ascendancy] 
86
 of the British Empire…’. Apart from the reference to religion these 
were pledges very similar to those of the Junior Imperial and Constitutional League. 
As one might expect some individuals were members of both organisations: Claude 
Hay MP and R. Belilios are examples. 
 
The JIL was less formally hierarchical than the Primrose League. Although it 
frequently had leading members both centrally and in the Branches who were 
aristocratic, its subscription structure was not based on a system of payments whose 
escalating amounts bought a higher and higher place in the hierarchy. In JIL 
branches everybody paid the same subscriptions. The two organisations had systems 
of awards and honours mildly reflecting the contemporary practice of inventing 
tradition.   Another similarity of the two bodies was that they worked closely with 
the NUCCA. The JIL, unlike the Primrose League, was heavily reliant financially on 
the central organisation of the Conservative party. Both had limited central budgets. 
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The Primrose League had most of its resources in its habitations (branches) and this 
is probably also true of the JIL. The Primrose League’s central funds were much 
greater than those of the JIL. In the late nineteenth century it had annual income of 
about £7000 whereas the JIL’s central funds rarely exceeded £1000 in any year 
before 1914. There was a ‘traditional preference of Conservatives for patronising 
local bodies’87 rather than central organisations and this may explain the lack of 
central funds in the JIL. 
 
Both organisations tended to use their central meetings more for the 
discussion of administrative matters than political issues, and they were also 
remarkably similar in their attempts to bring politics to those who might not 
otherwise take an interest in the subject. They both saw the need to educate their 
members in the branches through a process that avoided undiluted proselytising and 
thus saw the importance of social activities throughout the year in drawing members 
together. However, members of the Primrose League were ‘reminded…that [social 
events] were only a means not the object of the exercise’.88 In the JIL there was also 
a recurrent concern about the balance between social and political activities. 
 
A major difference between the two leagues was the demography of their 
respective memberships. The Primrose League recruited widely. Its habitations 
admitted to membership ‘non-Conservatives, women, non-voters and children’89 
whereas the JIL called upon new members to sign a document stating that they 
adhered to Unionist principles and was, with rare exceptions, exclusively male until 
1918. It even excluded women as guests from at least one of its annual dinners. The 
absence of branch records before 1914 prevents us from establishing how 
widespread was the exclusion of women from JIL social functions. Nearly half the 
Primrose League’s members were women which, because children were also 
members, means that they may have outnumbered men.
90
 It is interesting to note that 
during the Edwardian period the Primrose League turned its attention more strongly 
towards youth as a means of counteracting the growth of socialism. The Primrose 
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League collaborated with the Boy Scouts as part of the ‘current fashion’ for 
organising young people.
91
 There are very few details available of JIL membership 
before 1914 but what little evidence there is suggests a male membership between 
the ages of about eleven and thirty, although there are several examples of this upper 
age limit being exceeded. This is a major demographic difference from the Primrose 
League. 
 
The Primrose League was imbued with the traditional characteristics of 
Conservatism: the monarchy, the church, the constitution and the Empire.
92
 The JIL 
had different emphases: the Empire and the constitution were central to its beliefs 
but the monarchy was less evident in its deliberations, at least in its central councils 
and committees. Perhaps respect for the Crown can be assumed to be present in an 
organisation that wishes to unify the Empire. The king was a powerful symbol of 
imperial unity. Religion receives no mention in the central records of the Junior 
Imperial and Constitutional League. One cannot, however, conclude that it was an 
atheist organisation; perhaps religion did not form part of its corporate ethos and 
practices, or was simply taken for granted.    
 
The Primrose League’s imperialism was ‘quite blatant’.93 It attracted mass support 
particularly at times of heightened feelings of popular imperialism such as the twelve 
months from July 1899 that included the early part of the Boer War. Over 40,000 
people joined the Primrose League during that period. A similar surge in 
membership of the JIL of almost 70,000 occurred between January 1910 and January 
1912, a period that included a major constitutional crisis in Britain. The Primrose 
League was one of many imperialist organisations that sprang up in the Late 
Victorian and Edwardian periods but unlike others its imperialism was ‘vague, 
amorphous and sentimental’.94 It avoided political controversy. The same cannot be 
said of the Junior Imperial League with its unequivocal resolutions in support of 
imperial unity that were from time to time passed at its meetings. The JIL was a very 
much smaller organisation than the Primrose League; it had 70,000 members in 
January 1912 compared to the Primrose League’s 650,000 that year. It was, however, 
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a growing organisation whereas the Primrose League was in decline. Furthermore 
the JIL was a more politically committed organisation than the Primrose League and 
its imperialism was masculine, specific, and not vague or simply sentimental. That is 
not to say, however, that it made a radical impact on political matters in the period 
between 1905 and 1918.  
  
The League’s impact 
Despite its administrative and financial difficulties the League was not 
without impact on the political life of the time. At the outset it saw its branches, 
supported by the central organisation, as the key resource to be used for its activities. 
According to an early booklet published by the League, branch activities included 
lectures, debates, discussions and entertainment; holding public meetings in 
collaboration with senior Conservatives; canvassing; tracing people who had moved 
house; registration of those qualified to vote but not on the register; clerical work; 
and recruitment of both juniors and seniors.
95
 Members in the branches were thus 
seen as material to be educated in political matters and as resources to be used in 
preparing for elections and in elections themselves. There is some evidence to show 
that there were processes for attempting to make an electoral impact but little or none 
by which to measure the strength of that impact. Thus, for example, members were 
mobilised at by-elections and thanked for their efforts but one cannot measure their 
numerical effect on the electorate. The executive committee described how the 
League had, ‘as usual, taken a prominent part in Bye-Elections…[in 1913 with]… 
habitual enthusiasm’.96 Before that, in 1912, John Gibson, the Unionist candidate for 
South Hackney wrote ‘thanking the members of the League for their splendid work 
on his behalf’.97 In the same year, Reginald Blair MP thanked the League for the 
‘excellent work performed by them on his behalf at the recent successful By-Election 
at Bow and Bromley’.98 Finally, in 1914, R. Kerr Clark and Sir Matthew Wilson MP 
recorded their thanks for the League’s ‘valuable work’ in the recent by-elections at 
Bethnal Green and Poplar.
99
 Although by simply reading the minute books of the 
League one would be almost unaware that there were two general elections in 1910, 
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the League did make an impact on the general election in December of that year. A 
letter from Arthur Balfour to Imbert-Terry was published in The Times expressing 
his ‘best thanks for the admirable service [the members of the Junior Imperial 
League] have done throughout the contest’.100 The further engagement of the League 
in electoral work from about 1912 can be seen in a reference in November that year 
to ‘the effective and increasing assistance given by the Juniors in recent By Elections 
and Municipal contests’.101 Moves to help at by-elections began in 1908 when it was 




In the second main activity designed to make an impact, the political 
education of members, it is possible to gain a clearer, more numerical, picture of the 
level of activity and to see a strong working relationship between the centre and the 
branches of the League. The growth of socialism and its influence on young people 
was seen as a threat, and a motivating factor, therefore, in the League’s educational 
activities was the recognition that socialist parties were effective in ‘educational 
work with young people’. Courses of lectures were necessary ‘to counter Socialistic 
parties endeavours to capture young men of this country’.103 These remarks were 
aspirational but we can see the volume of practical activity in the report to the 
Council in November 1913 that ‘since the last Council meeting [in May 1913] 
speakers had been supplied by [headquarters] to 265 meetings of Branches’.104  
 
The third way in which the League sought to make an impact was through its 
monthly publication, an insert in Our Flag. Its total circulation was 170,000 but the 
insert was limited to a small fraction of this; in October 1913, for example, only 
14,200 copies had included the League’s insert. This circulation figure should be 
seen in the context of the League’s claim that its total membership at that time 
exceeded 100,000. If we assume that two or three people read each copy, not more 
than half the members would have received news of the League’s activities in any 
one issue.  
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There is no doubt that by 1913 the League had become a very active political 
organisation. However, on the evidence available, evidence which comes almost 
exclusively from the League’s own management, one cannot be sure about its 
effectiveness. Imbert-Terry was perhaps exaggerating when in a self-congratulatory 
spirit when he declared that ‘the vast membership…was doing…most powerful and 
good work throughout the length and breadth of the land’.105  Steel-Maitland 
expressed his ‘great faith in the League’ in February 1914. With a general election in 
mind he was clear about the main role of the League and where its impact could be 
greatest: the ‘duty of branches was [he said]…first to place their services at the 
disposal of the Unionist Agent for their constituencies’ (emphasis added).106 But  the 
next general election did not happen until December 1918 by which time the effect 
of war had been to destroy the League almost entirely. However, the League 
recovered after the First World War and perhaps its most important achievement was 
to rebuild the foundations of what was to become, by 1939, the largest political 
youth organisation in Britain and, after the Second World War, the Young 
Conservatives.  
 
The League’s political activities were suspended during the war but 
individual members responded to the war in two ways: by serving in the forces and, 
for those who did not enlist, by assisting troops arriving in London on leave. For 
those League members not in the services there was an opportunity to assist those 
who were. The Overseas Forces Reception Committee was a collaboration between 
the League, the Victoria League, the Maple Leaf Club (an organisation supported 
financially by the Ontario government)
107
 and the Peel House Club, with the purpose 
of greeting overseas troops from the Empire arriving in London at the rate of six 
hundred trains a week at ten railway stations and conducting them to their 





Members of the League reacted strongly and patriotically to the call to enlist. 
By February 1915 ‘at least 65 per cent of eligible members’ had joined the army or 
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navy. Nevertheless, the Executive committee believed that more could be done and 
decided to write to those branches that had not ‘adequately responded to the call of 
duty’.109  Contact with branches was difficult, however, because in many cases all 
the office holders were absent in the forces. By October 1915, branches had so 
completely, willingly and patriotically responded ‘to the country’s call that it was 
difficult to find any eligible members who had not enlisted’. For example, at Mile 
End only six out sixty-seven members had not enlisted
110
 and forty out of forty-eight 
secretaries of branches in the metropolis were on active service.
111
 The relative 
strength of members’ commitment to the call to join the services can be seen in a 
comparison with the overall response by young men at the time: before conscription 
was introduced early in 1916, only about 25 per cent of all eligible men in the 
country had volunteered.
112
 By 1918 the League had lost many valued members not 
only in its central committees but also in the branches. It was estimated that between 
sixty and seventy branch secretaries had been killed (out of a total of about 350 
branches active at the outbreak of the war).
113
 All the League’s most senior officials, 
however, Imbert-Terry, Hallett, Cannell and Danford Thomas remained in post and 
their continuity enabled the League to begin its revival in 1919. 
 
Conclusion 
Any attempt to draw conclusions about the Junior Imperial League before the 
First World War must be treated with caution. This discussion of the League’s 
activities has relied heavily on the League’s own central sources. The League 
received little publicity in the press and as far as I am aware there are no surviving 
records of individual branch activities before 1918. Such sources would have 
provided a more balanced and comprehensive picture. The League, itself, was 
satisfied that it was an effective political force. Its annual report in March 1914 
declared: ‘..the League has progressed with such astounding rapidity as to be now 
capable of playing a conspicuous part in the approaching battle for Unionist 
supremacy’.114 Certainly individual branches were active in the constituencies not 
simply when there was an election campaign in progress but also at other times in 
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strengthening electoral rolls. This work, as we have seen from the congratulatory 
messages from candidates, was useful. The regular supply of speakers to the 
branches is also indicative of a demand for political information that the central 
organisation was willing and able to meet. This activity ‘advanced the Unionist 
cause’ but it is difficult to quantify the extent to which this was true. However, the 
lantern slide lectures produced by the League emphasised the educational aspect of 
its purpose and it would be unreasonable to conclude that no younger members were 
made more aware of the political issues of the day from a Unionist perspective. The 
relentless opposition to Home Rule was a major part of the League’s programme and 
reflects its desire to ‘uphold constitutional principles’. It is in advancing the cause of 
Imperial Unity that the League appears least dynamic in meeting its objectives. 
Apart from two references to Canada, no colony or Dominion is mentioned in the 
central records. Empire Day was important but when it received especial focus it was 
in the context of Home Rule and the League’s imperial interest therefore seems 
Anglo-centric and unglobal. The League supported Tariff Reform and Imperial 
Preference through organising resolutions in the branches
115
 but there is no evidence 
that it sought similar support from overseas. Even when a letter was received from 
Montreal suggesting setting up League branches in order to accommodate members 
emigrating to Canada, consideration of the matter was deferred.
116
 The League’s 
motto was ‘For Empire’ but its commitment to imperialism seems largely passive 
and commonplace and its attempts to advance imperial unity relatively weak. The 
need for greater effort in that direction was recognised after the First World War 
when the League amended its objects to include the words ‘[to form] junior 
associations in each parliamentary division throughout the Empire’, replacing its 
former emphasis on metropolitan organisation.  
 
Finally, whatever the ambitions of the League, it was severely limited in what 
it could achieve politically, even when it had emerged from its period of poor 
administration before 1910, because the supervising committees lacked resources. At 
the end of the period of rapid growth when it had reached, it claimed, over 100,000 
members its central income could still be counted only in hundreds of pounds. 
Consequently one must assume that the branches were reliant largely on their own 
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resources and enthusiasm and, if so, that there would have been a sense of weak 
direction from the centre. Multifarious local activities but no strong national message 
may explain why the League received so little publicity, publicity without which it 






Table 5. Analysis of early Junior Imperial League Branches
117
 
Date formed Name of 
branch 
%Unionist 
vote 1900  
%Unionist 
vote 1906 
Category Region Pr. League 
membership 
 C. Hackney      
4/07 Bath 57.3 43.2  Bristol 2440 (1880) 
4/07 Bedford 53.4 45.1 A Central 1696 (1900) 
6/07 Dulwich (76.4) 51.4 A London 215 (est.) 
1886-88) 
10/07 N.Islington 65.5 45.5 B London 40 (1886) 
7/08 S. Exchange    [London]  
7/08 Central 
Finsbury 
53.2 44.5 C London 140 (1888) 
 Coventry 55.7 45.5  W.Midland  
10/08 Brentwood    Outside 
London 
 
10/08 N.West Ham 61.5 42.7 B Outside 
London 
68 (1888) 
11/08 Leytonstone    Outside 
London 
 
3/09 Peckham 59.3 37.6 C London 115 (1888) 
3/09 West 
Bromwich 
47.7 43.8  W.Midland 209 (1888) 
3/09  Leyton    Outside 
London 
 
3/09 S.Hackney 51.9 30.2 B London 1993 (1891) 
4/09 W.Bridgford      
 /08 Reigate 62.5 49.1  Outside 
London 
906 (1888) 
 /08 Stepney 61.8 57.3 C London 114 (1888) 
10/07? N.Hackney 67.2 48.8 A London 952 (1888) 
10/07? Dover (64.5) 65.7 B Outside 
London 
2000 (1900) 
10/07? East Finchley 54.3 41.9 C London  
10/07? Hoxton 
(Shoreditch) 
52.5 55.9 C London 115 (1888) 
10/07? Brixton 
(Lambeth) 
71.3 48.4 A London 80 (1888) 
10/07 S.St. Pancras 67.1 49.3 B London 95 (1886) 
10/07? Haggerston 
(Shoreditch) 
49.7 46.1 C London 220 (1889) 
Overall % at 
general 
election 
 51.1 43.6    
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 Data derived from Pelling, Social Geography of British Elections, and from Pugh, The Tories and 
the People. 
Chapter 3. The Junior Imperial League 1918-1939: its governance and 
membership 
 
The revival and growth of the Junior Imperial League in the years after the 
First World War were positively influenced by the expansion of the British electorate 
and the return of party politics after the break-up of the Lloyd George coalition in 
1922. The League’s largely aristocratic and upper-middle class leadership recognised 
the necessity of attracting young men and, for the first time in substantial numbers, 
women, drawn from an eclectic mix of social classes, who could contribute to the 
future electoral success of the Conservative party. The Junior Imperial League, it 
will be argued, recruited young people of the new, post-war, middle class, as well as 
from the working class. 
 
The mixing of social classes in the League brought accusations of snobbery 
in some of its branches, especially in its social activities, but the League provided 
opportunities for young lower-middle class men and women to acquire political 
skills, to advance through the League’s hierarchy and, in some cases, to become 
members of parliament.  
  
The social and political circumstances of Britain were a significant element 
in the growth of the League’s membership in the 1920s and in its subsequent decline 
in the following decade when the increasing attractions of the wireless and the 
cinema drew League members away from its own social activities. Furthermore, the 
1930s were years of national government dominated by the Conservatives in which 
there were only two general elections compared with five between 1918 and 1929; it 
was thus a time in which political campaigning was, it will be suggested, less 
interesting to young people. Nonetheless the League was a much larger and more 
successful organisation than its counterparts in the Labour and Liberal parties. It was 
well managed by an older generation in the Tory party and became increasingly 




The governance of the League 
The leadership of the League throughout its existence is notable for its 
stability and continuity. These attributes were quite rare in imperial activist groups 
because many of them, such as the IFL, ISAA, ERDC and the Empire Crusade, did 
not survive long enough to display them. When groups did last for several decades, 
however, individuals sometimes showed remarkable long-term dedication. The most 
notable examples are the League of the Empire, whose founder Mrs Ord Marshall 
was its honorary secretary from 1901 until her death in 1931, the EPA, in which 
Howard d’Egville was a leading figure for almost fifty years, and the Round Table 
whose founders were a dominant force from 1909 until the Second World War. 
 
In the JIL between 1906 and 1945, none of the key posts of president, 
chairman, secretary, treasurer and organising secretary was occupied by more than 
five individuals (see Appendix 1). These posts, with the exception of the organising 
secretary, were part-time and honorary and there was never a large central 
department of full-time officials available to plan, direct and control the daily 
activities of the League. However, the leadership was supported by a three corporate 
assemblies: the Central Body, the Central Council and the Executive Committee, to 
which several sub-committees reported, notably a finance committee and a publicity 
committee. Examining the membership and activities of these organisations helps to 
explain the governance and leadership of the League. 
 
The Central Body consisted of an unlimited number of life members, patrons, 
and subscribers of the League who, in effect, bought membership of it by paying, 
respectively, a single donation of £25, and an annual subscription of £10.10s or 
£1.10s. These were substantial sums, even allowing for inflation, when compared, 
for example, with the annual subscription of 2s 6d made by a Knight of the Primrose 
League, in the 1880s.
1
 In addition to a payment, each individual had to sign a 
declaration that they supported the principles of the League and have their 
membership approved by the Central Council.  The League’s records do not reveal 
the size of the Central Body but it was not seen by its members to be sufficiently 
large; a resolution passed unanimously in 1924 called on its membership to be 
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  It met annually and it seems to have been primarily a means of attracting 
funds from wealthy individuals sympathetic to Conservative politics. Its only 
apparent power was to elect, from its membership, twelve people to serve on the 
Central Council and six on the Executive Committee of the League. All members of 
the Central Body were entitled to attend the League’s annual general meeting.   
 
In addition to the officers of the League, the Central Council drew its 
membership from the officers of each of its seventeen federations and two 
representatives from each divisional council. It was closely allied to the main party 
by including a number of Conservative Party officials such as its chief whip, its 
chairman and vice-chairmen, chief organisation officer and chief publicity officer. 
Representatives from the Provincial Agents’ Association were also members of the 
Council. It is difficult to assess how much influence these officials actually had on 
the Central Council because records of the content of its meetings are brief and there 
are no attendance lists. A remark made at one of its meetings, reminding members 
that the chief whip was entitled to attend, suggests that their lack of awareness that 
that was the case means that their attendance was sparse. Nevertheless the fact that 
they had been given such an entitlement shows, at least, that the League wanted a 
close relationship with the most senior officials of the Conservative party hierarchy 
even to the extent of involving them directly in the governance of its affairs. 
Certainly there must have been close informal links. For example, in 1927, Lord 
Stanley was appointed a deputy chairman of the party at the same time as holding the 
chairmanship of the League. Other examples are Lord Eustace Percy, who was 
simultaneously a vice-president of the League and president of the Board of 
Education in Baldwin’s cabinet in the nineteen-twenties, and Lord Dunglass who 
was parliamentary private secretary to Neville Chamberlain from 1937 to 1940 
whilst he was chairman of the League. These close connections gave both formal and 
informal opportunities to advance to League’s interests as exemplified by a hostile 
remark by J.C.C. Davidson, the party chairman, that Stanley used his dual 
appointments to place ‘the League in a favoured position’.3 
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 Bodn. CPA CCO506/1/3 Central Body May 1924. 
3
 J. C. C. Davidson, Memoirs of a Conservative: J. C. C. Davidson’s Memoirs and Papers, 1910-37, 
ed. by Robert Rhodes James (London, 1969), p. 273. 
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Management of the League’s business was delegated by the Council, under 
its strategic direction, to an Executive Committee. The structure of the committee 
was very similar to that of the Council. It drew its members from the same sources: 
the party, the officers of the League, the Central Body and the federations and 
divisions. To a certain extent there was, therefore, duplication of effort between the 
two bodies, the main differences being that the Council met only twice a year 
whereas the Executive Committee met monthly.  
 
It was not only in the formal structure of its council and committees that the 
League was closely connected to the Conservative party. It had representatives on 
the Central Council of the National Union of Conservative and Unionist 
Associations. Initially, these were confined to senior members of the League: its 
chairman, secretary, three others selected by League headquarters, and the chairman 
of each federation.  It was not until 1938 that the League became fully integrated 
organisationally into the main party. The impetus for this change came, it seems, 
from the Conservative party whose chairman, Douglas Hacking, had set up a 
committee in March 1937 under Malcolm Fraser to recommend ways in which the 
League could be brought into closer cooperation with the party. The result was that 
at the annual conference of the National Union later that year a resolution, passed 
unanimously, and proposed by two members of the League asked that:  
 
The Junior Imperial League should be taken by the Party into full partnership and its position should 




It meant much greater representation of the League in the National Union’s 
central council  and also closer involvement in the affairs of local constituency 
organisations as well as Conservative party area councils. The League also set up a 
permanent network of area organisers to work closely with constituency agents. 
League federations were also given greater freedom to manage their financial 
resources which could now be devoted entirely to local activities. 
 
These changes finally placed young Tories on an equal footing with the 
men’s and women’s organisations within the party structure and provided an 
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opportunity to participate much more effectively in the business of the Conservative 
party. Young men and women interested in Tory politics had finally been formally 
and properly recognised by the party and had completely dispelled the suggestion 
made, when they were founded over thirty years earlier, that it was an impertinence 
for a young man to become involved in politics. The possibility of a young woman 
doing so was even less acceptable to older people but nevertheless they were, to a 
limited extent, politically active. The reforms of 1938 announced the consummation 
of the efforts of Tory youth to be taken seriously by the senior organisation. 
 
In spite of this one can see from the names of the individuals who headed the 
organisation (see Appendix 1) that the League was led by aristocrats who, whilst 
they were not old men, cannot be accurately described as youths or even within the 
League’s upper age limit of thirty. In the inter-war years the posts of president and 
chairman were always held by individuals who were at least in early middle age. The 
posts of secretary, treasurer and organising secretary were usually held by older, 
middle class, men.  One might conclude that the central organisation of the League 
represented older men from the upper reaches of society providing leadership for 
younger men of a much wider range of classes in the federations, divisions and 
branches. Even in these parts of the organisation, in many cases the president of a 
federation would be an older person, sometimes a junior member of the aristocracy, 
sometimes the wife of a member of parliament.  Arguably, there is a loose positive 
correlation between age and position in the class structure and seniority of post held 
in the League.  
 
It has been suggested that ‘[o]ne function of youth movements…was to 
smooth the way for upper-working class and lower-middle class assimilation into the 
urban-industrial order of British society.’5 Whilst this description does not fit exactly 
the League, it has some relevance to it. The League might be characterised as older, 
upper-class, people leading young people of all classes in the ‘right’ political 
direction in a controlled fashion, so that by the end of the 1930s they agreed to give 
them more effective involvement in the governance of party affairs. 
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The growth and decline of League membership 
The impact of the First World War on the active membership of the League 
was extremely severe. It fell from about one hundred thousand in three hundred 
branches to perhaps only a couple of thousand in only six active branches. There 
was, therefore, no rapid, straightforward, resumption of the activities of the Junior 
Imperial League immediately after the end of the First World War. The high 
proportion of members who joined the military, their slow demobilisation after the 
war, and the deaths in the fighting of many League officials combined to prevent it. 
The League had suspended its operations during the war; a substantial proportion of 
its members, especially those likely to be leading the activities of branches, were of 
military age and so were deployed in the armed forces.  By February 1915 ‘in many 
Branches not a single office bearer was left’6 and in October it was ‘difficult to find 
any eligible member of the League who had not enlisted.’7 A year later, even before 
the introduction of conscription, ‘75 per cent of Junior Imperialists who are eligible 
[had] joined the colours’8 and a survey of the forty-eight metropolitan branches early 
in 1918 revealed that in forty of them the secretary was on active service and a 
further three were ‘abroad on Government work’.9 At the end of the fighting, in 
November 1918, many members, not only in the branches but also in the League’s 
central committees, had lost their lives in the war. It was ‘estimated that more than 
ten thousand members died in their country’s service’10 out of a membership 
approaching one hundred thousand of which only a proportion (perhaps about two-
thirds) were of military age.
11
 Between sixty and seventy branch secretaries had been 
killed out of a total of 353 branches active in August 1914.
12
 However, all the 
League’s pre-war senior central officials, the Chairman, Hon. Secretary, Hon. 
Treasurer and Organising Secretary, remained in post throughout the war and this 
continuity enabled the League more readily to attempt its revival. 
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In March 1918 the chairman, Henry Imbert-Terry, wrote to the branches 
emphasising the importance of the new Representation of the People Act which 
enfranchised all men aged twenty-one or over, and women over thirty who were 
ratepayers or married to a ratepayer. The Act greatly increased the size of electorate 
from 28 per cent to about three-quarters of the adult population.
13
 Even though the 
official age range for membership of the League of fourteen to twenty-five years 
might suggest that only a minority of its male members were enfranchised, and very 
few women, the Executive Committee recognised the electoral importance of women 
by passing unanimously a resolution stating that ‘it is essential that the co-operation 
of women in the working of the League should be welcomed and secured’.14 In 
addition a member of the Executive Committee was sent, in the Spring of 1918, on a 
tour of the provincial Divisions of the League to convene meetings that would 
attempt to assess and revive interest in the League but the meetings were poorly 
attended and ‘were used for recruiting purposes for the navy and the army’.15 
Clearly, at that time, the League’s members were concerned with military rather than 
political matters, a view reinforced by Imbert-Terry’s decision not to send his 
proposed letter to the branches because to call for ‘vigorous political action [by the 
League]’ at the time of the German Spring offensive would have been inappropriate 
and ‘mistaken policy’.16 Furthermore members of the League who were not in the 
armed services were engaged in the activities of the Overseas Forces Reception 
Committee who met, between 1916 and 1918, three quarters of a million Dominion 
troops arriving at railway stations in London and guided them to their 
accommodation.
17
 These duties continued until well into 1919 and diverted attention 
away from the League’s affairs.18 
 
The League’s branches appear to have had no involvement in the general 
election in December 1918. For many branches the loss of their officials killed in the 
war exacerbated the problems of resuming activities and meant that they lacked the 
organisation and leadership to do so. The main party also had its organisational 
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problems. The election campaign began officially on the day after Armistice Day 
and, with polling day set for 14 December, there was little time for well-organised 
campaigning by parties that had suspended normal political rivalry during the war. 
The way in which the ‘coupon’ that officially endorsed coalition candidates was 
issued sometimes caused confusion and resentment. For example, in Liverpool, a 
Tory official claimed that interference by Central Office had cost the party ten seats 
in the region.
19
 Furthermore, The Times described the election as ‘the quietest…in 
modern times…free from the old kind of party horseplay’20 during which the 
political parties encountered a puzzled and apathetic public. In these circumstances it 
is unlikely that the League would have been an effective campaigning resource even 
if it had been as organised to be so as it was to become in later years. Progress 
towards that goal required more time. 
 
By the early summer of 1919, the results of a survey of all 353 branches 
concluded that although there was ‘eagerness to carry on the work of the League’21 it 
was too early to do so because of the slow rate of demobilisation of young men in 
the services some of whom were members of the League. The Central Council was 
informed in December 1919, at its first meeting since April 1914, that only fifty 
branches were fully functional. Another hundred were ready to resume activities but 
eighty-one branches still had no secretariat.
22
 By the beginning of the nineteen-
thirties this situation had been transformed. In its Annual Report for 1930 the League 
boasted ‘some 2000 branches’.23  
 
There were two sources for the expansion in the number of branches: the 
creation of new ones where none had previously existed, and the affiliation of 
established junior organisations whose political principles coincided with those of 
the League.  For example, in 1921 the Lancashire and Cheshire Federation of Junior 
Unionist Associations decided to affiliate its fifty branches. Nevertheless growth in 
the early nineteen-twenties was affected by the party political neutrality created by 
the coalition government that had been elected in December 1918. In many 
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constituencies the senior Unionist Association was completely paralysed ‘especially 
in constituencies represented by Coalition Liberals’ and this had meant that local 
agents delayed the setting up of junior associations.
24
 However, the League’s 
chairman, Imbert-Terry, reported an improved picture in April 1922: 
 
The continuation of the Coalition and the uncertainty inseparable from such a state of political affairs 
did much [in 1921] to prevent the growth of the League; but now in all respects the League is 
gradually surmounting the ravages of the War, and resuming something of the former strength and 
numbers. Over two-hundred organisations are affiliated to the League, and ‘applications for the 




Six months later the uncertainty was removed. The Lloyd George 
administration collapsed when Tory backbenchers voted in October 1922 to 
withdraw support for it and thus allow normal party politics to resume causing ‘the 
instant revival of interest in the work of the League’.26 This revival coupled with the 
expansion of the electorate in 1918, and again in 1928, created conditions conducive 
to the greater involvement of young people in party politics.  Table 6 shows the 
growth of the branches and membership claimed by the Junior Imperial League 
between 1909 and 1929.  
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Table 6. Growth in Junior Imperial League Branches and Membership, 1909-
29 
Date Branches Members Source Notes 
1909  Jan 30 3,000 Torchbearer 
1939 
 
1909  Dec 180 45,000 “  
1910     
1911 280 70,000 “  
1912  Dec 330 100,000   
1913     




1918 6    
1919  Jan 60  The Imp 
March 1928 
 
1920  Jan 114  “ See Note 1. 
1921  Jan 166  “  
1922  Jan 200  “  
1923  Jan 310  “  
1924  Jan 430  “  
1925  Jan 500  “  
1926  Jan 787  “  
1927  Jan 1015  “  
1928  Jan 1240  “  







2 Feb 1929 
 
 
Note 1. The figures for the number of branches are, with minor discrepancies, 
corroborated by Annual Reports and Minutes of Council and Executive Committee 
meetings.  
 
Although the League regularly, and proudly, publicised its growth in terms of 
the number of its branches, detailed figures of the number of members in individual 
branches and in total were rarely stated. The membership figures shown in Table 6 
seem to be rounded and therefore approximations. If we nevertheless accept them as 
reasonably accurate then it is clear that average branch membership fell from about 
250 before the First World War, to about 150 in 1929. Occasionally the total 
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numbers of members in branches are referred to in the League’s extant records. In a 
recruitment campaign in 1935, for example, an internal report claimed that sixty-one 
new branches were formed with a total membership of ‘almost 13,000’ suggesting an 




Total membership of the League declined during the nineteen-thirties from a 
peak of 250,000 in 1929, which figure, incidentally, exceeded the total individual 
membership of the Labour Party at that time of 229,000.
28
 The League’s membership 
in 1939 was estimated to be ‘approximately 100,000’.29 This figure may be an over-
estimate. In a survey
30
 of 221 branches in 156 constituencies in England and Wales 
in 1939, the average number of League members in each constituency was 
approximately a hundred. If we extrapolate these figures to estimate the total 
membership in all 520 constituencies in England and Wales, we arrive at an 
estimated total membership of only about 52,000. The true figure probably lies 
somewhere between fifty and one hundred thousand but if we accept the upper 
estimate, there was a fall of sixty per cent from the total membership announced by 
Lord Plymouth, the League’s president, ten years earlier. Whatever the rate of 
decline in membership may have been in the nineteen-thirties, an internal analysis of 
membership by region compiled in December 1934 confirms a downward trend (See 
Table 7, below). 
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Table 7. Approximate Membership 1934
 31
 




Northern 4221 3.6 
Lancashire and Cheshire 19038 16.0 
Yorkshire 12104 10.2 
East Midlands 9493 8.0 
West Midlands 13650 11.5 
Eastern 11542 9.7 
Essex 6066 5.1 
Middlesex 5522 4.6 
Kent 4562 3.8 
Surrey 3429 2.9 
Sussex 2145 1.8 
Wessex 7288 6.1 
Cornwall 2143 1.8 
Devon 2677 2.3 
Somerset 4270 3.6 
Wales 3854 3.2 
Total 118868 100.0 
  
The loss of membership was not due simply to falling numbers in functioning 
branches. Some branches ceased to operate at all. An internal report in May 1937 
referred to thirteen branches as ‘recently notified defunct’. However, the problem of 
failing branches was not ignored by League Headquarters; in 1936 twenty-two 
branches were revived, re-formed or re-organised and in the first five months of 
1937, thirty-one.
33
 There were also several national recruitment campaigns during 
the nineteen-thirties. One can interpret these campaigns as reflecting anxiety or 
disappointment that the League was not sustaining sufficiently the interest of young 
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people in politics. Certainly, in February 1939, Lord Dunglass (later, as Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home, prime minister) the League’s chairman, in a speech announcing a 
national three-year drive for new members, declared that  
 
The League is the largest youth political organisation in the country…but it 
still has a very much lower membership than it should have. Our objective must be 
greatly increased membership.
 34
    
 
This objective was never met. 1939 was the last year in which the League 
was active. A few months after Dunglass had spoken, national circumstances called 
for recruitment of a different kind and of much greater importance. But what were 
the causes of the decline in the membership of the League?  
 
Throughout the existence of the League a constant theme was the need to 
balance the amount of social and political activity in the branches. The reasons for 
the expansion, and subsequent decline, of the League lie, therefore, in members’ 
varying interest in these two types of activity.  A more detailed discussion of the 
League’s activities is contained in Chapter 4. However, a limited analysis of branch 
activities shows an increase in political activity and a corresponding relative decline 
in social events. In January 1927, 52% of activities were political or semi-political
35
 
rising to 57% by July 1930 and 61% in July 1937.
36
 A more detailed analysis over a 
longer continuous period of time is necessary in order to confirm any trend towards 
greater concentration on political issues but it is possible to suggest some reasons 
why such a trend occurred. 
 
The greater interest in political matters may have resulted from a loss of 
members who favoured the most popular social activities: sports, trips and outings, 
dramatics and dances. Alternative forms of entertainment grew rapidly from the late 
nineteen-twenties. The arrival of ‘talkies’ in 1929 caused a decline in the 
performance of live music
37
 and also drew between eighteen and nineteen million 
people to the cinema each week throughout the thirties. Broadcasting also 
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increasingly provided a way in which to spend leisure time. Radio licences increased 
from almost two million in 1926 to three million in 1930, to twice that by 1934 and 
almost to ‘saturation coverage’ by 1939. By then, ‘to have missed a popular 
programme became a social disability’.38 This pull towards other forms of social 
activity than meeting at the local branch of the League was accompanied by a push 
towards more political activity. Ordinary members wrote to the League’s journal 
urging members to take more interest in political issues and the party agent in 
Shrewsbury, J.H. Montgomery, argued that he would ‘rather have a…branch of 30 
young men and women sincerely studying and training for the future than 300 who 
join for the social side…and do little to support [the party]’.39 A more formal attempt 
to strengthen the standing of politically serious members was expressed in a 
resolution passed at the annual conference in 1934 calling for a full membership to 
be granted ‘only [to] such persons who are willing to undertake practical political 
work in the cause of Conservatism’40 but the idea of two categories of membership 
was rejected by the Executive Committee albeit that they were ‘desirous of 
extending the political activities of the League’.  One can interpret these calls for a 
stronger political aura in the League either as a need to overcome political apathy or, 
conversely, as a message reinforcing growing political interest. Nevertheless 
political messages and social circumstances may well have combined to make social 
members feel less welcome in the branches and drive them towards readily available 
alternative means of satisfying their social needs thus leaving behind a stronger 
proportion of political membership. 
 
The peak membership of 250,000 that the League claimed in the early 
nineteen-thirties should be seen in the context of approximately six million people 
who were aged between fifteen and twenty-five and so it is quite likely that the 
membership was exaggerated by League officials in order to try to over-emphasise 
the popularity and power of the League. In any case the figures may have been 
compiled by simply adding to existing records new branches without taking into 
account moribund and defunct branches and any loss of membership from active 
branches. If, however, we accept the membership figure of 250,000 it would seem 
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that it was not only unsurpassed in the years leading up to the Second World War but 
also, after 1945, by the League’s successor organisation, the Young Conservatives, 
whose membership peaked in 1949 at only 157,000.
41
 There was therefore perhaps a 
unique confluence of social and political circumstances in the nineteen-twenties that 
caused the League’s rapid growth in membership to its highest level ever. 
 
The Junior Imperial League was not the first organisation to be founded with 
the purpose of organising Tory youth. For example, the Lancashire and Cheshire 
Young Conservatives, with about sixty branches, already existed before the League 
was founded. Other, smaller, organisations such as the Isle of Thanet Young 
Conservatives, the Leicestershire Young Conservatives, the Epsom Junior 
Constitutional Club and the Young Conservatives Union in London were also active 
and illustrate the diversity of young Tory organisations. The Junior Imperial League 
leadership encouraged these organisations to affiliate and indeed sought, 
unsuccessfully, a leading role in comprehensively integrating them into a single 
organisation. Many did affiliate to the League and this provided a rapid means of 
growth for the League in the nineteen-twenties. The League’s claims about its 
growth in the number of its branches therefore give an exaggerated picture of the 
increase in its membership, if such increases are meant to indicate that young people 
were being newly recruited to the pursuit of Tory principles. Affiliating branches 
were not young Tories joining the party for the first time, but merely existing groups 
associating themselves with the League. Nevertheless this affiliation process was 
responsible for the rapid growth of the League and seems to have been more strongly 
manifest in the nineteen-twenties, during which time those who wished to affiliate 
had done so, than later when the emphasis was much more on direct campaigns for 
the recruitment of truly fresh blood.  
 
Nor was the Junior Imperial League the only organisation for young people 
of a political party. The Liberal and the Labour parties also organised youth for 
political purposes.  The National League of Young Liberals was founded in 1903 and 
by 1928 had 500 branches with ‘a paying membership of 25,000’, a figure which 
understated the total membership, according to its national secretary, because ‘many 
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of our members are too poor to pay any subscription’.  Its members, almost half of 
whom were women, engaged in canvassing and the distribution of literature under 
the supervision of the local constituency agent and were ‘an effective rival to 
the…Junior Imps’.42 They worked closely with local officials and were also capable 
of expressing themselves forcefully at their annual conferences. In 1932, for 
example, they resolved to support free trade and called on Liberal ministers to resign 
from the National Government. This did not mean, though, that they had no imperial 
feelings. Three years earlier, in 1929, they criticised their rival Tory league for 
‘abrogat[ing] to itself the name of Junior Imperial League’ and repudiated ‘the 
impertinent assumption that the Tory Party…has a monopoly of Imperial sentiment’. 
This limited evidence suggests that Liberal youth and the senior organisation had, at 
worst, a modus vivendi, but the same cannot be said of Labour youth and its senior 
organisation. 
 
The Young Labour League was formed in 1920 from the amalgamation of a 
few local party youth sections and by 1924 had 24 branches.
43
 By the beginning of 
the nineteen-thirties it was still narrowly based, operating effectively in few 
constituencies.
44
 Partly this was due to lack of financial resources but, more 
crucially, the National Executive Council was wary of organising youth in the 
Labour party because it believed that it would be too radical and undisciplined. It 
therefore placed tight restrictions on its activities by emphasising social and 
instructional activities at the expense of political matters. The NEC regarded its 
young people as politically naïve and unqualified to express views that were contrary 
to those of the party leadership and so it did not allow members of the Young Labour 
League to discuss political issues freely, to influence local committees or participate 
actively at Labour party annual conferences. Its main use, the NEC believed, was as 
an electoral resource. The resultant tension between the Labour party and its youth 
organisation was chronic and intrinsic and eventually led to the collapse of the latter 
in 1939.  According to Layton-Henry  
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[The] fundamental conflict is the clash between the instrumental role the party wishes the young 
movement to fulfil and the dominance of expressive politics in the youth movement…Loyalty to 
socialism is valued [by Labour youth] above loyalty to the Labour party.
45
    
 
One can contrast this with the attitude of members of the Junior Imperial 
League. In that organisation young people frequently and, seemingly 
wholeheartedly, expressed their support for the party’s leadership. This did not mean 
that they suppressed their ideological feelings; members from time to time contested 
the policies of their party, especially in imperial matters. However, arguably they 
demonstrated the antithesis of the attitude of young socialists and generally put 
loyalty to the party above ideology. Perhaps they were able to do so more readily 
because their pragmatic ideology was somewhat less rigid than that of their Labour 
counterparts. A second significant difference was the attitude of senior 
Conservatives to the Junior Imperial League. It would be quite wrong to argue that 
there were never tensions between seniors and juniors, but the League was 
increasingly integrated into the main party. For example, it took part in the 
Conservative annual conference and had representatives on the National Union of 
Conservative Associations. All this did not necessarily mean that their opinions were 
taken into account by the party leadership any more than was the case in the Labour 
party. It does, however, suggest that the Tories knew how to manage their juniors 
more effectively and did so by educating them in political matters, allowing them to 
participate and to express their political ideas.  This gave the members of the League 
feelings of involvement and freedom of expression, in contrast to the repression felt 
by members of the League of Labour Youth. The autocratic denial of an activity can 
become a spur to taking action that challenges and subverts a perceived tyrant, 
especially if it is youth that has been denied by an older generation. The Tories, with 
their participative attitude to youth, seems to have understood this. The Labour party 
did not and ‘never had a satisfactory relationship with the young’.46  
 
 
An important cause of the post-war expansion of the League was the many 
young women who took up the opportunity to become members. Until David Jarvis 
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examined it in the 1990s, ‘‘[t]he nature of the Conservative appeal to women in the 
crucial decade of the 1920s [had]…attracted little historical attention.’47 The Junior 
Imperial League was an important part of this appeal but even Jarvis does not 
include it in his analysis and almost nothing has been written about it by historians. 
The senior party, responding to the vital need to attract women voters in 1918, 
identified four characteristic types of potential Tory female voter: ‘the responsible 
citizen, the anti-socialist, the caring capitalist, and the imperialist.’48As will be seen 
in the discussion in Chapter 4, these types fit well with the activities and ideology of 
the young women who joined the Junior Imperial League, even though they were 
unable to vote until ten years later, in 1928. Recruitment into the ranks of the main 
party and of the League was not part of a self-consciously feminist movement, which 
would have had socialist connotations, but part of a trend in the greater involvement 
of women in party politics. However, even though electorally emancipated by 1928, 
women in the League could still convey an air of female political inferiority as an 





There were almost no female members of the League before the First World 
War but from 1919 they were freely admitted to membership and the pent-up need to 
be part of a junior political organisation meant that numbers grew rapidly. According 
to H.I.P. Hallett, the Hon. Secretary of the League, ‘ [In 1919] women began to flock 
into the League in large numbers’50 and were ‘in large measure’51 responsible for the 
revival and expansion of the League immediately after the war. During the nineteen-
twenties they became predominant in many branches and this caused concern that 
the balance between the two genders needed redressing. At the Annual Meeting of 
the League in 1927 a resolution was passed unanimously calling for ‘immediate 
steps to be taken to…increase the membership of the Men’s Sections of those 
branches where there is a preponderance of active women members’.52 The 
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resolution also suggested that young men were more apathetic and less involved in 
the branches’ activities than were women members. Admission of women to 
membership of the League was the cause ‘in large measure…not only the growth of 
the reviving League from 6 to 60 branches by January 1919, but also the subsequent 
expansion over the country’ by 1928.53 Miss C.A.Payne, Vice-Chairman of the East 
Midlands Federation of the League, wrote that year that the influx of women and 
girls meant that: 
 
In most branches…the positions of officers are filled by an equal number of boys and girls, the same 
applying to the Committee. The actual membership of the branch varies…from district to district, 




In the nineteen-twenties, therefore, women members, and the affiliation of 
established branches, produced an unusually rapid and unsustainable rate of growth 
in membership.  
 
Another factor which may have made the nineteen-twenties an unusually 
fertile period for the political activities of youth was the calling of elections. The 
various activities of the League will be discussed in more detail later but one of its 
most important and enthusiastically undertaken ones was assisting parliamentary 
candidates at general elections and by-elections. Members of the League were often 
congratulated by constituency agents and candidates on their efforts at election time. 
The publicity given to politics at that time could act as an effective means of 
attracting new members and stimulating the political activities of existing ones. As 
the League began to revive after 1919 its activity was stunted by the anaemia of 
party politics in a period of coalition government. However, the four general 
elections fought in the nineteen-twenties were three-cornered fights between the 
Conservative, Liberal and Labour parties and with fewer and fewer seats left 
uncontested. Furthermore, the election of 1929 enabled young women to vote for the 
first time. These elements combined to create an atmosphere in which political 
awareness and activity among the young could increase and draw them into 
membership of the League. Indeed in February 1929, with a general election known 
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to be imminent, Lord Castlereagh, prospective candidate for Darlington, in a speech 
at a rally in Durham, claimed that the membership of the League in Darlington had 
grown in the last year from about 130 to 600. That increase, he said, ‘was typical of 
the whole country’,55 a statement that we should perhaps not take too literally in its 
arithmetical implications but rather as a perception of widespread rapid growth in 
membership. However, a more objective report in The Times exemplifies the 
argument about the combination of the League, women and elections: ‘At 
Darlington…[w]ith the enthusiastic aid of the Junior Imperial League [Lord 
Castlereagh] has captured the interest and allegiance of large numbers of new 
women voters’.56  
 
The nineteen-thirties were very different in terms of levels of activity at 
general elections. There were only two in the decade and neither was a close-run 
contest. By-elections and local elections still provided opportunities for campaigning 
but the long period of national government that began in 1931, with its large 
Conservative majority, created fewer opportunities for the members of the League to 
engage nationally in enthusiastic partisan electoral politics. In its annual report in 
May 1937, for example, the League referred to ‘a year of diminishing political 
activity’, presumably referring to electoral matters.57 The situation was unlike that of 
the preceding decade and it is likely that the relative electoral quiescence of the 
period was reflected in declining League membership. 
 
It does not seem to be by chance that in the inter-war years the growth of the 
League occurred in the years of stronger partisan politics, between 1922 and 1931, 
and that its stagnation and decline happened in years of coalition and national 
government in 1919 to 1922 and again from 1931. This is not to argue that the 
League was simply an electoral machine. Its range of political activities was wide 
and there is no single cause of the pattern of the recruitment or loss of members. 
However, perhaps its work during election campaigns was its most recurrently 
conspicuous and thus brought it its most effective means of publicising itself and 
therefore favourable consequences for recruitment and the retention of members. 
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Membership and social class. 
The growth and decline of the League’s membership gives an incomplete 
picture of the League that can be enhanced by looking at its social categorisation. 
There are, however, no records of membership that indicate class origins. 
Nevertheless some idea of the class issues that concerned the League can be gleaned 
from its debates and correspondence. They illustrate the recurrent tension between 
the political and social aspects of the League in the desire for as broad a 
representation of the classes as possible, on the one hand, and on the other, the 
manoeuvres of some branches to establish a degree of exclusivity in their social 
activities.  
 
The need to recruit more working class members was referred to by League 
officials on a number of occasions. It was a contentious issue. For example, at the 
annual conference in 1927 a resolution proposed that: 
 
…active steps should be taken in each branch to secure as members of the League more of the 
working class and humbler portions of the community. It views with disfavour practices in any branch 
which tend to discourage such portions of the community from joining the League, and recommends 




The resolution was passed only after the second sentence had been removed. 
It would seem, therefore, that either the meeting did not accept that some branches 
were actively trying to turn away working class applicants for membership, or that 
they did not wish to endorse officially that such practices occurred perhaps even to 
the extent of condoning them.  One speaker referred to ‘hundreds’ of branches 
having ‘50 per cent of the working class represented on their committees’, a 
statement that can be taken to mean that many branches had a significant working-
class membership that had influence in branch affairs. Certainly such a proportion 
fully reflects the fact that between 1918 and 1939 the working class vote in England 
was divided roughly equally between Labour and the Conservatives.
59
  Thus the 
desire for more working class members was not simply principled but also 
                                                 
58
 The Imp, 3 (June 1927), 5.  
59
 McKibbin, Classes and Cultures, p. 530. 
120 
 
pragmatic: they were needed in the campaign to defeat socialism. It was ‘very 
important that young boys just starting life in the factories should be attracted to the 
League’.60 The larger the branch the more likely it was to include a wider 
representation of the social classes, according to one member writing to The Imp. 
Such branches would be able to reject more effectively the accusation of the 
Socialist Party that the League wanted to be a ‘select’ organisation that ‘[shut] out 
those of the working class’.61 This was not, however, a policy that was invariably 
accepted by the branches and it was sometimes consciously subverted. For example, 
Leslie Wilkins recalled that: 
 
Junior Imperial League [dances] were “democratic” in that they were open to all at a reasonable price, 





Such snobbery was not uncommon. Victor Raikes, Vice Chairman of the East 
Midlands Federation, drew attention to the deleterious effects of snobbery in some 
branches. Any branch committee in which ‘all [were] much the same social 
standing’ resulted in the branch becoming an ‘exclusive club’.63 Snobbery was also 
uppermost in the mind of a member of the Hampstead branch who attended a course 
in 1930 for League members at Ashridge, the Conservative Party’s training 
establishment. Although sceptical on arrival, he was impressed by the fortnight he 
spent at the college and reported that ‘there was not a trace of snobbishness or class-
consciousness’,64 suggestive that it was something that he had expected to encounter. 
Snobbery, however, remained an issue throughout the nineteen-thirties. W.S. 
Shepherd, a member of the North London Council of the League, spoke in 1938 of 
‘many branches where a worker is not welcome and we have made the average £2-
£3 a week worker suspicious of the Conservative Party’.65 
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It is difficult to assess the intensity and salience of snobbishness among 
members of the League and attempts to turn away members of the working-class. It 
is clear, however, that recruitment of working-class people was seen as essential to 
the electoral success of the Conservative party. After the First World War, 
‘occupational class’ became a more important factor in determining how people 
voted than it had been before the war when religious allegiance had been more 
relevant.
66
 The leadership of the League recognised this but some members, perhaps 
those who regarded social events as more important in the League’s activities  than 
political ones, did not always agree. If so, this illustrates the continuing tension in the 
League between political necessity and social convenience. Thus, although a 
working-class person who voted Tory was welcome to the League politically, his or 
her presence at social events might be considered unsettling and undesirable to 
middle-class members. Middle class sociability was different from that of the 
working classes
67
 and it is not surprising, therefore, if this sometimes caused 
snobbery in some League branches. 
 
Recruitment from a wide field was seen as important by the leadership of the 
League.
68
 In late 1928 the League launched a major campaign to attract new 
members. A ‘special Imp recruiting film produced by the Gaumont Company…must 
have been seen by about 1,000,000 people during the recruiting period’.69 Going to 
the cinema was an activity widely enjoyed and the film would therefore have been 
seen by members of all classes. However, another part of the campaign, the 
publication of recruiting campaign letters over the signatures of leading members of 
the Conservative party gave the League a strong upper-class image but no more so 
than the Tory party itself. The signatories were Stanley Baldwin, Mrs Baldwin, Lord 
Balfour, J.C.C. Davidson, Lord Birkenhead, Earl Beatty, John Buchan, Lord 
Lonsdale, Field-Marshal Lord Plumer and Lord Derby. 
 
Nevertheless the League’s membership was eclectic and it would be wrong to 
identify it exclusively with any particular social class. At the very extremes of the 
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class structure it included such diverse people as Lord Eustace Percy (1887-1958), a 
son of the seventh duke of Northumberland, and a Derbyshire coal miner who was a 
member of the Alfreton branch of the League, who wrote in March 1927, in the 
aftermath of an acrimonious strike by coal miners that had lasted for eight months 
and ended in their defeat in December 1926,
70
  that he was a Conservative ‘because 
it was the only party that stands for God, King and Empire’.71  Of these three 
institutions it was probably the Empire that most enabled such extremes of the social 
order to join the League in a common cause.  
 
We know no more about the imperial sentiments of this Derbyshire coal 
miner than those expressed in his letter and this typifies a particular problem in any 
attempt to analyse the imperial beliefs of ordinary members of the League: 
documentary records of the imperial thoughts, beliefs and actions of ordinary people 
are rarer than those who have a ‘public presence’.72 Thus, for example, Percy’s 
imperial thinking is expressed in his published memoirs:   
 
It may have been the tragedy of the Empire between the [two world] wars that the statesmen of the 
late nineteenth century had made an imperial policy but neglected to make, in any serious sense, an 
imperially minded nation. …if imperial-mindedness be at all a matter of educated manners, we had 




The introduction of effective imperial propaganda in schools began, earlier 
than Percy suggests, in the 1880s
74
 and by the beginning of the twentieth century the 
‘schools seemed to be bringing the working-class imperial bacon home’.75 It follows 
that many of the young men and women who were members of the League in the 
inter-war years, and their parents before them, were products of this curriculum and 
it may help to explain the rate of expansion in the League’s membership between 
1918 and 1939; an increasing proportion of British youth had acquired imperial-
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mindedness and had learned to think imperially and were thus attracted to an 
organisation that had adopted ‘For Empire’ as its slogan.  
 
During the last decade of the nineteenth century there was a growing 
emphasis placed on the teaching of history in schools and by 1900 it was made 
compulsory in elementary schools. Young children would thus develop feelings of 
‘patriotism’ and ‘national pride’.76 The Board of Education believed that young 
children could not understand their nationality unless they were taught ‘how the 
British nation grew and how the mother country…has founded daughter countries 
beyond the seas’.77 It discouraged references in the classroom to ‘radicalism and 
systematic criticism of the socio-political order’ and wanted the history books used 
to contain ‘romantic’ narratives of imperial manly heroism exemplified by General 
Gordon and Lord Nelson. The new curriculum thus attempted to inculcate a sense of 
the Anglo-Saxon superiority of Great Britain and its Dominions and recognition that 
Britain had a duty to civilise and develop its dependent colonies. One cannot easily 
assess the impact of such a programme on the children and whether it might have led 
some of them to support the Empire politically. However, that schoolchildren were 
capable of being active in the League is illustrated by the example of William Turpin 
who at the age of fifteen in 1939, with the help of fellow pupils, succeeded in setting 
up a branch of the League in a Yorkshire village with an initial twenty members.
78
 If 
young people were imperially minded they were perhaps more likely to join the 
Junior Imperial League than the youth organisation of any other political party, even 




 ‘[g]rass-roots working-class activists in the Liberal, Labour and Communist parties were almost 
uniformly anti-imperialist, while those who were less interested in politics generally brought a healthy 
apathy to imperial issues.’  
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It would be wrong, however, to over-emphasise the dominance of the League 
as a force for youthful imperialism. As discussed earlier, the Young Liberals 
resented the League’s presumption of a monopoly of imperial sentiment.80 
 
No individual who joined the League was likely to be hostile to the Empire 
although one can speculate that some who joined for purely social reasons may have 
been indifferent to it. The League was closely bound up with the Conservative party 
whose belief in the Empire was manifest. For example, in Looking Ahead, a Tory 
publication reviewed in The Imp, it was asserted that ‘to strengthen and develop the 
Empire by every possible means is the first item in the programme of the Unionist 
Party.’81 Senior League figures who addressed the League’s membership conveyed a 
similar message to the youth of the country.  Any attempt, however, to assess the 
depth and breadth of the imperial thoughts of League members is problematical 
because of the need to rely on the League’s limited documentary sources. It would 
be wrong to assert that the sole purpose of the League was the preservation and 
advancement of the British Empire, but it clearly mattered to members when 
particular issues such as the governance of India and trade with the Dominions came 
to prominence in the nation’s political agenda.  
 
In respect of the more mundane activities of the League, imperialism is 
present through, for example, its regular and prevalent recognition of Empire Day 
each year and provides evidence that the celebration of Empire Day in the inter-war 
years was of political importance, although this has been largely overlooked by 
historians.
82
  It began, in 1904, as a ceremony in schools and soon spread to the 
wider community so that ‘[by the 1920s] it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
idea of [Empire Day] as a fixed and national celebration had taken root across a 
broad section of the population’.83  During that period, almost all members of the 
League would have known Empire Day activities as an annual event throughout their 
entire lives and many would have regularly participated in them during their 
schooldays. Later, in celebrating Empire Day as members of the League, they 
became part of the ‘[political] right [us]ing Empire day as a means of spreading 
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political propaganda and attacking socialism’.84 Celebrating Empire Day was not the 
only common element of the League’s imperialism as can be seen, for example, in 
speeches by Plumer, who referred to the need ‘to impress on members of the League, 
actual and potential, the responsibilities which devolve upon them as citizens of our 
Empire’ and Beatty who declared one of the purposes of the League to be ‘to educate 
the youth of the nation in a full and complete knowledge of the British Constitution 
and our great Empire’. 85  
 
The sentiments of these speeches and activities were not unfamiliar matters 
to members of the League. Many had personal, non-institutional, awareness of the 
Empire. As George Ayling, honorary secretary of the Midhurst Junior Conservative 
Association observed ‘it is extremely rare to find anyone [in the League?] who has 
neither friend nor relative in one of the Dominions’86 and his imperialism was strong 
enough for him to argue that the Tory party should change its name from 
‘Conservative and Unionist’ to ‘Conservative and Imperialist’ in recognition of the 
loss of Ireland but the continuing importance of the Empire to conservatism. 
Conversely, there were others who wished to remove the word ‘Imperial’ from the 
League’s name and replace it with ‘Conservative’. One member explained that 
although he supported the Empire, it was now more appropriate to include the 
League’s conservatism in its name.87 The issue was discussed at a Central Council 
meeting a year later, in 1930, but it was decided ‘by a large majority’ that no change 
to the League’s name was ‘advisable’.88 Some members continued to press for a 
change but, in 1938, there was still ‘very great opposition to any 
change…particularly among the older members’89 The question was further debated 
at the Annual Conference that year but a proposal to change the League’s name was 
defeated by 217 votes to 176.
90
 ‘Imperial’ was never removed from the League’s 
name. Imperial thoughts and deeds were undoubtedly closely associated with the 
League but it is difficult to gauge their strength and it may be, as some historians 
have concluded of the wider imperial picture, that in the League too, ‘Empire was 
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taken for granted and that which is taken for granted can be almost unseen.’91 If so, 
this would help to explain why references to the personal imperial connections of 
individual members are rare in the League’s publications and records. However, it is 
possible that League members were not generally conversant with the Empire.  
 
For example, at a conference of the Royal Empire Society in December 1937, 
attended by young people from many parts of the Empire, including members of the 
League, it was concluded that: ‘[o]ne fact that emerged very strongly…was the lack 
of knowledge in the various parts of the Commonwealth of the conditions of life and 
the problems of…other parts’.92 It may well be that this general remark did not do 
full justice to metropolitan youth, whose knowledge of the Dominions might be 
expected to be greater than, say, an Indian’s understanding of New Zealand. This did 
not mean, however, that members of the League were not keenly interested in 
imperial matters. At League meetings debates about the Empire occurred often, even 
if usually in the narrow limits of issues affecting only the Dominions and India, as 
will be seen in the discussion of the League’s ideology in Chapter 4.  
 
There is evidence that class relations in the League mirrored the structure of 
its organisation. There was a strong positive correlation between position in the 
League hierarchy and position in society in general. Peers were in many senior 
positions; from 1906 until 1945, the President of the League was always a peer. The 
involvement of aristocrats in the League carries a hint of noblesse oblige. 
 
In the 1920s, when a federal structure was being created, peers were often 
appointed as federation presidents. For example, in 1927 Lady Plymouth was made 
president of the West Midlands Federation and the Marquess of Tichfield held the 
equivalent position in the East Midlands.
93
 The appointment of aristocratic 
individuals to leading positions does not necessarily imply their close involvement in 
the affairs of the League. At the annual general meeting of the West Midlands 
Federation in 1935, Lady Plymouth was absent as were the Earl of Bradford and 
Viscount Bridgeman. The 131 members present were, with the exception of a 
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middle-rank army officer, all untitled people.
94
 On other occasions the peerage was 
more attentive.  At the inaugural meeting of the Sussex Federation in 1929, Lord 
Eustace Percy was elected its president. Viscount Gage chaired the proceedings and 
he was accompanied on the platform by the Earl of Plymouth, Lady Shiffner, Rear-
Admiral T. P.H. Beamish and only a handful of untitled persons. After the meeting 




The presence of peers was an almost universal feature of imperial activist 
groups at least until the Second World War. Before the First World War, almost 
every group had a significant aristocratic element with the Women’s Guild of 
Empire (founded in 1914) being a notable exception. Peers continued to be active in 
imperial groups in the inter-war years and had active leadership roles. Thus, for 
example, Lord Long was president of the EDU and Lord Hunsdon chaired the 
founding committee of the EIA.  This does not mean, however, that the middle 
classes did not participate in the management of imperial activist groups. Thus, for 
example, Henry Page-Croft emerged as leader of the EIA; and the IES and IEL, in 
the 1930s, had a strong upper-middle class element alongside a few peers.  
 
The central management of the JIL was also upper middle class, certainly 
until the early 1930s. In the branches themselves matters were more egalitarian with 
chairmen and secretaries generally ambitious young people from lower classes. The 
League’s records contain the names of many individuals and the offices they held 
but the possibility of analysing the changing class aspects of the League in the 
context of who held power in the League is problematical. Those who were 
aristocratic or at least upper-class and who led the League have left more details of 
their lives than those further down the social scale. This absence of information 
about ordinary members and the class to which they belonged means that no firm 
conclusions can be drawn about the League and its class structure. Nevertheless, a 
strong impression can be gained from reading the records that the League became 
more middle class during the 1930s. This is not surprising because between the wars 
the emergence of a larger, different middle class was a national social trend.
96
 For an 
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aristocrat or upper class individual, personal contact and common educational 
backgrounds such as Eton, Oxford and Cambridge, meant entry into influential 
positions in the League were made easy. This was not the case for middle class 
members who had to work their way up the League hierarchy or catch the eye of 
established politicians through their energy and speechmaking skills. 
 
Bernard Braine is one such example. The son of a clerk in the Admiralty, he 
was born in 1914. After leaving Hendon grammar school he began his career as a 
clerical officer in the civil service and joined the Junior Imperial League in 1933. By 
1938 he had risen to be chairman of the Home Counties S.E. Federation and Surrey 
Group Council of the League. During his military career in the Second World War 
he rose from private soldier to lieutenant-colonel. In 1950 he was elected to 
parliament and remained a member until 1992. Braine was an active and very 
influential member of the League in the nineteen-thirties and was described in an 
anonymous article in Torchbearer in August 1938 as having ‘made himself the 
effective spokesman of [the] movement’ to make the League a greater force in the 
Conservative party. In a speech to the Conservative Party Conference in 1937 he had 
argued for a much greater recognition of the League and for its full involvement in 
serious Tory politics: ‘We wish to be something more than the lickers of envelopes 
and the folders of circulars. We wish to be partners in a great firm’, by which he 
meant the Conservative party. Braine’s remark was not wholly justified. For 
example, in the general election in 1929 sixteen members of the League, all under 
thirty and who were clearly not mere clerks, had stood for election.  These young 
men, all born between 1897 and 1906, were, with only two exceptions, aristocratic or 
upper middle-class. Their predominant social characteristics were their education at 
public schools and Oxford or Cambridge, their military service in the First World 
War and their membership of the legal profession. Almost without exception they 
held senior office in the League as president or chairman of one of the its federations 
or divisions, or sat on its Central Council or Executive Committee. It is not possible 
to know whether they arrived at these senior positions through years of mundane 
service as ordinary branch members or, more likely perhaps, rapidly to the senior 
organisational levels of the League. They were, however, by 1929, indeed ‘partners 
in a great firm’ whose days folding League circulars were, if they existed at all, 
probably perfunctory. In any event, they were not the children of clerks and saddlers 
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but of such as the Marquess of Londonderry, of the Lord Lieutenant of Cornwall and 
of Thomas Cook, head of the dynastic travel agent.
97
 Certainly public school boys 
were perceived in the League as more politically competent; when a League national 
debating competition was mooted in the 1930s, one of the rules was that nobody 




Nevertheless, in June 1938 Braine’s wishes became reality when, following 
organisational changes in the Tory party, he was able to declare that the youth of the 
party had, at last, become ‘equal partners’ in the Conservative Party. This new 
arrangement brought much greater representation of the League on the Conservative 
party constituency associations, on Area Councils and on the Central Council of the 
National Union.  ‘Thus, at every stage of party organisation--constituency, area and 
national--the League is brought into full partnership’. It was according to Sir 
Douglas Hacking, the chairman of the party, on an equal footing with ‘the separate 
men’s and women’s organisations’. 99  Bernard Braine’s parliamentary career was 
moderately successful. He held junior positions in government until 1964 and spent 
the rest of his time on the backbenches where he ‘could easily have been mistaken 
for a traditional Tory knight of the shires’ and came to be seen as ‘a desperate 
reactionary’. Throughout his career he maintained his ‘high conception of Britain’s 
imperial role’ supporting the decision to invade Suez, and opposing sanctions against 
Rhodesia.
100
  Bernard Braine’s career illustrates the rise of a lower middle-class 
imperialist through the ranks of Tory political power. 
 
Another example of a lower middle-class individual who rose to ministerial 
rank in the government was Patricia Hornsby-Smith. She was an exact contemporary 
of Braine and her father was a saddler and umbrella maker. She was educated at 
Richmond county school and left there to do secretarial work. She joined the Junior 
Imperial League on 1930 and quickly became prominent as a very effective public 
speaker. Her involvement in politics led to her being appointed as principal private 
secretary to Lord Selborne, minister of economic warfare, in 1941. She was elected 
to the House of Commons in 1950 and remained there, with a break of four years, 
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until 1974 and held several government posts.
101
 Like Bernard Braine, she never 
attained cabinet rank but she illustrates the opportunity to experience a successful 
political career that was increasingly open to the youth of the Tory lower middle-
class that grew to maturity in the inter-war years and who can be contrasted with the 
cohort of young League members who stood for election to parliament in 1929. 
 
One of the reasons for the bias towards the selection of upper-class 
candidates was that some Tory candidates, unlike their political opponents, were 
expected to defray the costs of their constituency activities amounting to several 
hundred pounds annually and an additional sum at the time of an election.
102
 This 
rankled with impecunious League members who had political ambitions. At a 
meeting of the League Council in 1939, a motion was passed unanimously urging 
the party to select the candidates ‘on personal ability rather than financial standing’ 
and opined that the ‘excessive demands...on Members of Parliament and Prospective 
Candidates…in the form of…election expenses [were] detrimental to the best 
interests of the Party’.103 However, the need for such financial resources did not 
apply to local politics, a point made by William Ray, leader of the London County 
Council, in a speech to League members in 1927.
104
 Seeking local office, he said, 
was an easier and less costly way for ‘ambitious young men and women’ to further 
their political careers than standing for parliament. It may well be that what one is 
seeing here are circumstances that tended to divide young Tory candidates into those 
whose wealth enabled them to stand for parliament, and those of lesser means, and 
class, who were limited, at least early in their careers, to seeking positions in local 
government. Stephen McAdden illustrates the latter. He left school early to take 
employment as an office boy and subsequently as a labourer. He joined the Junior 
Imperial League and became chairman of its West Toxteth branch in 1929. In 1937, 
at the age of twenty-nine, he was elected to Hackney Borough Council. It was only 
after the war, in early middle age, that he became a member of parliament in 1950. 
One can speculate that he might have been a parliamentary candidate at a younger 
age, at the 1935 general election, had he been of a higher social class. McAdden was 
strongly supportive of the Commonwealth, voted against sanctions against Rhodesia, 
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and opposed Britain’s entry into the Common Market without proper safeguards for 
the Commonwealth’s interests. Like the Derbyshire miner, he demonstrates the 





We have seen in this discussion of the class structure of the League that it 
drew its membership from all classes and this relative social diversity is arguably 
one of its defining features. In particular, it afforded an opportunity for people from 
different social classes to intermingle in the pursuit of common political and social 
activities, and to do so in their adolescence and early adulthood when an individual’s 
tenets and beliefs may be more readily malleable than in later life. The leadership of 
the League was aware of this and therefore emphasised the need to attract young 
boys and girls away from socialism. The individual branches and, for some, the 
courses at Ashridge, afforded an opportunity to learn about Conservatism and its 
belief in the maintenance of the constitution and the Empire.  The League was 
essentially about the organisation of young people and, as has been observed in 
relation to non-political movements like the Boys Brigade and Boy Scouts, it may 
have ‘helped to absorb the upwardly aspiring into the ranks above them in the status 
hierarchy’.106 One cannot be certain about the extent to which this happened in the 
League because ordinary people whose names we see in the attendance records of 
branch meetings, divisional assemblies and national rallies have, with few 
exceptions, left no details of their changing social status. However, as has been 
shown by the examples of Braine, Hornsby-Smith and McAdden such absorption did 
occur.  From the middle of the 1920s, the effects of the expansion of secondary 
education and of newspapers, radio and cinema brought knowledge of better 
opportunities than youth groups for young men and women to move upwards 
through political and social strata.
107
 Consequently the popularity of youth 
organisations for those in the lower social strata declined and this might partly 
explain the fall in membership of the League in the nineteen-thirties. 
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It would be wrong to be definitive about any similarities between the League 
and other youth organisations such as the Boys’ Brigade and the Boy Scouts. 
Springhall, perhaps wrongly, specifically excludes what he refers to as the Young 
Conservatives from his book, on the grounds that it was not a youth movement 
because it did not ‘propagat[e]…a code of living, compet[e] for awards and 
badges…and provide [members] with … a uniform’.108 The League, however, did 
provide its youth with a (political) code, and badges and awards were a constant 
aspect of its activities. It was also part of the substantial and fashionable increase in 
the number of youth movements, both political and non-political, in the two decades 
from 1890 and thus it might be expected that they shared some common 
characteristics. An important one was that the structure of the hierarchies of these 
youth organisations was, as has already noted of the League, positively correlated 
with social status; those in the higher echelons of the class structure tended to retain 
their hold on the senior positions. As far as the League itself is concerned, this was 
not an obstacle to social mobility within its ranks. The significant change in class 
characteristics during the nineteen-thirties meant that social mobility was not merely 
upward movement through a rigid hierarchy of unchanging classes. This is 
particularly true of the middle classes, and it was a development that was beneficial 
to the League. 
 
The middle class that began to emerge at the beginning of the nineteen-
thirties was increasingly likely to be self-employed, and more managerial and 
technical in nature.
109
 It was a ‘modern’ middle-class and differed from its 
Edwardian predecessor which had been more centred on the medical, legal and 
religious professionals working on their own behalf. Not only did the middle-class 
become much larger from the middle of the inter-war years, but it developed a 
greater strength of feeling about a general need to defend the constitution, an earlier 
and specific manifestation of which can be seen in its pragmatic opposition to the 
general strike in 1926.
110
 The maintenance of the constitution, and of the Empire, 
was a fundamental tenet of Conservatism and it is therefore to be expected that there 
was a conflation of middle-class and Tory beliefs. This is not to suggest that the 
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middle classes were always Tory or that Tories were always middle class, but it 
reinforces the argument that the League was increasingly permeated with middle 
class members and values during the inter-war years. As one historian has 
concluded: ‘[t]he Conservative Party was, indeed, anxious both to assimilate and 
represent the newer middle class’.111 The Junior Imperial League is an important 
example of this, and one that has been neglected by historians. 
 
Conclusion 
The determination of its leadership to revive the Junior Imperial League 
immediately after the First World War provided a catalyst for a rapid growth in 
numbers during the nineteen-twenties. The League had lost many of its branch 
officials in the fighting, but all the League’s most senior officials had survived the 
war and retained their belief in the importance of youth in party politics. The 
changed composition of the electorate in 1918, the ending of coalition government in 
1922, and a succession of general elections contested by three substantial  political 
parties created an environment in which interest in politics could thrive, an interest 
that was not confined to those who could vote at general elections. The franchise was 
not extended to all adult men and women until 1928 but it is a measure of the 
success of the League’s growth in membership that it attracted a quarter of a million 
members between the ages of 14 and 25 years, many of whom did not have the vote. 
Especially for young unenfranchised women, the League was a new opportunity to 
engage in activities in a political context and they enrolled in such numbers that they 
were in the majority in some branches.  
 
The leadership of the League was never satisfied with the number of young 
people joining its branches and frequently arranged national recruiting campaigns 
with the stated wish of reaching half a million members. The growth of popular 
entertainment media such as the cinema and wireless and a Conservative domination 
of politics in national governments throughout the nineteen-thirties that rendered 
party politics less combative and more ‘unassertive’,112 acted against attempts to 
expand membership. It consequently fell to nearer 100,000 by the end of the decade 
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and it seems reasonable to conclude that, at least in terms of numbers, the League 
had reached its apogee by the beginning of the nineteen-thirties. That did not, 
however, weaken its importance within the organisation and hierarchy of the main 
party. It drew increasingly close to the constituency, area and national bodies of the 
Conservative party by increasing its representation and influence within them and 
thus enhancing the opportunities of young aspirant politicians to display their 
political skills to senior members of the party,  from whatever stratum of society they 
came. As we have seen some, such as Bernard Braine and Pat Hornsby-Smith, 
successfully grasped these opportunities. The League is an exemplar of the 
emergence of the new post-war middle-class that replaced the Edwardian version. It 
adapted to the changed socio-political situation after 1918 and left behind its upper-
middle class masculine single-minded defence of empire and constitution, to become 
a much more feminine and socially mixed organisation, retaining a loyalty to king 
and Empire, but now more interested in a wider range of electoral issues. 
 
The intermingling in the League’s branches of young people of different 
classes was not without tension. Accusations of attempts to exclude working-class 
people from social functions, of snobbery and of forming cliques, were recurrent 
throughout the period. The leadership, and some ordinary members, were alert to the 
need to recruit from the working-class if the party were to be successful at elections. 
However, this political objective was to some extent subverted by those whose 
enjoyment of the social activities of League depended upon those around them being 
the ‘right sort’. Nevertheless the membership of the league was socially remarkably 
diverse containing at one extreme the son of a duke and at the other a Derbyshire 
coal-miner. It is true that they occupied very different positions in the hierarchy of 
the League and there is evidence that there was a strong positive correlation between 
position in the hierarchy and social class: the aristocrats led, the middle-class 
managed and the lower classes participated. 
 
The growth and social membership of the League was a microcosm of the 
changing social and political circumstances of the years between the two world wars. 




Social occasions where the whole Conservative family met could definitely be awkward and were 
usually avoided. But the carefully managed sociability and the well-defined hierarchies were 




The bringing together of young Tory people in the League was not merely for 
social purposes, however. Although the fact that ‘[t]he 1920s and 1930s presented 
the younger generation, for the first time, with the opportunity to turn the pursuit of 
leisure into a major object of life’114 was important in any impact the League could 
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Chapter 4. The Junior Imperial League, 1918-39; its activities, ideology and 
impact 
 
The organisation and the membership of the League formed the foundation 
on which it could pursue its various activities and seek to make an impact on the 
political scene. The individual branches of the League provided a milieu in which 
young men and women could mix socially and it will be suggested that these non-
political pursuits throw some light on the manner in which men and women from 
different social classes mixed together during the inter-war years.    
 
Branch activities were always, deliberately, a mixture of the sporting, social 
and political. There were two reasons for this: first, to attract young people into the 
branches, and second, to hold their interest during the more politically quiescent 
periods. Maintaining the right proportion of political and non-political activities 
could sometimes be controversial but the leadership of the League was clear that its 
main purpose was to support Conservatism. Although sometimes challenging the 
leadership’s approach to imperial trade and to Indian governance, members of the 
League were strongly loyal to Stanley Baldwin. It was as an electoral machine that 
the League had most impact, and it will be argued that it was a significant resource 
for the Conservative party during general election campaigns.  
 
The League stuck to its belief in the British Empire, which it implicitly 
defined as the Dominions and India, and did not always address as closely and 
vigorously its political objectives in the domestic arena as it did in the imperial. It 
preferred to react pragmatically to topical domestic issues rather than adopting a 
rigid ideological stance. The League’s brand of imperialism had its roots in the ideas 
of Disraeli and Joseph Chamberlain, it will be argued, but the League gradually 
attenuated its imperialism throughout the period. It changed over time, and its 
metamorphosis took it from being an independent imperialist league of Tory young 
men before the First World War, to a political organisation of men and women with 
significant political skills, valued by the party, and more and more closely integrated 





In the League’s Handbook for Organisers and Workers, branches are given 
clear guidance about the nature and purposes of their activities. 
 
[They] should aim at maintaining a due proportion between their serious and their lighter activities. 
Sports and social events are useful in fostering comradeship and in attracting new members, but they 





These two types of branch activities can be seen as dichotomous and yet 
symbiotic. They were dichotomous because of what many members, of both the 
League and the Conservative Party, saw as a division between those members who 
preferred social and sporting events and those who engaged in political activities, 
and yet symbiotic because social activities attracted young people into a political 
environment and sometimes even paid for political events. For example, in March 
1927, the costs of a political demonstration organised by the Bristol Federation of 
the League were met from the ‘proceeds of social gatherings’.2 The ‘social side…is 
really essential in keeping [members] together and in building up…spirit’, but some 
senior Conservative Party members believed that ‘political activities [in the 
branches] held a very secondary place to social activities’,3 a view also expressed by 
a branch member who wrote:  
 
Locally [in the Freshwater and Totland Branch of the League] we never seem to get anything 
[political] unless it is followed by a dance…At present  the political side of the League is almost 
entirely in the background…4     
 
This criticism echoed that of Hubert Oliver, the Hon. Secretary of the Oxford 
City Branch of the League, who wrote in January 1927 expressing concern that the 
balance of activities favoured the social rather than the political. He preferred a small 
branch of fifty members keen on politics to a branch of two hundred that ‘scarcely 
ever touched upon’ politics.5  
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Whatever the relative strengths of social and political activities, it is clear that 
they were diverse both within and between branches. The Frazer Report (1937)
6
 
quotes a League member, explaining with ‘perhaps…picturesque exaggeration’, that 
‘a…meeting may mean Politics to a member in one Division; Tennis in the next 
Division; and Hiking in the next’.7  An article in The Birmingham Post, reprinted in 
The Imp in April 1930, provides evidence that contradicts Frazer’s remark about 
exaggeration.
8
 The diversity of branch activities is striking. According to the writer, 
there were well-managed lectures, debates and mock Parliaments all run by young 
members: ‘no-one over-age has anything to do with the direction of [meetings]’. 
However, the business of the branch was not all ‘dreadfully serious’. There were 
social activities especially in the winter when concerts, dances and whist drives were 
organised. In the summer there were rambles. Sports events were popular; ‘each 
branch’, the author claims, ‘has…clubs for football, cricket, tennis and swimming’.  
There is, perhaps, here, an example of ‘a youth movement…offer[ing] a…potential 
mechanism for the maintenance of class stability modelled on the public schools’.9   
 
All of this is confirmed in a recruitment poster which declared: ‘Join the 
Imps if you want Sports…Social Life…Political Life’.10 The sequence in which 
these activities is presented to the reader may not be significant and indicative of the 
League’s priorities, but it is recognition that football and dancing are effective ways 
of drawing young people into political activity. As a member of the League 
explained in a letter to a local newspaper: ‘we mingle social activity with political, 
but our aim is to further the principles of our movement amongst young people.’ 11 It 
was not an approach unique to the League. Although most imperial activist groups 
were much more political than social organisations, the Primrose League from late-
Victorian times had had ‘a rich array of social events and entertainments’ in its many 
branches
12
 and the Overseas Club, active from 1910 to the early 1920s, was 
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principally a social organisation, reporting that ‘every branch…holds a banquet, 
concert, or patriotic demonstration’.13  Social activities were also an important ‘part 
of the routine’ of the National League of Young Liberals and of the Labour League 
of Youth.
14
 In the Junior Imperial League social activities should not be seen as 
subverting or replacing the political. On the contrary, they were a means of bringing 
cohesion and continuity to branches especially during the summer parliamentary 
recess and in periods of quiescent party political activity such as during the coalition 
government after the First World War. There was ‘little doubt that the policy of the 
League in encouraging the sport and social side …had done much to keep the 
branches together during a very trying period’ when normal party politics were 
suspended.
15
 Furthermore, membership was cheap and so encouraged participation 
in recreational events: the annual subscription was only one shilling with additional 
contributions of a few pence to the cost of hiring halls.   
 
Whatever view one takes about the seriousness or otherwise of branch 
activities, in the same year of The Birmingham Post report, the Finance Committee 
of the League was unequivocal that the League’s main purpose was not social: ‘the 
ideals of Empire’, it reported in May 1930, were ‘the cause for which the Junior 
Imperial League exists to promote’.16 These sentiments resonated with the aphorisms 
of Tory leaders at the beginning of the twentieth century: Lord Salisbury declared 
that Britain’s commerce could only flourish ‘under the shadow of the Empire’; 
Balfour was clear that the League’s aim was ‘consolidation of the Empire’; and 
Joseph Chamberlain exhorted members to ‘learn to think imperially’. These were 
beliefs that the League’s leadership thought important enough to give prominence to 
in a League pamphlet.
17
 Another pamphlet issued by the League in 1922, What the 
League Can Do
18
, highlighted, in a series of sub-headings, a more general political 
content to the League’s activities. First, the arousing in young people of interest in 
political work; then, political education by means of lectures, discussions and 
debates; and helping the local senior Conservative association at public meetings, in 
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canvassing, registration of voters and in clerical work. These were practical political 
activities that saw the League’s members as a political resource. 
 
What was the balance between political and non-political activities in the 
League’s branches? An analysis of branch reports may help to answer this question. 
Forthcoming events were not generally advertised in advance in The Imp but reports 
about them were published each month and included very brief summaries of branch 
activities in the immediately preceding weeks. Those for July 1930 are summarised 
in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Analysis of Branch Reports in The Imp, July 1930
19
 
Type of activity Number of mentions % of total 
Sports 22 23.7 
Trips and outings 10 10.8 
Dramatics 5 5.4 
Dances 10 10.8 
Talks 24 25.8 
Rallies/demonstrations 7 7.5 
Recruitment campaigns 3 3.2 
Debates 6 6.4 
Other 6 6.4 
Total 93 100.0 
   
Any conclusions drawn from this analysis can only be tentative because the 
sample is small and it relates only to one month. The activities of only 96 branches 
were recorded at a time when there were over one thousand branches, according to 
Layton-Henry.
20
 Furthermore, although the analysis shows an equal balance between 
social and sporting activities on the one hand and political activities on the other, it is 
distorted by the activities of one area, Lancashire and Cheshire, which reported 
eleven of the total of twenty-four talks. The branch reports may have been selective; 
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social activities may have been chosen for mention rather than political ones, and 
vice versa. The analysis does, however, confirm the diversity of branch activities in 
the League and shows that they were, indeed, social, sporting and political. A 
directly imperial element was also present; four of the seven rallies were held to 
celebrate Empire Day. 
 
There was, in the League’s indoor activities, which included dances and 
dramatic performances, an echo of the Primrose League at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Even in that era in which the electorate was much smaller than the inter-war 
period, the Primrose League was conscious of the need to provide ways in which its 
members, even if they were non-electors, could mix with politicians in an 
entertaining social milieu. The Junior Imperial League imitated this policy and 
directly juxtaposed the social and the political: dances were often preceded or 
interrupted by a short political talk by an MP or other political dignitary. The ‘music 
hall…harvest supper’ of the Victorian Primrose League21 had been replaced by 
musicals such as  Imperial Follies and by the dinner dance but their purpose was 
essentially the same: to entice members to a social occasion which had political 
content.   
 
In the Junior Imperial League’s outdoor activities there were also faint 
echoes of the late nineteenth century. Although cycling does not seem to have been 
especially popular in the League, at least one branch participated. Paignton arranged 
a cycle tour in the summer of 1930. The late Victorian and Edwardian interest in 
cycling for pleasure had been largely middle class but in the nineteen-thirties it was 
‘predominantly a working-class pursuit’,22 and perhaps the apparent scarcity of 
League cyclists demonstrates the relative absence of working-class people in the 
League’s membership. Regardless of class, the high proportion of sporting activities 
in the branches is a direct consequence of a particular trend in the use of leisure time 
in the inter-war years. It was a period of rapid expansion in outdoor activities. 
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Rambling exemplified most powerfully the boom in outdoor activities. Until 
the attempt by the government to encourage such activities through the National 
Fitness Council created by legislation in 1937, they had been largely driven by 
voluntary organisations such as the Junior Imperial League. The fashion for rambling 
grew in the nineteen-twenties and early nineteen-thirties and was seen to be socially 
distinct from, and superior to, hiking. ‘Ramblers saw themselves as an elite with an 
interest in topography and tended to be drawn from the liberal professions’ whereas 
hikers were merely ‘fair-weather walkers more likely to be from ‘the lower-middle 
and upper-working classes’.23 It is interesting to note that many League members 
were enthusiastic ramblers and that references to hiking are missing in their report of 
activities in July 1930. That month, for example, the West Nottingham branch 
formed a rambling club, Swinton reported ‘very successful rambles’ and 
Grangetown had held ‘a regular series of rambles’.24 We are not given details of 
these rambles, such as how well they were attended or by whom but it seems safe to 
assume that they were enjoyed by both men and women and afforded an opportunity 
for them to mix together in relaxed, yet organised, circumstances that enabled them 
to converse informally on topics of mutual interest. Being outdoors enabled men and 
women to mingle in ‘a space of equality and freedom…which did not respect 
conservative conventions of freedom’.25 However, the presence of female ramblers 
was not acceptable to some supporters of established societal conventions, largely 
because of their attire; it was not proper behaviour, they believed, for women to wear 
shorts and thus expose their knees. Despite this criticism there were other 
opportunities for men and women to enjoy outdoor activities together whilst wearing 
sports attire. Tennis sections were formed by many branches and, at least in the early 
nineteen-thirties, was second in popularity only to rambling.  
 
The social standing of tennis during the first half of the twentieth century 
moved downwards through the classes from an upper-class activity to a more 
universal game. However, from its earliest days in the later Victorian years, tennis 
had provided an opportunity for men and women to mix socially in a sporting 
environment; it could ‘be played by either sex or by both together. Therein lay its 
                                                 
23
 Richard Holt, Sport and the British: a Modern History (Oxford, 1989), p. 200. 
24
 The Imp, 5 (July 1930), 15. 
25
 David Matless, Landscape and Englishness (London, 1998), p. 80. 
143 
 
true social importance’.26  Tennis expanded rapidly after the First World War from 
about a thousand clubs affiliated to the Lawn Tennis Association in 1914 to almost 
3,000 by the end of the nineteen-thirties and what had originally been a sport for the 
upper-classes, often played in country houses, had spread to the lower-middle classes 
many of whom played on municipal courts. Many of the new tennis clubs were 
frequented by ‘players whose dress fell “considerably short of English standards”‘ 
and thus struck a ‘vulgar’ note and brought a lowering of standards.27 
 
It is difficult to draw any clear conclusions, from these comments, about the 
degree to which tennis facilitated the mixing of the social classes because the fact 
that different social classes played the game does not necessarily mean that they did 
so together. It does appear, however, that tennis was not a sport much favoured by 
the working classes in the inter-war years. Indeed, Tony Mason argues that ‘middle-
class sports, like golf and tennis…enabled the middle class to segregate themselves 
from their inferiors’.28 Although tennis was a snobbish game before 1914 and 
became more universally played thereafter, snobbery could still be present in the 
inter-war years. Birley observes that the requirement to wear white (cream) not 
coloured clothes ‘was as important as the postal address of the tennis club’.29  This 
statement recalls the remark by a Junior Imperial League member that the 
requirement to wear a dinner jacket ensured that only people of an acceptable social 
kind attended League dinners even though the cost of a ticket was within the reach of 
the lower classes. One can speculate that a dress code set a similar standard at tennis 
parties. Whether or not different classes mixed at League games of tennis, it seems 
clear that men and women did: ‘Tennis was marvellous for meeting members of the 
opposite sex. Off court was probably as important as on court’ for doing so in the 
nineteen-twenties
30
.  One can reasonably assume that such ‘marvellous’ meetings 
also occurred when tennis was played by members of the League. A sentence in a 
contemporary official report is graphically evocative of such post-match occasions: 
‘[t]he cigarette held between slim fingers has become one of the symbols of female 
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emancipation, while lighting a girl’s cigarette is fast becoming a romantic cliché.’ 
31
Arguably, tennis in the League, as a part of its mixture of social and political 
activities, provided an excellent means for young women to enjoy their burgeoning 
sexual and political emancipation. From the point of view of branch committees, it 
was an example of how to maintain continuity during the summer months when 
interest in politics declined bringing the risk that some members might lose touch 
and not return in the autumn for the real purpose of the branch: politics.     
 
Other sporting arrangements reported by the branches were more general in 
nature, referring only to the setting up of a sports committee or sub-section. It is 
reasonable to assume that they included men and women in proportion to the overall 
membership of the branches. In any event, it seems that the League was keen to 
follow sporting fashion closely and not to be seen to be lagging behind the socio-
sporting trends of the period. The Lincoln branch formed a ladies’ cricket section in 
1930 not long after the emergence of organised women’s cricket and its first ‘public 
match’ played in 1929  received extensive reporting by the press.32  Nascent 
organised women’s cricket was a manifestation of what Alison Light has referred to 
as the movement by women away from identifying themselves with ‘the men in their 
lives’ and increasingly to ‘[represent] modernity in the post-war generation’.33 
Certainly, as was discussed in the section on membership in Chapter 3, women had 
their own, strong, identity in the League and spoke up for their political beliefs. 
Light argues that this feminist modernity helps to explain ‘the domestication of the 
imperial idea between the wars’ and ‘the elaboration of imperial fantasies’. If so it 
may well be a reason for the appeal of the League to young women of the period. It 
was indeed a time and a ‘world… in which the sexes meet on more practical terms 
than in the past’.34 Women joined the League in large numbers and Martin Pugh is 
clearly wrong to state that the League ‘remained adamantly male…during the 
1920s’.35   
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The range of outdoor activities organised throughout the extensive branch 
network of the League makes it difficult to draw any firm political or social 
conclusions. Rambling, cycling, tennis and cricket in the summer; football and 
hockey in the winter suggest an apolitical and classless mixture of activities that fell 
short of a full-bloodedly public school sporting ethos; there was no rugby or rowing, 
as far as one can tell. Some games did have political connotations. Socialists 
regarded cricket as elitist but nonetheless, at the beginning of the nineteen-thirties, 
the British Workers’ Sports Federation introduced cricket as one of its activities. 
This most quintessential of English pastimes was capable of ‘bind[ing] the nation 
and Empire together’36, a sentiment that would have appealed strongly to members 
of the League, whether they played the game or not.   
 
Similarly, it would be wrong to see the League ramblers as exclusively part 
of a right-wing movement; rambling appealed to all parts of the political spectrum, 
right and left. For example, the Clarion Rambling Club, founded in 1931, sprang, 
like its associated organisation the National Clarion Cycling Club (NCCC), from 
socialist roots. The organisations that participated in rambling were increasingly 
diverse and included the WEA as well as rotary clubs and church organisations and 
this suggests that rambling was not quite as strongly middle-class as Richard Holt 
has indicated. The Junior Imperial League was a part of this trend in outdoor 
activities which was ‘predominantly a youth movement’. For the League it was a 
way of bringing youth to politics through leisure and the same was true of the 
NCCC. However, both organisations saw the combination as less effective than they 
wished. Critics of the NCCC were disappointed in the dilution of the political 
commitment of its members by the overly-enthusiastic pursuit of outdoor activities, 
opining sarcastically that ‘we propose to cycle and dance ourselves into the socialist 
commonwealth’,37 a taunt that might well have been made of the Junior Imperial 
League with ‘British Empire’ replacing ‘socialist commonwealth’. 
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One might reasonably expect that the activities of League branches in high 
summer would contain a high proportion of outdoor and sporting events but, indoors, 
political ideas were not neglected. Thirty out of the ninety-three branches who 
reported their activities in July 1930 held debates or listened to talks. Perhaps 
surprisingly, examination of the branch reports in the mid-winter month of January 
of that year shows proportionately less debating activity: only thirty-eight branches 
out of 191 reported that they held debates or listened to talks.  It would be facile to 
draw firm conclusions about the seasonality of branches’ political activities from 
such a small sample of data. However, the fact that the number of branches who 
reported in July was less than half of those in December may indicate that the overall 
level of activity in the branches fell away in summer, at least in preparing reports for 
the League’s magazine. We can be certain that political topics were addressed 
throughout the year and that outdoor activities did not preclude them even at the 
height of the summer.  Perhaps in winter the proportion of indoor social events 
outweighed the proportion devoted to the outdoors in summer because members 
were, by nature, more disposed to participate in indoor events than outdoor.  
 
Of the debates and political talks in January 1930, twenty-two (55%) were on 
political topics; twelve (30%) on sporting or cultural subjects; and six (15%) on 
other matters.
38
 Topics included an apparently frivolous debate, ‘That this house is in 
favour of men’s dress reform’, but frequently addressed serious issues. Political 
topics included socialism, the performance of Ramsay MacDonald’s Labour 
government, unemployment and capital punishment. The imperial content of the 
League was manifested in debates, in five of the branches, on Empire Free Trade (a 
campaign to protect imperial trade launched by Lord Beaverbrook in June 1929);
39
 
on Safeguarding; and on Imperial Preference. It is clear from this analysis of 
members’ activities in their local boroughs, towns and villages that they were not 
monomaniacal imperialists. Indeed, one cannot argue that they unswervingly 
pursued the purpose of ‘advancing the cause of Imperial Unity’ stated in the 
League’s founding principles in the way that, for example, the League of Empire 
Loyalists did a generation later. But as we have seen, this was not, anyway, their sole 
purpose. They were also charged with furthering the Conservative cause in general. 
                                                 
38
 The Imp, 5 (January 1930), 13-16.  
39
 L. S. Amery, My Political Life, Vol.3, The Unforgiving Years, 1929-1940 (London, 1955), p.22. 
147 
 
This they did with great vigour when an opportunity arose. The most important 
opportunities were at local elections, by-elections and general elections and the 
valuable efforts of League members at these elections were recognised by senior 
party officials. For example, in July 1930, the Election Agent for Nottingham, Ian 
Campbell-Robertson, wrote to The Imp praising League members at a recent by-
election:  
 
…at Central Nottingham, …our success was to a great extent due to the exertions of a willing band of 
helpers, which largely included members of the League. 
It did not seem to matter what the job was, they undertook it cheerfully, and proved themselves 
reliable and often acted on their own initiative…canvassing, delivering circulars, attending our own or 




However, such undiluted support for the local Conservative cause was not 
always the case. Sometimes their support for the Empire mattered more to League 
members than loyalty to the Conservative party.  At the East Fulham by-election in 
October 1933, The Evening Standard reported that the Tory candidate was ‘in 
trouble with the local branch of the Junior Imperial League for less than 
wholehearted support of Empire Free Trade’. In the early nineteen-thirties, according 
to one historian, the League was generally dissatisfied with the lack of support by 




There are many expressions of praise for the work done by members of the 
League at general elections, by-elections and local elections.  Two examples at 
general elections are: the annual report for 1922 referring to the ‘valuable 
work…displayed by the Branches’; and in 1924 to the ‘ungrudging commendation of 
[MPs], Candidates and Agents in all parts of the country for the work of the 
Branches’.42 At the local level, for example, thanks were expressed by local party 
officials for assistance given at the London County Council Elections in 1922; and at 
County Council elections in 1925.
43
 The League sustained its electoral activities 
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throughout the inter-war years. In its annual report in May 1937 it called for a 
‘fighting-force’ to be available at the general election which ‘will soon take place’.44 
The leadership of the League was similarly concerned with concerted effort at by-





Another important example of the League’s mass national activity was the 
rally at Crystal Palace in 1930. It was expected to be ‘the most ambitious gathering 
ever organised by the League’46 surpassing even the rally held in March 1928 (which 
will be discussed in the section on ideology, below). It was attended by 8472 
people
47
 drawn from eighteen regional federations of the League who assembled for 
a Grand Parade before being addressed by Neville Chamberlain, Chairman of the 
Conservative Party. He began by recalling the speech made by Disraeli at the same 
venue in 1872 in which he had set out a vision of a ‘united Empire bound together by 
an Imperial tariff’. Chamberlain’s version of this was a quota system which would 
create products that were wholly domestic and imperial in content thus making ‘the 
greatest contribution…[to] the development of inter-Imperial trade’.48 Chamberlain’s 
speech, as reported in The Imp, may be taken as indicative of the common priorities 
of the Party and the League and illustrates the political nature of the gathering. 
However, the activities that day were not purely political. The rally and speech were 
preceded by a Sports Meeting at which both men and women competed.
49
 The 
League’s recurrent juxtaposition of sporting, social and political activities was 
clearly manifested at the Crystal Palace rally on 20 September 1930. Indeed in a 
report in The Imp of events that day, the writer explains that ‘sports contests 
[promote]…a sense of corporate unity…an efficient magnet for people who might 
otherwise not be drawn into a political field’.50  This statement perhaps reveals a 
deliberately structured diversity in the League’s activities in which leisure activities 
are merely a means towards achieving political ends.  
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Annual conferences could sometimes be relatively low key events but they 
were still reported in the national press
51
. For example, although the Annual 
Conference in London on 31 May 1930 was attended by over 600 people from 
branches throughout the country, with Lord Stanley MP in the chair, no-one from the 
highest echelons of the party, such as Baldwin, Churchill, Austen Chamberlain or 
Leo Amery was present but members unanimously expressed their loyalty to the 
leadership in a motion of ‘unabated confidence in…Stanley Baldwin’ and pledged to 
him their ‘undiminished support’. One speaker recalled that Baldwin had declared, a 
few years earlier that he ‘loved the “Imps”‘; there could be no higher praise than 
that, she said.
52
 Relations with the leaders and senior officials of the Conservative 
party and were generally very good. 
 
According to a Birmingham newspaper, it was at general elections that the 
League enjoyed its ‘hey-days’.53 Although this may be overstating the case, because 
the League was also vigorous at by-elections and local elections, it may be justified 
because general elections mobilised the League’s resources nationally rather than 
simply locally. By-elections can be a way of gaining publicity for a pressure group’s 
cause but the participation of League members in them appears to have been  
primarily a means of helping the Tory candidate to secure election rather than as a 
way of gaining publicity for its own imperial beliefs. The major importance to the 
League of general elections is exemplified by the 1929 election. Thus the Executive 
Committee, which rarely intervened directly in the activities of branches, issued a 
directive on April 10th, that from the dissolution of Parliament until polling day 
(May 30th) ‘the [normal] activities of all Federations, Divisional Councils and 
Branches of the League shall be suspended’.54 Branch members responded well to 
this call, although it is difficult to determine the degree to which they would have 
participated anyway in supporting local Conservative party candidates. Some idea of 
the extent of this mobilisation can be gained from a report in The Imp of the work 
done by members in one Division during the campaign (Table 9). 
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Table 9. Voluntary work done by League members during the 1929 general 
election campaign in one (unidentified) Division
 55
 
Activity Number of members 
involved 
Private secretary to candidate 1 
Aide-de-camp to candidate 1 
Whole time voluntary clerk 2 
Sub Agents 1 
Speakers 5 
Canvassing 30 
Clerk tellers at polling stations 59 
Clerical work 152 
Distributing literature 137 
Lending a conveyance 25 
Driving a motor car 28 
Messengers: General 72 
Messengers: Cyclists 36 
Messengers: Motor Cyclists 18 
Shorthand writer for reporting meetings 15 
Stewards at meetings 57 
 
These activities, in total, amount to 639 tasks and even allowing for some 
individuals performing more than one, show that several hundred League members 
were working voluntarily for the Conservative party during the campaign. It is likely 
that the editor of The Imp chose to publicise the work of one of the most active 
divisions and that some were hardly active at all. However, if one assumes an 
average figure of 250 members in each Division that assisted with the election 
campaign, and extrapolate this to estimate the total number at work in the 463 
League Divisions formed throughout England and Wales (out of a possible total of 
507)
56
 it would meant the mobilisation of about 115,000 young people during the 
campaign. The source of the figures and their anonymity (the Division in question is 
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not identified in The Imp) suggest an element of propaganda, even exaggeration, but 
they are nevertheless indicative of the extent of one of the League’s major activities: 
helping the senior party to win parliamentary seats. It is important to understand that 
they show that the Junior Imperial League was a significant force in electioneering in 
Britain for a period between the wars, a fact that has been ignored by historians. It is 
comparable in its electoral effectiveness with the Primrose League in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which ‘effectively supplemented and 
sometimes supplanted the [Conservative] party organisation as an election 
machine’.57 The JIL and the Primrose League were not the only imperial activist 
groups to act in such an extensive and direct way in supporting candidates at 
parliamentary elections; the BCU selected and financed twenty-four candidates at the 
1918 general election. Other groups, however, such as the EIA (and in the 1950s, the 
LEL, unsuccessfully) sought to recruit existing MPs to their cause. Conversely, the 
Empire Crusade put up candidates at by-elections in the 1930s to oppose 
Conservative candidates. The support of actual or potential MPs was important to 
many imperial activist groups in pursuing their objectives but in the case of the JIL 
(and the Primrose League) there seems to be a general sense of loyalty to the 
Conservative party that transcended mere imperial objectives. In reporting the 
electoral efforts of JIL members, The Imp may not have been the creator of 
exaggeration but merely its willing purveyor. In one division in the south of 
England, 
 
…the Conservative candidate, who secured a bumper majority, said the backing given by the Imps 





Whether or not the campaigning was indeed heavenly, it is interesting to 
consider the mixture of tasks. Only thirty-seven of the activities shown in Table 9 
(above) required any political skills: aide de camp, sub-agency work, speaking and 
canvassing. The remainder were simply clerical or to do with distribution and 
transport. This does suggest that, at least in this particular division, individual 
League members were largely used as political cannon-fodder during election 
                                                 
57
 Pugh, The Tories, p. 137. 
58
 The Imp, 5 (July 1929), 6. 
152 
 
campaigns. One cannot gauge with certainty the extent and impact of the political 
activities. For example, although there were only five speakers we do not know how 
many meetings they addressed in this division nor the size of the meetings although 
in another division ‘the Imps were responsible for holding 54 meetings at which 83 
speeches were delivered by Imps’.59    
 
As we have seen, Bernard Braine and Patricia Hornsby-Smith are good 
examples of how the League’s activities and structures facilitated the rise of young 
politicians. The hierarchical League organisation, comprising Federations, Divisions 
and Branches, provided young men and women with an organisational and  political 
escalator on which they could rise to the notice of senior politicians and thus better 
develop a political career. J.D. Profumo and Roland Cartland are other prominent 
examples among many who ran for, and were elected to, positions in local or 
national politics. Perhaps, therefore, those who criticised the mix between social and 
political activities missed the point. They were not rivals but mutually supportive. 
The emergence of young politicians who had learned their skills through 
membership of the League, and the effective mobilisation of many members during 
election campaigns were valuable outcomes of the League and were not subverted by 
dances and rambles. Indeed without social activities it is arguable that the League’s 
political side would have been weaker.    
 
Ideology  
The League’s post-war ‘scheme of ideas’ can be seen formally in its revised 
statement of its objects which was prepared in 1920.
60
 The objects were defined as: 
 
To create a practical interest in political work and organisation among young men and women of the 
Empire…to co-operate with existing Conservative and Unionist bodies, with a view to advancing the 
cause of Imperial unity, upholding Constitutional Government, and actively furthering the principles 




These words, which remained unmodified throughout the remaining years of 
the League’s existence, are essentially unchanged from those chosen at the very 
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inception of the League twenty years earlier in 1905. The words addressing its 
imperial and constitutional aims are the same except that ‘Constitutional 
Government’ replaces ‘constitutional principles’. More significantly, perhaps, is that 
‘furthering the Unionist cause’ is replaced by ‘furthering the principles of the League 
throughout the Empire’. The word ‘union’ in the Conservative party lexicon was 
flexible in its meaning and not reserved exclusively for references to the unity of the 
constituent political nations of the British Isles. For example, in a speech in 
December 1924, Baldwin defined it as ‘ the sense that we stand for the union of 
those two nations of which Disraeli spoke’.62  Its removal from the League’s 
statement of objects may be interpreted, not as weakening of the League’s 
Conservatism, but perhaps recognition that the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 
finally precluded a united British Isles. Welsh and Scottish nationalism presented no 
threat to the cohesion of Great Britain.    References to the particular union that 
included Ireland were therefore otiose and in this respect the League was ahead of 
the main party which did not drop ‘Unionist’ from its title until 1925.63   
 
The Conservative party rarely stated its principles in a formal way
64
 but the 
League did so in 1921. Its ten principles were laid down by its governing bodies and 
promulgated to activists.
65
 The three listed first, presumably to establish their 
priority, were imperial:  
 
1. To maintain our constitutional monarchy and democratic form of government, which secures to the 
Empire a greater measure of Freedom than enjoyed by any other people. 
2. To promote the unity and commercial supremacy of the Empire. 
3. To secure the efficient defence of the Empire on sea, in the air, and on land. 
 
These are the principles of Joseph Chamberlain and perceive defence and 
commerce as imperial matters that were the essential elements of a united British 
Empire. They raise the question of exactly what is meant by ‘Empire’ because they 
do not specifically identify particular parts of it. Chamberlain excluded India and the 
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dependent colonies from his ideas on imperial unity, and it would seem that the 
League agreed with this approach because imperial references in League discourse in 
the inter-war years were largely confined to the Dominions and mooted methods of 
trading with them. Trade with India was never an issue for the League and India only 
became relevant to League principles when its governance became a controversial 
issue in the first half of the nineteen-thirties. In the context of Indian governance and 
the dependent (i.e. directly governed) colonies, the reference to ‘Freedom’ seems 
studiedly blinkered if those who defined the League’s first principle were conscious 
of the contemporaneous call for self-determination contained in Woodrow Wilson’s 
fourteen principles. 
 
The next six principles referred to ‘respect for law and order’; ‘the right of 
everyone to own and manage property’; ‘individual liberty’; the promotion of ‘co-
operation between employers and employed’; ‘fight[ing] class warfare’; and the 
elevation of the ‘standard of life’ through improvements in health, education and 
‘industrial ability’. They are national and domestic, not imperial, principles and 
represent a statement of one-nation toryism. They also have a flavour of social 
imperialism that is perhaps better captured by Lord Stanley in a speech to five 
hundred members of the League in 1928. The League, he said, ‘stood for the 
development of the Empire, the strengthening of Empire ties, the defence of the 
Constitution, and the betterment of social conditions’.66 Stanley was not simply 
ideological in his leadership of the League but also declared the essential and 
practical purpose of the League to be an effective imperialist force at general 
elections. Thus the following year, during the election campaign in 1929, The Imp 
told its readers that: 
 
Time and again our chairman, Lord Stanley, has reminded us that the real purpose of the League is to 
return the largest possible number of Conservative members to the House of Commons. The League 
of course has other functions; but when we get down to brass tacks that is the object--to make sure 
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The final League principle is consistent with this declaration. It reverts to the 
Empire and aims ‘to interest and educate the young men and women of the Empire 
in political questions of the day and to assist them to take a larger share in public 
life’.68 The outcome of the pursuit of this principle was the League’s extensive 
activities at election time and the increasing number of members who sought election 
both locally and nationally. Furthermore this principle is, perhaps, the only one in 
which the League could, through its own efforts in its branches, take direct action. It 
reiterates the opening declaration in the objects of the League and is arguably the 
principle which had the most sustained political impact. All the other principles were 
policies for which it could only campaign and not, of itself, fulfil directly. Arguably 
the resolutions at conferences and the ensuing debates within the League did little or 
nothing to influence party policy. The League was not alone in this. At the Annual 
Conference of the senior organisation, the NUCUA, in 1929, representatives argued 
that the party leadership openly ignored resolutions passed at annual conferences.
69
 
That does not, however, necessarily deflect either body from the issues that 
concerned them; it merely illustrates their ineffectiveness in changing party policy.  
 
The League’s objects and principles were clearly enunciated by its leadership 
but by their very nature they were expressions of intent to which branches and 
members were expected to give support. Branches were required to be ‘in 
sympathy’70 with them before they were allowed to join or affiliate to the League 
and, furthermore, individual applicants for membership were expected to sign a 
declaration: 
 
I desire to become a Member of the Junior Imperial and Constitutional League and I hereby declare 
that I profess and support the principles of the League and will use my best efforts to forward its 
objects.
 71  
 
Such commitment implied action. The objects and principles remained to be 
put into practice and one needs to assess the extent to which this occurred. One way 
of doing so, as suggested earlier, is to examine the topics discussed at annual 
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conferences and the content of speeches by leading members of the party such as 
Stanley Baldwin, or other notable people such as, for example, Lord Curzon, Lord 
Derby and Neville Chamberlain. The reactions of members to those addresses help 
to demonstrate the League’s beliefs. Conferences also provide a substantial source of 
information about members’ practical political priorities. In an editorial in 1925 The 
Times commented on the value of the Conservative Party conferences: 
 
The conference always serves a useful purpose in that it enables the party organisers to sound the 
feeling of Conservatives in the constituencies, and it gives the leader of the party an opportunity to 




The same was true of the League. Several hundred representatives attended 
its annual conferences to debate, and to vote on, resolutions. An analysis of all the 
conference resolutions between 1927 and 1939 is shown in Table 10.  
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Table 10. An analysis of League Annual Conference resolutions, 1927-1939 









1927 0 0 0 1 1 9 11 
1928 0 0 4 2 1 5 12 
1929 2 1 1 0 1 5 10 
1930 5 0 2 1 1 3 12 
1931 2 1 1 1 1 1 7 
1932 2 3 4 3 0 4 16 
1933 1 2 1 4 0 4 12 
1934 5 1 3 2 2 4 17 
1935 3 4 1 3 1 4 16 
1936 1 1 2 4 1 6 15 
1937 - - - - - - - 
1938 2 2 2 3 1 5 15 
1939 0 1 1 1 1 4 8 
Totals 23 16 22 25 11 54 151 
 
We are mainly concerned here with the four columns relating to imperial, 
foreign and domestic political policies. (The column headed ‘Other’ refers to a 
resolution of congratulation and support for the Conservative party leader. There 
were two such resolutions in 1934.) In order to assess the validity of these 
resolutions as evidence of the nature of the League’s ideology, it is important to try 
to establish how resolutions were placed on the agenda of an annual meeting. There 
is very little evidence about this but the record of a meeting of the Executive 
Committee in May 1930 sheds some light on the matter. 
 
[T]he Chairman [Lord Stanley] read [a resolution] regarding the situation in India, which had been 
submitted by the Twickenham Divisional Council, and said he was of the opinion that it would be 
very unwise to discuss this at the Annual Meeting. He had been in touch with Mr Evans, the 
Chairman, and understood that the Divisional Council were agreeable to the resolution being 
withdrawn…It was agreed that the resolution should be withdrawn….Mr Lane suggested that the 
resolution of the Twickenham Divisional Council regarding food tariffs, should be taken last [at the 
Annual Meeting] as he considered it to be a dangerous motion. The Chairman replied that except in 
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the case of the one on ‘India’  they had to take any resolutions that were submitted. After further 




We can see here, first, that the leadership of the League is not arbitrarily or 
autocratically controlling the conference agenda but using persuasion with those who 
submit resolutions which it considers inimical to the interests of the League and the 
party. Secondly, because it was not uncommon for annual conferences to run out of 
time and thus not be able to address later items on the agenda, by managing the 
position in which resolutions are placed on the agenda, the League’s leadership 
could attempt to curtail debate. However, in this example, the chairman allowed the 
Twickenham resolution on food tariffs to be placed eighth on an agenda of twelve 
items, ten of which were discussed. It was fully debated and extensively reported in 
The Imp.
74
 Thirdly, the Chairman’s statement that the committee ‘had to take any 
resolutions that were submitted’, confirms the open and democratic nature of the 
annual meetings. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that analysis of the 151 
resolutions tabled between 1927 and 1939 is capable of conveying some idea of the 
political priorities of members in the branches. The analysis concentrates heavily on 
the content of the resolutions submitted for discussion. Because the information is 
not always available, it does not comprehensively analyse the debates and whether a 
resolution was accepted or not. Although this gives an incomplete picture of the 
League’s ideology, it is nevertheless strongly indicative of the issues which were of 
major interest to the League. 
 
There are a number of broad conclusions that can be drawn from analysing 
the conference resolutions. First, the League was loyal to the Conservative party 
leader. At each annual opportunity, with the exception of 1932 and 1933, it 
expressed its support. Thus for example, in 1930, the resolution that ‘this Conference 
reiterates its unabated confidence in…Stanley Baldwin…as Leader of the Party, and 
pledges itself to give him continued and undiminished support’, was passed 
‘unanimously and with acclamation’.75 This may have particular importance as a 
display of loyalty because Baldwin had lost the general election in May 1929 and his 
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leadership had come under attack by members of the senior party organisation. At 
the NUCUA conference six months later the party leadership and organisation were 
strongly criticised but Sir William Ray and H.G. Williams, both senior and long-
standing members of the League, supported the leader and carried the day with 
Williams expressing a personal view that was cheered by those present. It coincided 
with the League’s principles. ‘There was only one way to run a party [he said]. 
When they had once elected a leader they must back him or sack him’.76 The League 
always backed him. 
 
An important example of the demonstration of this backing and of the 
League’s beliefs and ideology expressed en masse can be seen in a rally held at the 
Albert Hall on 10 March 1928.  Its importance derives from its scale, both in terms 
of the number of members attending (over 8,000) and the presence of more than four 
hundred MPs, candidates and agents, and the speech made to it by Stanley Baldwin. 
The chairman of the party, J.C.C. Davidson, and its principal agent, Robert Topping, 
also attended. It was, according to Lord Plymouth, president of the League, ‘by far 
the greatest meeting ever organised by the League’. Because the Albert Hall was 
full, arrangements had been made to relay the proceedings to loudspeakers in Hyde 




The meeting was one of youthful exuberance about the British nation and the 
leadership of the Tory party. It began with community singing of ‘all the old 
choruses’, a rendering of Land of Hope and Glory78 and a speech by Lord Plymouth 
referring to the ‘spread[ing] amongst [young people of] the spirit of patriotism and 
loyal citizenship and constitutionalism’.79 When Stanley Baldwin arrived, the entire 
audience rose waving their programmes in organised contingents of red, white and 
blue in ‘a most brilliant effect’ and roaring the Imps’ Whisper, a concerted shout of 
‘One, two, three, HI!’ that seems to be an almost puerile collective expression of 
youthful and affectionate greeting of authority. Baldwin’s speech was about 
democracy, duty and service. These were constant themes in Baldwin’s politics; he 
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frequently referred in his speeches to serving one’s country.80 The audience cheered 
these notions as well as references to ‘love of home’ and patriotism. He made no 
direct references to the Empire but again caused cheering when he explained that: 
 
Our trust is the trust of our own people, wherever they may be, all over the world…helping hundreds 
of millions of human beings…to follow the path…which we believe…is…the wisest and…makes for 
the greatest happiness of the people of the world. 
 
Whilst appealing successfully to the patriotism and sense of imperial duty of 
those present, Baldwin also emphasised the importance of youth in political 
activities. Those present would have felt that they had a worthwhile opportunity to 
contribute to the maintenance of the Conservative cause and that their efforts were 
valued by the Tory leadership. They showed in their reaction to Baldwin that their 
beliefs included loyalty, patriotism, duty, service and a sense of Britain’s essential 
importance in world affairs. In his speech, Baldwin raised no controversial issues, 
made no criticisms, suggested no particular policies; he endeavoured to excite and 
motivate those present, men and women, to pursue the Tory cause at a time when his 
party had suffered six by-election defeats in the previous two years and was ‘an 
unhappy party’81 facing a general election, with an expanded electorate, within 
eighteen months.  Thus, at that time, he probably saw the League primarily as an 
electoral resource and not as a force for imperial beliefs.  
 
Baldwin spoke to the League on other occasions during his period as party 
leader between 1923 and 1937, almost the entire period of the League’s active 
existence between the wars. It is interesting to compare his speech in 1928 with that 
made in May 1924. In this latter speech we can again see the League’s strong loyalty 
to Baldwin.  First, he received his invitation to address the League’s annual dinner 
after his defeat at the general election that he had called, in December 1923, on the 
controversial issue of tariff reform, and yet before his post as leader had 
subsequently been ratified by the party. Secondly, on his arrival all the nine hundred 
people present rose and cheered for several minutes.
82
 Unlike his speech in 1928, his 
references to the Empire were direct, ambitious and bullish. To loud cheers he 
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declared that the League was ‘not afraid of the word “Empire”’. The Empire, he said 
to further cheers, had not been won by military conquest, although the services had 
played a part, but by ‘the bone and sinew of our people’. India, he said, had become 
part of the Empire through trade, and the Dominions because of emigration. His 
specific geographical references excluded the dependent colonies and he was thus in 
accord with the League in his understanding of what Empire meant. References to 
‘the Empire’ often meant only India and the Dominions, an important definition to 
bear in mind when attempting to assess the nature of the League’s imperialism. It 
was the terms of trading with the Dominions and the governance of India that 
dominated imperial discourse in the nineteen-thirties and in which the League 
participated. Baldwin referred to his ambition that one day there would be free 
movement within the Empire just as there now was in the United States. Many years 
ago the creation of the United States had not seemed possible, he said, but it had 
happened. In the same way, although a United Empire had not yet been achieved, the 
enthusiasm of the youth of today was capable bringing it about. This was greeted 
with loud cheers. 
 
These two speeches were made in a period in which India and the Dominions 
were seeking increasing formal independence of action for themselves. The Imperial 
Conference in 1926 had declared Britain and the Dominions to be equal and 
autonomous; and Indian nationalism was being addressed by the British government 
through the Simon Commission set up in 1927.  In 1930 Nehru declared the 
independence of India; in 1931 the Statute of Westminster was signed; in 1935 the 
Government of India Bill became law. Although these events were all in the future 
when Baldwin made the speeches that have been discussed, they were in train and so 
may help to explain the dilution of his imperial rhetoric in front of the Junior 
Imperial League in 1928. This decline in the salience of imperial affairs continued in 
the nineteen-thirties. By 1938 a group comprised of candidates, party agents, 
lawyers, journalists…and many others, some of whom were League members, met 
over a weekend at Ashridge to discuss imperial affairs. They concluded that there 
was ‘a serious lack of interest shown today by the people of Great Britain in the 
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problems of the Empire’.83 This trend is also indicated by examining the resolutions 
on imperial matters that were put to the League’s annual conferences. 
 
At annual conferences, the resolutions gave approximately equal attention to 
domestic and overseas affairs and, within the former, to economic and non-economic 
issues. Domestic non-economic issues were largely concerned with issues of 
governance such as House of Lords reform; with electoral questions such as votes 
for women; and with countering socialism and communism. Economic issues 
emphasised support and protection that had an imperial flavour, for industry and 
agriculture. Unemployment was also a recurrent issue, especially in the nineteen-
thirties.  Thus an important characteristic of domestic issues was that they did not 
resonate with the League’s fourth to ninth principles described above. Law and 
order; property rights; personal liberty; industrial relations; class warfare; health and 
education did not preoccupy the collective consciousness of the Junior Imperial 
League at its annual conferences. In domestic politics its ideology was not linked 
rigidly to a set of formal principles. It was pragmatic and alert to the issues of the 
day that interested members in the branches. Within that context, its ‘systematic 
scheme of ideas’ was to admire and support the party leadership and to work to bring 
about, or sustain, a Tory administration. 
 
The League’s political themes in imperial and foreign affairs were more 
determined and persistent. The imperial issues that interested the annual conferences 
can be divided into three categories: trade, defence and India. All three were 
encapsulated in the desire to preserve and integrate the British Empire. The League’s 
debates about the Empire reached an apotheosis at the conference in 1930.  In 
addition to a motion of confidence in Baldwin, nine resolutions were debated: two 
concerned internal administrative arrangements and seven addressed political policy. 
The general theme of these political resolutions was economic and imperial. Within 
the wording of the resolutions, appreciation was expressed about Baldwin’s imperial 
policy which had advanced the idea of Imperial Economic Unity; his proposal for a 
Dominions conference to deal with protection of home-produced wheat and meat 
was welcomed; protective duties against foreigners were recommended so as to 
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rationalise ‘Industry and Agriculture in the Empire’; food tariffs were ‘desirable’ in 
order to bring ‘Imperial Economic Unity into being’. A final resolution stated that 
‘no avowed supporter of Free Trade shall occupy any position such as Parliamentary 
Candidate or any official positions within local associations’.84 All these resolutions 
were carried and show that many members of the League believed strongly that the 
solution to Britain’s domestic economic problems lay in closer unity of the Empire; 
foreign, that is non-imperial, trade was seen as a threat. The Conference thus issued a 
clear message of support for economic imperialism of a type that had its origins in 
the idea of imperial unity that emerged strongly in the 1880s and the debate about 
tariff reform in the early years of the twentieth century. Its place in the ideology of 
Conservatism in 1930 is important and is discussed later in this chapter.  
 
How imperialist was the League? The sources do not suggest that it was 
obsessed with empire but it did support imperialism, especially in relation to the 
Dominions and India. It may be that Empire was so embedded in League members’ 
thinking that it became commonplace and a received wisdom to which one did not 
need often to refer. Nevertheless the League strongly supported imperial preference 
and saw the Empire as a means of solving unemployment in Britain by trade and 
emigration. The League admired imperialists such as Rudyard Kipling and Arthur 
Bryant, invited Leopold Amery to address its annual dinner, considered, but rejected, 
using Land of Hope and Glory as its anthem and owed its founding inspiration, in 
part, to Joseph Chamberlain.
85
 In 1929, at its annual conference it called upon the 
leadership of the party to ‘adopt an imperial policy of a bolder nature’ in order to 
‘bring about a closer…unity between the constituent parts of the Empire’.86 At that 
time, at least, the League wanted to make the Conservative party more imperialist 
and yet it was oddly passive about the mechanics of its imperialism. There is no 
evidence that it ever sought to set up branches in the Empire in spite of that being 
stated as one of its objectives, and it was  weakly responsive to the few approaches 
from the Dominions for assistance in copying the League, for example in Canada. 
Certainly interest in imperial affairs grew then waned at annual conferences in the 
nineteen-thirties. In 1929 there were two resolutions; in 1930, five; in 1931, two; in 
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1932, two; in 1933, one; in 1933, one; in 1935, five. In the four years 1936 to 1939, 
only four resolutions were put to the conference (see Table 10).  
 
One has the impression that the League transformed itself from an institution 
that initially sought primarily to fight directly for the Empire and the constitution, 
into one that was principally an electoral resource and a training ground for young 
politicians and in which empire, though salient, was not always paramount. In 
practice this was its most effective way of pursuing its imperialism. Rather than 
merely theorise about imperial issues, it sought to be effective by helping to secure 
the election of Tory representatives of pro-imperial issues to the House of Commons. 
Certainly it was easier for members to act locally in practical ways, for example in 
Empire Day celebrations, than it was to engage directly with distant parts of the 
Empire. The League experienced its relatively weak practical imperialism 
vicariously through those who sat in parliament, and its stronger theoretical 
imperialism through its debates and conferences. Unlike the JIL, almost all imperial 
activist groups such as the Imperial Federation League, the Imperial Federation 
(Defence) League, the Tariff Reform League and the United Empire Trade League 
were, for example, concentrated persistently and exclusively on imperial affairs; 
achieving their particular objectives in either imperial governance, defence or trade 
was their principal aim. Others, later in the twentieth century, such as the Empire 
Industries Association and the India Defence League concentrated, respectively, on 
trade relations and opposing Indian self-government. One might say that attempting 
to change some aspect of the affairs of the Empire was their full-time purpose. The 
JIL, however, whilst loyal to the Empire, turned its attention more strongly to 
particular imperial affairs largely at times when taking up a topical issue. Thus, its 
particular, but relatively transient, interests in the Empire centred, in the 1930s, on 
trade relations with the Dominions and on the governance of India and it is these 
matters that illustrate an important aspect of the nature of the League’s Conservatism 
which has its origins in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Before 
considering them in more detail, however, it is important to consider the roots of the 
League’s imperialism. 
 
The League was founded in the same period during which a number of other 
imperial activist groups were extant, such as the Royal Colonial Institute, the 
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Primrose League, The Imperial South African Association, the British Empire 
League, the Victoria League, the League of Empire, the Empire Day Movement, and 
the Tariff Reform League, all described in Chapter 1. Additionally, quasi-Tory 
leagues also appeared  in the early years of the twentieth century, including the 
British Constitutional Association, the Navy League, the Imperial Maritime League, 
the National Service League [and] the Middle Class Defence League’.87 The names 
of these organisations capture the political questions that engaged Tory activists at 
that time: ‘anti-socialist’, ‘tariff reform’, ‘constitution’, ‘navy’, ‘imperial’, ‘national’ 
and ‘middle-class’. The vocabulary of the contemporary Tory discourse of activists 
who sought to further aspects of toryism emphasised preservation and development 
rather than radical change. Thus, for example, the Navy League was determined that 
‘the command of the sea was the primary object of national policy’ and the Tariff 
Reform League sought ‘to consolidate and develop the resources of the Empire’88 
although introducing tariffs was seen by some Tories (and Liberals) to be counter to 
traditional Tory beliefs in free trade. (We can contrast these preservationist 
principles with the socialist Fabian Society whose radical aim was to ‘further the 
reconstruction of society’.) The League’s full name, the Junior Imperial and 
Constitutional League, thus drew on the contemporary Conservative terminology 
and its ideology rested on what the philosopher Ted Honderich has called ‘reform’, 
not ‘change’. The former, he argues, alters what is not fundamental about political, 
social or economic circumstances whereas the latter changes their foundations.
89
  
The League, insofar as can be seen from the resolutions debated at its meetings, 
proposed no fundamental concepts. It sought reform, not change, and sometimes 
resisted even reform, as in the case of the governance of India.   
 
The League’s most persistent and sustained belief was in the use and 
preservation of the Empire, which by implication, they defined as the Dominions and 
India. The dependent colonies were never an expressed part of the League’s 
interests. One can speculate that this may be because, generally, their governance 
was stable and unlikely to change at least until 1936 when the transfer of African 
colonies to Germany was mooted bringing an adamantine response from the League 
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rejecting such a notion.
90
  The League’s imperial ideology had its roots in Disraeli’s 
belief in the Empire that he had expressed in his Crystal Palace speech in 1872 and 
which was referred to by Neville Chamberlain as still relevant when he spoke to the 
League at their huge rally and inaugural sports meeting at the same venue in 1930.  
 
I want to take you back to the past …[to] this same Crystal Palace, 60 years ago…[when] Disraeli 
made one of his most celebrated speeches. It is astonishing to realise how much of that speech was 
appropriate to these modern times. 
 
This was an expression of the continuity of the Conservative party’s belief in 
the Empire and an endorsement of Baldwin’s compliment to the League in a speech 
in 1924 when he declared that the League was not afraid of the word ‘Empire’. In all 
the activities and of the League, social or political, it is the word that emerges most 
strongly either directly or more subtly. Over the years several attempts were made to 
remove ‘imperial’ from the League’s title but they never succeeded. It would be 
wrong to assume that the membership of the League was uniformly enthusiastic 
about the Empire but those who were enthusiastic about it held sway, at least in the 
matter of the identity of the League. And yet in some ways their imperialism was 
passive. They sought no expansion of membership within the Empire, in spite of this 
being one of their declared aims, unlike several other imperial activist groups. The 
Primrose League, for example, had habitations (branches) in several countries of the 
Empire, especially those to which British people had emigrated;
91
the Victoria 
League had associated organisations in Canada and South Africa; and for the 
Patriotic League of Britons Overseas, the Overseas Club and the Empire 
Parliamentary Association, overseas membership was the essence of their purpose.  
Nor is there evidence of formal contact between the League and those living in the 
Empire throughout the world. This may be because the activities of the League were 
heavily based on individual branches and thus reinforced their parochialism. 
Certainly there were centralised events but even here the agenda was often heavily 
accommodating to the branches and not to central direction or control. The League’s 
imperialism was thus diminished and focused on trade with the Dominions, usually 
for domestic economic benefit and for greater imperial unity, and on the governance 
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of India. These important issues defined its range and illustrate the nature of the 
League’s Conservatism. But in what ways did the League’s beliefs relate to 
Conservative ideology and what was the context of the League’s debates about the 
Empire in the nineteen-thirties? To answer these questions we need first to look, very 
briefly, at some of the historiography of Conservative ideology in the inter-war 
years. 
 
There have been attempts by historians such as Honderich, O’Sullivan, 
Jarvis
92
, Barnes and Green to analyse and define the elusive nature of Conservative 
ideology. However, no narrow consensus has been reached and conclusions 
sometimes seem contradictory. Thus, for example, John Barnes asserts that 
‘Conservatives feel that ideology at best is an inadequate guide to political 
practice’93 whereas Ewen Green states that ‘[i]deology…is central to the history of 
the Conservative Party’.94 Whichever of these two statements one prefers, it is 
undoubtedly true that the Conservative Party concerned itself with certain core 
beliefs and policies in addressing the social, political and economic issues that it 
encountered. We should, perhaps, therefore, be more concerned with the 
manifestations of Tory policies, the concrete outcomes of their decisions, rather than 
with any attempt to define an abstract ideological framework into which all policies, 
in theory, should be located. These policies of the Conservatives were rooted in their 
political stance as the party of property and of business and its consequent opposition 
to socialism. They also recognised the vital need to persuade a new, expanding 
electorate to vote for it. It was also the party of Empire
95
 and it is on the practical 
aspect of Conservatism that the following discussion concentrates rather than the 
various abstract frameworks, or interpretations, of Conservatism that have, for 
example, been defined by one historian as: an  ‘aristocratic ideology’; ‘political 
pragmatism’; ‘non-utopian’; ‘a disposition of habit or mind’; ‘unequivocal[ly] 
ideological’.96 Another describes the key elements of Conservatism as ‘intellectual 
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imperfection’; ‘political scepticism’; ‘traditionalism’; and ‘organicism’.97 By setting 
these abstract ideas aside for the purposes of this discussion it is not intended to 
impugn their validity but rather to take an alternative approach and consider actual 
aspects of Tory policy, in the first half of the twentieth century, and the participation 
of the Junior Imperial League in debates about them. The necessity of this arises 
partly because of the League’s records that are available: speeches, debates and 
publications provide quotidian data but no member of the League appears to have 
left a written discussion of the League’s ideology. In the inter-war years one of the 
most important and enduring of these debates was about tariffs and imperial 
preference and it provides a case study of the League’s ideology in practice. (A 
second example, not discussed here, is the governance of India.)  
 
The contentious question of international trade policy especially in relation to 
the Empire was one that had created divisions in the Conservative party from 1903 
until the nineteen-thirties and was responsible for their electoral defeats in 1906 and 
1923. In 1929 the general election was fought by the Conservatives largely on the 
themes of unemployment and Baldwin’s reputation. Imperial trade policy did not 
contribute to the Conservative defeat that year but it soon came to the forefront in 
debates about how the party could regain power. For example, some constituency 
associations believed that that had insufficient say in determining party policy and 
that ‘the Conservatives could only hope to return to power by advocating a sweeping 
policy of extension of safeguarding and the development of the Empire’.98  The 
debate about the best way to protect British industry and agriculture, whilst at the 
same time reinforcing the commercial unity of the Empire, was reactivated. Broadly, 
one can define the three factions within the Conservative party into those, such as 
Salisbury, Derby and Churchill, who were free traders opposed to imperial tariffs; at 
the other extreme, the tariff reformers, such as Neville Chamberlain and Leo Amery, 
who believed in food taxes on foreign, that is to say, non-imperial, imports; and a 
central group, including Baldwin, who sought a compromise solution based on 
import duties that would safeguard industry. The forceful intrusion of Lord 
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Beaverbrook, a man of intensely imperialist sentiment, into this situation exacerbated 
differences within the party. 
 
Beaverbrook used his newspapers to spread propaganda in support of his 
Empire Free Trade policy whilst at the same time seeking to draw Conservative MPs 
to his cause.
99
 Empire Free Trade meant the creation of an economic bloc comprising 
Britain, its colonies and the Dominions. The bloc would raise high trade barriers to 
those countries outside it whilst giving preference to those within it. An essential 
element of the implementation of the scheme was the introduction of food taxes, a 
policy that was seen by many Conservatives to be anathema to electoral success, as 
had been the case in 1906. Beaverbrook’s campaign raised the intensity of the debate 
within the Conservative party about foreign trade. At the NUCA annual conference 
in November 1929 debates about ‘safeguarding, tariffs and the empire’ were a major 
part of the agenda. The conference wanted a bolder policy than Baldwin’s ‘median 
position’.100 The Junior Imperial League was in agreement with the senior body. It 
had held its annual conference earlier in November and had called for a ‘closer 
industrial and commercial union between the constituent parts of the Empire’ and for 
imperial preference as a solution to the unemployment problem. Thus both 
organisations were drawn towards Beaverbrook’s trade policy. In the case of the 
Junior Imperial League this was made fully explicit at a meeting of its Council in 
February 1930. The League, with only two dissenting votes, ‘strongly urge[d] the 
Conservative party to adopt a policy of Empire Free Trade’.  Such a policy was far 
more imperialistic than that of the party leadership and had been voted through by 
the Council in spite of a warning from one of the League’s vice-chairmen, H.G. 
Williams, that it ‘would constitute a vote of censure on Mr Baldwin’.101  
 
Stuart Ball is right to suggest that ‘[t]he vitality of [Beaverbrook’s] campaign 
was…making a strong appeal to the younger generation’ of the Conservative 
party,
102
 but there was rivalry between the League and Beaverbrook’s new political 
party, the United Empire Party,  founded in February 1930. At its annual conference 
in July 1930, the League passed a resolution attacking Beaverbrook for trying to 
                                                 
99
 Ball, Baldwin and the Conservative Party, p. 42. 
100
 ibid., pp. 50-51. 
101
 Bodn. CPA CCO506/1/4 Council Meeting 8 February 1930. 
102
 Ball, Baldwin and the Conservative Party, p. 55. 
170 
 
‘represent to the Country that the Junior section of his party as the Party of Youth’. 
The resolution called for the League to ‘assert its supremacy’ as the leading political 
youth organisation and to rebuff Beaverbrook’s attempts to recruit to the United 
Empire party, members of the League.
103
 This did not, however, mean the League 
rejected Beaverbrook’s Empire Free Trade. As already seen, the conference also 
passed resolutions supporting imperial preference and food taxes and rejecting 
supporters of free trade within the party.  The League’s stance in 1929 and 1930 was 
at odds with the party leadership and more towards the diehard wing of the party. Its 
beliefs resonated with the arguments of Joseph Chamberlain whose campaigning that 
began in May 1903 had motivated the founders of the League to include the word 
‘imperial’ in its name at the founding meeting in 1905. The League was usually 
strongly loyal to Stanley Baldwin but for a period after the 1929 election it was less 
so and wittingly or not, it looked back to its earlier, and conflicting, loyalty to 
Chamberlain and the Empire. Putting Empire before loyalty to Baldwin emerged 
again in May 1933 when the League passed a resolution at its annual conference that 
opposed the policy on India of the National Government led by Baldwin.
104
 Its 
proposer, Randolph Churchill, argued that it was the responsibility of the League ‘to 
recall their leaders to their …proper path of duty. It was more important to save our 
Indian Empire than to save the National Government.’ 105 
 
In what other ways did the League relate to the Conservative Party and to 
Conservatism? Since its inception in 1906, the League had always been intimately 
associated with the Conservative party and yet the two organisations were not fully 
integrated until 1938. Until then their relationship had been ambiguous, even 
confused, as can be seen from the following examples. At a meeting of the Central 
Council of the League in February 1930, the Chairman had declared that, although 
the League had representatives on the Council and Executive of the Conservative 
Party, the two organisations were ‘definitely independent bodies’.106 This view was 
contradicted later that year at a League rally at Crystal Palace, when Lord Stanley 
observed that the League was a ‘party of youth within the ranks of the Conservative 
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Party’ and not working merely on its own behalf. 107 Earlier, in 1925, the League’s 
Chief Organising Officer, Capt. A.G. Mitchell, described the League as ‘the official 
junior organisation of the Conservative and Unionist party’ and reinforced this view 
by recommending that the local party agent be used in the process of setting up a 
new JIL branch.
108
 Regardless of the changing nature of its independence from, or 
integration with, the Conservative party, it is clear that the League was a 
Conservative body throughout its existence. 
 
Impact 
Speaking at a conference of Eastern Area of the League in September 1928, 
its chairman, Lord Stanley, enunciated, once again, Disraeli’s Crystal Palace 
principles of maintaining the institutions of the country; upholding the Empire; and 
elevating the condition of the people. In doing so, he was clear about the impact of 
the League. 
 
It was a movement that would affect the future, not only of the Conservative Party, but of the nation 
and the Empire. The League took the place of the school, college, regiment, and university of more 
fortunate people. It was a great national movement…[that] stood for the development of the Empire, 





It would be wrong to take at face value this statement of the League’s 
importance. It was made by the League’s principal public figure for consumption not 
only by those present but also by the national press. It was exaggerated, rhetorical 
and intended to motivate young members and to impress the wider public but it 
provides a valid framework with which to assess the League’s impact in the terms 
used by its leadership. What impact did the League have on the party, the nation and 
the Empire? And in what ways did it stand for the Empire, the Constitution and 
better social conditions? Was it a surrogate means of educating young people? The 
answers to these questions lie in an assessment of the League’s activities.  
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The League’s impact on the Conservative party is perhaps the area in which 
it was most effective. First, it provided a mechanism for young, politically ambitious 
men and women to learn about politics and to acquire political skills in a way that 
was readily available to them via a widespread network of local branches whose 
annual membership subscription cost little. Almost every constituency in England 
had a branch as well as many in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The League’s 
hierarchical structure of branch, division and area offered members a progressive 
means of pursuing politics and of coming to the attention of more senior figures in 
the party. Many members became Conservative candidates in local and 
parliamentary elections, a proportion of them successfully so. Others became party 
agents. Stanley’s remark about the League being an institute of learning relates to an 
important activity of the League: the inculcation of political ideas and skills. In the 
branches the debates held and the talks given by visiting politicians provided an 
opportunity for young people to discover and explore Tory politics. Speaking 
competitions organised on a regional and national basis were an incentive for the 
politically ambitious to acquire and demonstrate political ability and to come to the 
attention of senior politicians.  
 
Stanley’s reference to the educational role of the League is further 
exemplified by the access that members had to courses at Ashridge and at its 
predecessor, the Philip Stott College. One should not, however, exaggerate the 
educational impact of the League. Many members were primarily interested in social 
rather than political activities and, even at its peak of a quarter of a million, the 
League’s membership was only a very small fraction of the national cohort of people 
between the ages of fourteen and thirty.  Nevertheless as an organisation wishing to 
spread political knowledge and Conservative ideas and to find and develop young 
politicians, the League was effective even if its impact cannot be exactly quantified. 
The League provided a way into politics especially for men and women lower down 
the social scale who lacked the political connections, through family and society, that 
aristocratic and upper-middle class men and women often enjoyed.  The discussion 





The League was an effective and disciplined electoral force. Party candidates 
were energetically assisted at the time of local and parliamentary elections by an 
army of young people, estimated, as we have seen, at over one hundred thousand 
during the general election campaign of 1929, for example. One cannot quantify the 
impact of this electoral force in terms of seats won that might otherwise have been 
lost, but the impact of the League in elections was immediate and direct and 
expressions of gratitude from candidates and party agents were common throughout 
the inter-war period. There are no reports of members of the League using violent or 
intimidatory methods during campaigning, or at any other time. They were an 
exemplar of the moderation which mainstream politicians sought to engender in 
British politics in the inter-war period, even though youth culture was not without its 
violent elements. They accepted the ethos of their leader, Stanley Baldwin, who 
‘sought to embed the ideas of reasonableness and peaceableness into the national 
psyche’. 110  
 
In the field of policy any impact on the party was weak. The League 
expressed its ideas at conferences and through resolutions passed at meetings of its 
various constituent bodies which were then forwarded to the Council or Executive 
Committee. Sometimes a resolution was sent to party headquarters. None of this, 
however, seems to have brought about change in Conservative policy. In any case 
the League hardly ever took a position at variance with mainstream party policy 
although its resistance to the progress towards Indian self-government is an 
exception to this. The League leadership was wary of being at variance with the 
main party and sought to avoid any embarrassing resolutions or confrontations. Even 
if the League had been a vociferous element at the fringes of party policy as either a 
radical or die-hard element, it is doubtful if the party leadership would have taken 
serious notice. The senior body, the National Union of Conservative Associations, 
complained that its resolutions were ignored by party headquarters so the youth 
organisation cannot be expected to have done better. It follows that if the League had 
little impact on the Conservative party, which was in government for most of the 
inter-war years and capable of passing laws, then it could not have had any effect on 
national and imperial policies except by taking some form of direct action that by-
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passed the Conservative party. The League never did so; it was not a militant 
organisation, unlike the League of Empire Loyalists, and never sought publicity for 
its beliefs through activities such as marches, mass demonstrations and disruptive 
behaviour. Nevertheless, because of its electoral activities and its production of 
candidates, Lord Stanley was right to claim that the League had an effect on the Tory 
party, but his claim about the nation and the Empire is far-fetched. 
 
The League was not strong financially and at least one MP complained that 
the League would never be a worthwhile force whilst it lacked greater financial 
strength.
111
 The League’s financial resources were both central and local. As long as 
a branch followed the League’s objects and principles, it was free to set its own 
agenda of political and social activities and to manage its own finances. Apart from 
subscriptions, money was raised through surpluses made at events organised by the 
branches. Centrally, there was a separate budget used to pay for a small staff and for 
office administration and publicity using a grant made to the League from 
Conservative Central Office to cover these costs. Thus the League, neither centrally 
nor in its branches, ever had large sums of money with which to campaign for new 
members or publicise its beliefs and activities to the public at large. Indeed the 
central management of the League does not seem to have been interested in 
providing a national driving force for such purposes, even on one occasion 
suggesting that it did not need all the money offered to it by Central Office. A reason 
for this financial temperance may be that the League’s effectiveness lay in its human, 
not financial, resources, especially, for example, at election times when as unpaid 
volunteers they could help the local party organisation by replacing the paid 
canvassers that parliament had made illegal in 1883. 
 
It may well be that the lack of impact of the League on national 
consciousness arose, not from lack of financial resources, but from the perception of 
its leadership, and that of the Conservative party, of what the League was for. If it 
was primarily a means of educating young people in Tory politics some of whom 
would become candidates and agents, and of creating and maintaining a resource to 
be used at elections, this could be done almost entirely at a local level and so there 
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was no need for strong central resources and direction. The League’s headquarters 
formed a helpful and guiding secretariat rather than a powerful command centre. 
Indeed, a strong central national force with plenty of funds might have been an 
embarrassment to the leadership. A resolution at a League meeting contesting party 
policy was a much safer outcome than a national campaign that opposed the party’s 
policy on India, for example. The League’s organisation into many small branches 
did not facilitate national campaigns When the branches were formed into divisions 
and federations this was not to strengthen them but to facilitate communication with 
them from the League’s headquarters. Writing in Torchbearer in June 1937, Anne 
Gill, Honorary Secretary of the Pudsey and Otley Divisional Council, observed that 
there was a parochial attitude in many branches. They were interested in their own 
membership numbers, finances and successes but were insufficiently concerned 
about the activities of other branches even though the League had a hierarchical 
divisional and federal structure. This parochialism, she argued, meant that League 
members ‘[did] not look upon [themselves] as a national organisation’.112 Gill’s 
complaint captures the fragmented, parochial nature of the structure and power of the 
Junior Imperial League but perhaps misses the point that,  if the main party saw the 
League as primarily a mechanism for training young politicians and for marshalling 
them during election campaigns, a system of disconnected local branches would 
suffice. It remains to address the questions: why does the Junior Imperial League 
matter and what does it tell us about Conservatism and the Empire?   
 
Conclusion 
Historians have written almost nothing about the Junior Imperial League. 
Layton-Henry deals briefly with it in introducing an essay on the Young 
Conservatives from 1945 to 1970 and historians such as Martin Pugh, John Ramsden 
and Philip Williamson mention it only in passing. Even the diarists and memoirists 
J.C.C. Davidson, Cuthbert Headlam and Lord Eustace Percy make little or no 
mention of the League. This might be because of its relative importance in Tory 
politics. In general, in writing about a long career, politicians will conclude that the 
junior section of any organisation is, by its intrinsic nature, likely to be 
overshadowed by its senior relation. Nevertheless, some senior Tory politicians 
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underestimated the value of the League and perceived it as frivolous and too 
interested in social, rather than political, matters and this may have diverted attention 
from the League’s political value. However, it was a serious political organisation 
and its importance has been overlooked, and unduly so. Evaluation of the Junior 
Imperial League adds significantly to knowledge about both the Conservative 
movement and imperial activism in the first half of the twentieth century. 
 
The Junior Imperial League cannot be characterised as an imperial pressure 
group tightly and persistently focused on a single issue in the way that, for example, 
the Empire Industries Association and the British Commonwealth Union were. It 
was a well organised imperial interest group of young Tory-minded people 
concerned with a wide range of political topics and social and sporting activities. Its 
impact on policymaking was negligible but it provided a good opportunity for men 
and women of different social classes to develop their political skills and bring them 
to the notice of Conservative party officials. It is true that for some members, the 
League was merely a social club but it could correctly claim to be the largest 
political youth organisation in the country even though its stated peak membership 
of 250,000 members is probably exaggerated. Even if only a small proportion of its 
members were committed to extensive political activity this would still mean that it 
was of value to Conservatism for very little investment from the main party. The 
League received little money or other resources from the senior organisation and yet 
it provided it with thousands of effective men and women during election 
campaigns. In the 1924 general election, for example, ‘many members of parliament 
cordially admitted that they owed their victory largely to the help of the Imps.’113 
Some members of the League, as we have seen, themselves became members of 
parliament, and whilst one cannot conclude that this was always solely due to their 
experience with the League, there are examples, such as Braine and Hornsby-Smith, 
where it almost certainly was. Members of the League also ran for office in local 
elections and ‘[m]any of the most successful constituency agents… gained their 
knowledge and enthusiasm by an apprenticeship in the Junior Imperial League’.114  
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These political successes could not have been achieved, to the extent that 
they were, without the social and sporting events that all branches organised. They 
provided an environment in which political awareness, knowledge and skills could 
be nurtured and electoral activity quickly set in motion. The leaders of the League 
and the main party were alert to this and saw the benefit to its political cause of 
sporting and social events and advertised them in their recruiting campaigns. Those 
who complained about the distraction from politics that social activities caused may 
have had a point but they did not see clearly enough that the enticement these 
activities provided was a necessary prelude to the more serious, political, business. 
Without them many branches would have been much weaker numerically, to the 
point of closure, and thus cause the loss of a setting in which even a minority could 
engage in political matters. The opportunity for young people to mix socially also 
created team spirit and so made them more effective in working together on political 
issues.  
 
Although the League had little influence on Conservative policymaking, a 
weakness that it shared with the National Union of Conservative Associations, it 
sought increasingly to be recognised as a serious organisation and to be allowed to 
participate fully in the party’s senior councils. The Conservative party, which was 
much more successful in managing and motivating youth than was the Labour party, 
was sympathetic to this wish and by 1938 the League, whilst retaining its 
independence, was fully represented on the various administrative bodies of the party 
structure on a similar footing to that of the men’s and women’s sections. One might 
reasonably postulate that Tory youth was at last fully emancipated and that this is 
recognition of respect and esteem for it in the senior echelons of the party by the end 
of the nineteen-thirties. Conversely, it might be that by allowing the League an 
increased presence on its committees the party was bringing the League into party 
affairs merely to assuage its restlessness about its role and in the belief that it was 
thus unlikely to be troublesome.    
 
The central management of the League always dealt with the branches, 
divisions and federations with a light touch. Individual branches, as long as they 
adhered to the League’s principles, were left to manage themselves. As a result of 
this autonomous structure the League was not usually, except at general election 
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times perhaps, a tightly cohesive, monolithic force acting on orders issued from the 
centre. This is in contrast to smaller imperial activist groups such as the Round 
Table, the Empire Resources Development Committee and the Empire Development 
Union, for example. It did, however, hold annual general meetings and from, time to 
time, rallies attended by several thousand members. This enabled them to be 
addressed by senior members of the party including Stanley Baldwin. Leader and 
League expressed their mutual admiration on a number of occasions. This loyalty to 
the leader was one of the defining features of the League and it may help to explain 
why the League rarely challenged party policy, except notably over imperial issues, 
and that when it did demur, senior League members sought to temper dissent and 
avoid embarrassing Baldwin.  
 
The Junior Imperial League and the Conservative party were pragmatic and 
flexible towards each other and created a feeling of mutual support.  They did not 
adopt a rigid, ideological stance in their relationship (unlike the Labour party and its 
youth). Each responded to the other’s needs: the main party, for example, sought 
help in election campaigns; the League sought greater political recognition and 
responsibility. By working together, the Conservative party was better enabled to 
rise to the challenges of the expanding post-war electorate that brought greatly 
increased numbers of young men and women to the polling booths of Britain. The 
Junior Imperial League was a valuable Tory asset and contributed to the 
advancement of Conservatism in the years between the two wars. It was also a 
significant presence in imperial activism.  
 
The League was founded at a time when there was a mushrooming of such 
organisations; several had been founded in the later years of the nineteenth century 
and yet more appeared during Edwardian times. From the outset the JIL drew 
inspiration from one of the leading imperialists of the period, Joseph Chamberlain.  
It created for itself imperial credentials: it chose ‘imperial’ as part of its name and 
clung to it throughout its existence; and ‘For Empire’ was its motto. As we have 
seen, it was strongly allied with the Conservative party, the party of Empire, and 
recognised its Disraelian roots as exemplified when Stanley Baldwin referred back to 
them in a speech to the JIL at a rally in the 1930s. Within the ambit of the 
Conservative party it could comfortably and loyally express its belief in the British 
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Empire. It did not often seek to change imperial policy, rather it celebrated and 
enjoyed Britain’s imperial status, accepting the Empire in banal, commonplace ways 
that took it for granted. In these ways, of all the imperial activist groups, it was most 
akin to the Primrose League. It was an imperial interest group that was largely 
inward-looking in the sense that, unlike every other imperial activist group, it 
appeared uninterested in making strong contacts with people throughout the Empire. 
This low-key imperialism characterises the League and its position in the spectrum 
of imperial activist groups will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
 
Epilogue      
The outbreak of the Second World War interrupted the League’s activities. It 
stopped publishing its magazine, Torchbearer, in July 1939, and suspended 
indefinitely meetings of its Central Council and Executive Committee in May 1940. 
  
By 1943, however, the Conservative party had turned its attention to its plans 
for Tory youth in the post-war period. The chairman of  the party appointed a 
committee under the chairmanship of Gerald Palmer MP to ‘consider and report as to 
what action should be taken to re-establish the Junior Movement of the Conservative 
and Unionist party, with recommendations as to the basis on which it should be 
organised…. after the war.’115 Palmer reported in June 1944, recommending the 
complete integration of the League into the National Union.
116
In fact it amounted to 
dissolution of the League and was not without controversy. A number of senior 
League members such as Herbert Williams, Pat Hornsby-Smith and Derrick Woods, 
secretary of the East Midlands Federation, objected to the ‘somewhat illegal 
suppression of the League’.117The League had always been an independent body, not 
subordinate to the Conservative party and the transfer of the League’s funds to the 
new youth organisation was improper. Woods argued that a meeting of the Executive 
Committee of the League in 1944 had decided to re-organise the League and change 
its title but now (November 1945) he wrote, ‘I have been informed…that the League 
is … defunct’. It was left to Lord Dunglass, chairman of the League, and Anthony 
Nutting to overcome resistance to the demise of the League. The Junior Imperial and 
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Constitutional League was finally dissolved in 1946 at a meeting of its Executive 
Committee, to be succeeded by the Young Conservatives.   
 
  
Chapter 5. The League of Empire Loyalists, 1954-1967 
 
The League of Empire Loyalists was very different from the JIL in several 
ways. It was at loggerheads with the leadership of the Conservative party, not 
cooperative with it, as the JIL had been. The JIL drew ever closer to the 
Conservative party throughout its existence whereas the LEL became estranged from 
it and lost the support of individual members of the Conservative party. Its purpose 
was wholly political and without social activity. Its imperialism, which had a 
virulent element and sought publicity through disruptive tactics, was quite unlike the 
low-key, celebratory imperialism of the JIL. These contrasting features place the 
LEL at the opposite end of the spectrum of imperial activism to that of the JIL.  It 
was a persistently controversial organisation both in terms of its membership and 
activities and in its ideology which some historians have argued was fascist. In the 
first of two chapters about the League, this chapter will discuss the membership, 
activities and impact of the League. The next chapter, Chapter 6, will then address 
the question of the League’s ideology. 
 
The membership of the League, it will be argued, in this chapter, had 
similarities with the right-wing of the Conservative party with whom it sought, but 
failed, to establish a co-operative relationship. Its activities were carefully planned to 
achieve maximum publicity but it had little impact on public or governmental 
opinion. Nevertheless by examining the League, we can draw some conclusions 
about the nature of British imperialists in the middle of the twentieth century.   
 
The origins of the League, its governance and organisation 
The League of Empire Loyalists was officially launched at Caxton Hall, 
Westminster in October 1954
1
 after it had first been mooted by its founder, A.K. 
Chesterton, seven months earlier in an article in his weekly ‘views-letter’ Candour in 
which he announced: 
 
The proposal is not to create a new political party, but to organise public opinion so as to force upon 
existing parties policies favourable to national and imperial survival…Were the [proposed] 
League…to develop sufficient dynamism at home, its impulses would …put heart into our kinsmen 
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overseas and reawaken in them the knowledge that it is a proud thing to be British…[T]he immediate 
task is…the liberation of the British genius so that it may again assume the leadership of mankind.2  
 
In an earlier piece in Candour, Chesterton had argued that forming a new 
political party was futile; it was influencing public opinion that was essential.  
 
As politicians almost invariably act as politicians…there is no sense in building up another party 
which…would become just another instrument for the advancement of their own careers. But in so far 
as they are amenable to currents of opinion…there is surely no reason why we shall not try…to 
command their obedience by canalising…the public opinion to which they are subject… What is now 
needed…in an increasingly Jew-dominated world [is] in effect, a Board of Deputies of Native Britons 
to safeguard British interests…an organisation of British patriots which would [attack] any public 




In eschewing the creation of a political party he was acting in a similar way 
to almost all imperial activist groups. Only Beaverbrook’s group, the Empire 
Crusade, formed a political party. Other groups, however, such as the British 
Commonwealth Union and the Empire Industries Association, recruited back-bench 
Tory MPs to their cause and Chesterton also tried to do so but was unsuccessful.  
 
Chesterton’s arguments for the formation of the League establish, from the 
outset, the matters that were of principal importance to him at that time: ‘national 
and imperial survival’, ‘kinsmen overseas’, ‘Britons’, ‘British sovereignty’ and 
‘British patriots’. These ideas had been familiar to imperial activists since late-
Victorian times; the Overseas Club and the Patriotic League of Britons Overseas are 
particular examples of groups pursuing the notion of kith and kin in the Empire. 
Chesterton was a British imperial patriot whose Kiplingesque belief was that the 
British Empire was ‘the highest flowering of civilisation’4 and whose imperialism 
was deeply conservative.  According to his wife, Doris, his ‘attitude [to the Empire] 
remained frozen in the period 1914-18’.5 Forty years later, when the League was 
founded, Chesterton was pessimistic about the future of the British Empire. It was 
now threatened by ‘the world-wide Dollar Empire’ that conspired to ‘steal from [the 
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historic nations of Europe] the fruits of their long and splendid labours overseas’ and 
so the first words that Chesterton wrote for Candour, in October 1953, were: ‘The 
British Empire is disintegrating’.6  
 
The League was not Chesterton’s first involvement with political 
movements. He had joined Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists in 1933 
when, according to his wife, he had been ‘in search of a creed’.7 Having discovered 
the BUF almost by chance, Chesterton’s commitment to it ‘was total from the very 
outset’.8 He rose to become its leading spokesman and subsequently its Director of 
Publicity and Propaganda and editor of Blackshirt. He also wrote Mosley’s official 
biography, Portrait of a Leader, published in 1937. By the autumn of that year, 
however, he had become disillusioned with Mosley’s leadership and had decided to 
resign from the BUF, finally doing so in March 1938.
9
 Chesterton later regretted his 
association with Mosley and saw it as an ‘accursed spectre that haunts me wherever I 
go’.10 
 
In 1939, within eighteen months of his resignation, Chesterton was back in 
the British army in which he had previously served as an officer in the First World 
War and had won the Military Cross. When Chesterton left the army in 1943 because 
of ill health, he joined Truth, a right-wing journal, as deputy editor and remained so 
until he left in 1953
11
 after a disagreement about editorial policy following a change 
of ownership. Now unemployed, he was acutely aware that his prospects were poor 
because of his past association with fascism. 
 
In considering his employment prospects, Chesterton saw Beaverbrook’s 
newspapers as the only ones having ‘the guts and patriotism to use [his] kind of 
trenchant attack’12 and thus promulgate his imperial ideas. In January 1953, he had 
written directly to Beaverbrook who responded by appointing him for a fixed term 
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from May 1953 until January 1954 to ‘engage in such work as [Beaverbrook] may 
designate for you’.13 However, Chesterton’s contract was not extended. He had had a 
difficult relationship with Beaverbrook’s editors who appear to have doubted his 
journalistic abilities and to have been hostile to his political views. Although 
Beaverbrook expressed his approval for some of the work that Chesterton had done 
for his newspapers, he declined to overturn his editors’ decision not to continue 
employing Chesterton. Beaverbrook wrote to Chesterton explaining that, ‘I cannot 
run the paper[s] from 3,000 miles distant [in Canada]…responsibility and authority 
rests with the editors’.14 Chesterton remained on good terms with Beaverbrook who 
offered to help Chesterton find new employment as he, Beaverbrook, would ‘no 
doubt be in a position to use some influence’ on Chesterton’s behalf.15 Fortunately, 
however, for Chesterton his new enterprise, Candour, was already underway and 
Chesterton never again needed an employer; Candour, his political group the League 
of Empire Loyalists (and the National Front into which it merged in 1967), occupied 
his time until his death in 1973. For most of that time he appears to have had no 
wage or salary but to have ‘deducted necessary living expenses’ from the capital 




Although his impecunious circumstances and poor employment prospects 
caused Chesterton to found Candour, he could not have done so without the 
financial backing of L.K. Jeffery, a wealthy British expatriate living in Chile. Early 
in 1953, at about the same time as he had approached Beaverbrook, Chesterton wrote 
a leaflet in which he accused Ronald Staples, the new owner of Truth, of betraying 
its campaign in support of Britain’s imperial interests: ‘week after week we [who 
wrote the paper] warned our kith and kin all over the world that our Imperial 
power…is being deliberately destroyed’. In the closing paragraph Chesterton made a 
direct appeal for funds: ‘The people I wish to reach are [Truth’s] readers…if they 
would be interested in the formation of a company to start another paper, I should be 
glad to hear from them [by receiving their provisional guarantees of financial 
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support]’.17 It is this that is said to have prompted Jeffery to send Chesterton a 
cheque for £1000
18
 ‘with the request that it should be used to launch a newsletter 
which would express distinctive British attitudes [in] a…world hostile to British 
power’.19  The first issue of Candour, whose purpose was ‘to try to help in restoring 
the cohesion and power of the British world’,20 appeared on 30 October 1953 and 
was the vehicle for the creation of the League the following year.  Chesterton saw 
Candour as resonant with Eye Witness, a weekly publication edited by his cousin, 
Cecil, in the early years of the century. Both publications, he believed, demonstrated 
the importance of ‘the two kinds of courage that have nourished the nation; the 
courage of the forum and the courage of the field…it seems easier to die in battle 
than to tell the truth in politics.’21 For Kenneth Chesterton, Cecil was ‘the man I 
must choose as my own exemplar’.22 
 
Details of the size and manner of distribution of Candour are not fully clear. 
It was a four-page leaflet published weekly (until it ran into financial difficulties in 
1961 when it appeared only intermittently) and was registered at the GPO as a 
newspaper. Its cover price was 1/3d and it was available on subscription at an annual 
cost of 25s. It is hard to envisage such a flimsy publication available on news-stands 
or at newsagents and it is probable, therefore, that distribution relied heavily on 
subscriptions. For example, because Chesterton had been closely associated with the 
anti-Semitic British People’s Party in the 1930s, helping to define its policies,23 he 
was able to take the opportunity, when its right-wing weekly pamphlet, People’s 
Post, ceased publication following the death of the Party’s president, the Duke of 
Bedford, in 1954, to take over its subscribers. There was also an overseas readership. 
The mast head of Candour declared its availability to Britons overseas, air mail rates 
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The League’s organisation demonstrated its imperial ambition by setting up 
branches in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada as well as in colonies 
such as Ceylon, Southern Rhodesia and Kenya. Without access to the League’s 
archives, it is not possible to know the number and strength of its branch structure in 
Britain but the leadership of the League is a little clearer. It consisted of a National 
Council of about thirty-five people of which more than half were resident in 
Commonwealth countries, and an annually elected Executive Committee of about 
fifteen people.
25
 Chesterton was not Chairman of this latter committee but of the 
Policy Committee which had powers to prevent subversion of the original objects of 
the League.
26
 Undoubtedly Chesterton, ‘often…portrayed as the archetypal 
“authoritarian personality”‘27 wielded considerable power and authority in the 
League because of this chairmanship, as well as his editorship of Candour and his 
control of Jeffery’s contributions, the use of which was entirely at Chesterton’s 
discretion.
28
 Furthermore, the chairmanship of the League’s council was perceived 
by its incumbent as ‘little more than nominal’.29 There is evidence that the League’s 
governance was dominated by Chesterton. Rodney Legg , who was in charge of the 
subscription list at the time,
30
claimed that Chesterton appointed members to 
committees simply to give an ‘appearance of respectability and numbers’;31 and also 
in Chesterton’s dismissal of the League’s Australian National Executive Committee 
and restructuring of the organisation in New Zealand during visits to those two 
countries in 1960.
32
 His senior colleagues certainly recognised Chesterton’s 
autocracy: ‘A.K. Chesterton is the Candour/League movement’, several of them 
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At the meeting to establish the League, it was agreed that the first task was to 
recruit members and a target of 20,000 was suggested.
34
 In fact, during the League’s 
entire existence until 1967, membership never reached more than about 3000, 
peaking in 1958 and then going into rapid decline
35
 so that by 1961 it had fallen to 
about 300 according to Rodney Legg. Even at its peak, the LEL was a small group 
comparable in size to the United Empire Trade League, the Victoria League and the 
Indian Empire Society. Chesterton’s preference for a select membership helped to 
ensure that the League was never a mass movement
36
 and he sought to recruit 
prestigious people to his cause. For example, in 1957, a direct approach was made to 
Lord Nuffield. He replied that he ‘quite agreed with [the League] but that he was too 
tired to do any more and that the young people must now take over’. Even without 
his active involvement in the League ‘his name would be a tremendous boost’. 37 But 
what kind of people did join the League?  
 
The names of the leading officials of the League, in its National Council and 
Executive Committee, were pre-printed on the League’s official writing paper and 
these provide a source, in the absence of access to full membership lists, from which 
some broad conclusions can be drawn about the sociological nature of the League.  
(See Appendix 2 for biographical details.). The sixty leading League members listed 
provide only a very limited source from which to draw sociological conclusions. 
However, Chesterton was an accomplished propagandist and the names that 
appeared on League stationery were, in effect, a means of conveying a perception of 
the nature of the League to its interlocutors. Within this limitation, it is nevertheless 
possible to see that the League attracted those who tended to be middle or upper-
middle class public-school educated people with military backgrounds who had 
served the interests of Britain and her Empire. In this respect it was similar to the 
Indian Empire Society and the India Defence League of the 1930s. A second 
category of member was living in the white Dominions (Australia, New Zealand, 
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Canada and South Africa) or settler colonies such as Kenya and Southern Rhodesia. 
A third category contains professional civilians: journalists, architects and surveyors. 
There are a few who have made some progress in local politics, but none nationally, 
perhaps reflecting either Chesterton’s cynicism about politicians or parliamentary 
politicians’ reluctance to be openly associated with the League. There are, 
apparently, no academics or clerics. Not shown in Appendix 2, with the exception of 
Colin Jordan, (who later joined the National Front) is another type of member, the 
younger political activist such as John Bean and John Tyndall, but they were 
impatient with Chesterton’s leadership and left to form their own organisations 
because Chesterton preferred the elitism of the League to their demands for the 
creation of a mass movement.
38
 In 1957, for example, Jordan resigned after his 
proposal to ban Jews and black people from membership was rejected by Chesterton 
and subsequently formed the racist White Defence League, and Bean left to set up 
the National Labour Party. The presence of this younger element meant that the 
League was perceived as a training ground for a post-war ‘generation of British 
fascists and neo-fascists’.39  
 
Despite this transient group of fascists, it is possible to summarise the 
sociological nature of the League, from very limited membership data, as privately 
educated; military; conservative, even reactionary; patriotic and imperialistic; and 
rooted in elitist feelings of ‘traditional superiority’ and defence of the status quo. 
These are characteristics which can be seen in earlier imperial activist groups 
especially, for example, the Indian Empire Society and the India Defence League, 
the only other imperial activist groups whose main purpose was to prevent countries 
from gaining independence from Britain. Unlike these organisations, however, the 
LEL lacked a strong element of people who had served in the Empire in military and 
administrative roles. If League members were conservative, were there sociological 
similarities with imperialists on the Tory party backbenches? If such similarities can 
be demonstrated, additional weight may be added to the idea of a class-based British 
imperialism. 
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By examining Early Day Motions in 1956/7, the authors of Backbench 
Opinion in the House of Commons 1955-59 have categorised Conservative 
backbenchers’ attitudes to ‘Europe’ and ‘Commonwealth’ into ‘two groups: sixty-
three “Empire Moderates” and sixty-four “Empire Stalwarts”‘.40 Of the latter, eight 
members also rejected any federal relationship with the European Economic 
Community and may therefore be considered extreme Empire Stalwarts. Apart from 
Harry Legge-Bourke, Finer and his co-authors do not name these MPs but by 
analysing the signatories to the original EDM documents I have established their 
identities (see Appendix 3).  
  
From the biographical details of these eight ultra-imperialists we can deduce 
that they were public school educated (all eight), went on to further education at 
university or Sandhurst (five), had imperial or other foreign experience (six) and 
were either professional soldiers (three) or had conscripted experience of military 
service (three). It is clear that this group, as with the League, is characterised as 
middle class, conservative and imperialist, public school educated, military officers. 
To what extent, however, are these characteristics merely those of Tory MPs in 
general? To address this question it is useful to look at a group of Tory MPs who did 
not strongly support the Empire.  
 
In Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 1955-59, the authors have 
analysed a group of Tory MPs that they call the European Stalwarts. These are 
twenty-eight MPs who signed EDMs supporting Britain’s involvement in the 
Common Market and who never appended their names to any of the pro-
Commonwealth EDMs.
 41
 Finer, Berrington and Bartholomew found that 
‘[m]embers who entered Parliament in 1950 or before were predominantly Empire-
minded’ but there was an intake in 1951 of Tory MPs more disposed towards 
Europe, a change that was ‘accentuated in 1955…[Tory] members who won their 
seats [that year] outnumbered the Empire men by nearly two to one’. It was these 
younger members who were Pro-Europe whereas ‘the over-sixties were over-
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whelmingly pro-Commonwealth’.42 Finer et al further conclude that differences in 
occupation of the Empire Stalwarts and the European Stalwarts were ‘of minor 
significance’ but do not go into much detail of two important aspects: military and 
imperial experience. Nor do they identify the MPs by name so that further analysis 
of the EDMs is necessary to determine exactly who they were. By examining the 
original nine EDMs (containing several hundred names), I have identified these 28 
European Stalwarts  and also, from other sources, established their military and 
imperial experience. The same identification process and analysis have been done for 
the 63 Empire Stalwarts. The results are shown in Table 11.   
 
Table 11. Comparison of military and imperial experience 
 Empire Stalwarts European Stalwarts 
Military experience: 
     professional career 
     non-professional 










     extensive 
     moderate  











The Empire Stalwarts were more likely to have had experience of the armed 
services than the European Stalwarts and also to have pursued a professional 
services career. The more striking difference between the two groups is that Empire 
Stalwarts were three times more likely to have had experience of the British Empire 
than European Stalwarts. Assessment of the depth and importance of this imperial 
experience is, to some extent, subjective. It varies from that of Sir David Campbell 
who was Deputy Chief Secretary in Uganda from 1936 to 1942 and Lieut.-Governor 
of Malta from 1943 to 1952; of Christopher Armstrong who was with the Burmah 
Oil Company for twenty years from 1922, in 1942 Controller of the Petroleum 
Industry in Burma and a member of the Burmese House of Representatives and from 
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1944 to 1954 farming in Kenya; to, at the other extreme of experience, Harry Legge-
Bourke who was merely aide-de-camp to the British Ambassador in Cairo in 1941-
42.  Further research is needed to describe more specifically the nature of these 
individuals’ imperial experiences, but it seems clear that those who had experienced 
the Empire directly were much more likely to champion its cause than those who had 
not. This finding does not contradict Finer, Berrington and Bartholomew. It extends 
and reinforces their argument. In describing a stereotypical right-wing Tory MP, 
they refer to 
 a belief in the domination of subject peoples, scepticism towards the United Nations, and a vigorous 
insistence on a firm and independent British foreign policy. These beliefs comprise the right-wing 
syndrome…of a Conservative party in Parliament, and a fortiori, by fierce majors and tweedy 
women…in the constituencies43.  
We can conclude that Empire Stalwarts are quite clearly distinct from other 
Tory MPs and have similarities with members of the League of Empire Loyalists. 
 
It would be wrong to exaggerate the significance of this conclusion from such 
a small sample and from such limited action as merely signing four Early Day 
Motions. However, Sue Onslow has observed that, ‘[t]he answer to the erosion of 
British influence and prestige [in the early nineteen-fifties] was seen to lie in the 
extension and consolidation of imperial preference [but this was rejected] at the party 
conference in 1954’. 44 This rejection caused a cadre of eighteen backbench 
Conservative MPs to form the Expanding Commonwealth Group (ECG) in order to 
take more sustained imperial action (See Appendix 4.) Its members were, once 
again, public schoolboys who had proceeded to university, usually Oxford or 
Cambridge, and had served as officers in the armed forces. This particular group had 
a stronger element of aristocracy and, outside their wartime experiences, less 
colonial experience than the members of the League previously discussed, but they 
were clearly imperially minded, arguing that the Commonwealth must expand or die 
and needed to ‘develop its resources to match the power of the USA or the USSR’,45 
sentiments with which Chesterton would have strongly agreed. Another feature of 
the ECG members is that they were almost all born in the fifteen years leading up to 
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the outbreak of the First World War. Those born then, according to Chesterton, 
became aware of ‘the splendour and manifest distinctions of European genius...our 
Imperial destiny, as it seemed to us, was essentially a projection and intensification 
of this feeling of kinship…’.46 The ECG, then, provides further evidence of the 
sociological similarities of the League and imperialist-minded members of the 
Conservative Party. 
 
David Cannadine has argued that the governance of British Empire was 
based on the social structure of the metropole,
47
 and that ‘social ranking’ is important 
in British attitudes to empire. However, he observes that little consideration has been 
given by historians to the empire as a social structure ‘in which…[social] status is 
fundamental’. Britain, he believes, was a social hierarchy whose apex wielded 
domestic and imperial power.
48
 Even if it is no more than a likelihood that the 
British people’s various perceptions of the empire also arose from their different 
social positions,
49
 Porter is clear that ‘class was by far the most important factor in 
influencing people’s attitudes to empire’. The working class showed little interest in 
empire whereas the education enjoyed by the upper and upper-middle classes meant 
that they were most supportive of, and affected by, the empire. Furthermore, the 
predominance of colonial officials educated at public schools lasted until the middle 
of the twentieth century
50
 and provided a class-based link between Britain and her 
empire.  
 
The argument that follows in this chapter supports Bernard Porter’s class-
based view of empire but I have attempted to provide a more empirical analysis than 
Porter by examining the social backgrounds of the two groups of people (i.e. 
members of the League and right-wing Conservative MPs) who are said to have been 
the only ones who cared strongly about the loss of empire.
51
 Thus Porter has a point 
but does not test it empirically in the post-war period. Nor does he concentrate on the 
effects of loss of empire on aspects of British identity, merely stating that because 
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the empire made little impression on British society ‘when it was a going concern it 
follows that its dissolution did not need to have much of an impact either’.52  
 
There is no consensus among historians about the relevance of empire in 
British society. At one extreme of the debate it has even been suggested that there 
never was a British empire
53
 but scholars who have accepted its existence can be 
broadly divided into two categories: those who see the empire as largely irrelevant to 
domestic society and those who argue that it had relevance at least to some degree. 
Further complexity is added to the debate because the perceived importance of 
empire, both actually and historiographically, has varied over time. Thus John 
Mackenzie has observed that: ‘[t]he British, it has often been said, were indifferent 
to imperialism…apart from a brief [period] …in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century’.54 Mackenzie and others in the historiographical debate have sought to 
reject this idea but recently Bernard Porter has revived it.  
 
Those who emphasise the relevance of empire within this context include 
Wendy Webster who has argued that, although in mid-twentieth century Britain 
many people were ignorant of empire, the idea of a ‘people’s empire’ was one of 
three key media themes of Englishness (often equated with Britishness) that reached 
its climax in the coronation in 1953.
55
 Weight believes that the mainstays of 
Britishness in the 1950s were the ‘monarchy, Protestantism, democracy and 
empire’,56 but that Britain’s imperial identity was in rapid decline in the late 1950s.57 
Paul Ward sees in the break-up of the British Empire the removal of a major element 
of Britishness. British imperial rule was, he states, probably the most important 
element of foreigners’ perceptions of Britishness but he draws attention to the 
questioning, by historians, of the extent to which this was shared by the British 
public. Stuart Ward’s discussion of what he refers to as the ‘minimal impact thesis’ 
challenges the notion that loss of empire had little effect on British identity.
58
 He 
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sees the official attempt to define who was and who was not a British subject as 
holding ‘the key to understanding how end of empire impacted directly on British 
identity in Britain’.59 Bernard Porter, however, is unequivocal. He opines that the 
British Empire made a ‘superficial…impression on British society and culture’ and 
that its dissolution ‘did not have…much of an impact’ because British society 





Within the context of Britain in the 1950s and 1960s, what evidence can be 
suggested in support of the arguments that British imperialism was particularly 
associated with the upper and upper-middle classes? In other words, who were the 
imperial British in post-war Britain? One approach would be to examine those 
known to have opposed the loss of empire and, as Porter has observed, these were 
only a few ‘Conservative zealots’ and the League of Empire Loyalists.61 For the 
purposes of further discussion I shall amalgamate League members, the participants 
in the Expanding Commonwealth Group and the backbench MPs who signed 
imperialistic Early Day Motions and refer to them as ‘empire enthusiasts’. Their 
brief biographical details can be found in the Appendices. 
 
To what social and occupational class(es) did these empire enthusiasts 
belong? Table 12 shows the education and military experience of the sixty 
enthusiasts for which (very limited) biographical data is available. This sample 
comprises thirty-five members of the two principal management bodies of the 
League (Appendix 2); all eighteen members of the Expanding Commonwealth 
Group (Appendix 4); and seven ultra-imperialist backbench Tory MPs (Appendix 3). 
Forty-nine per cent of the empire enthusiasts have at least one of the four attributes 
shown in Table 12; 20% have two; 25% have three; and 5% all four. Only one has 
none of the attributes. It would be wrong to draw too firm a conclusion from such a 
small sample, but one might reasonably conclude that this analysis suggests that 
there is a positive correlation between the four attributes and enthusiasm for empire. 
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Number 34 25 17 24 
Percentage 56.7 41.7 28.3 40.0 
 
 
Military service of itself does not necessarily indicate any particular social 
class, particularly in the 1950s when many men from all parts of society would have 
served in the Second World War. However, it is a powerful indicator of class in this 
particular case: all the thirty four men (there are no women) were officers and seven 
of them were professional servicemen trained at military or naval college. Of the 
twenty-five who attended public school, seven were at Eton or Harrow and all of the 
remainder were at leading schools such as Rugby, Marlborough, Stowe and 
Haileybury. In an age when few went up to university, twelve of the seventeen 
graduated from Oxford or Cambridge. It is important to note that, of the sixty, only 
five had close family connections with the peerage. We may reasonably conclude, 
therefore, that although there was an aristocratic tinge to the imperial enthusiasts, 
they were predominantly middle and upper middle class. If we accept that, as 
previously suggested, only the League and right-wing Conservatives were politically 
active in deploring the loss of empire, we may conclude that this is evidence (but not 
proof) that suggests that imperial Britishness was largely confined to the middle and 
upper-middle classes. Such a conclusion might be confirmed or modified by, for 
example, an analysis of attitudes to imperial Britishness among the readership of the 
Daily Express, or of the membership and demise of pro-imperial organisations such 
as the Royal Colonial Institute and the Empire Day Movement that pre-dated the 
League; but that is beyond the reach of this thesis.
62
 It is certainly the case, however, 
that people of all classes belonged to imperial activist groups (about which more in 
Chapter 7) and it is important to note that the Primrose League and the Women’s 
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Guild of Empire had a strong working-class element. It has been said that one can 
understand the League by looking back to British imperial thinking at the start of the 
twentieth century.
63
 Indeed one can see in Chesterton’s language of imperialism 
echoes of Seeley who wrote of a Greater Britain of ‘the English (sic) as…one people 
in a worldwide state’64 and of Lord Milner who claimed that ‘the Empire is my 
country’. As one ex-member of the League said of his former colleagues: ‘These 
people have never really believed that Queen Victoria is dead’.65  
 
During the thirteen years it existed, the objects and membership of the 
League were right-wing, conservative and imperialistic. Thus, because, as we shall 
see, the League had little impact during the thirteen years it existed, it provides 
useful evidence of the nature of Britishness in the 1950s.  It provides strong evidence 
that only a tiny section of British society felt strongly about empire at that time. That 
section was from the upper echelons of society that had been privately educated in 
the early twentieth century, had served its country militarily and wanted to articulate 
a late expression of imperial Britishness. 
 
Activities and Impact 
The activities of the League were designed to acquire publicity for the 
League’s beliefs and policies, and to influence public and political opinion, not just 
in Britain, but in the white Dominions and some dependent colonies. They included 
‘stunts’ on public occasions and interruptions at other political organisations’ 
meetings; the publication and distribution of Candour; attempting to gain the support 
of Conservative backbench MPs and ordinary Tory branch members; taking part in 
parliamentary elections; and building a network of useful contacts in the Empire. 
More opportunistically, the League leadership appears to have relished the 
opportunity to sue for libel, gaining favourable publicity, and funds from damages, 
by clearing its name of accusations of violence and fascism. The League’s central 
activity, certainly in its early years, however, was to gain publicity that would 
convey its existence and message to as wide an audience as possible. It was, to use 
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Joseph Conrad’s words, a policy of ‘propaganda by deed’,66 and most of the deeds 
consisted of interrupting official political meetings especially those of the 
Conservative Party. One Conservative activist explained to Central office that the 
League had a ‘small “commando” of about fifteen people who attended meetings 
with the objective of being chucked out’, a result for which they were well trained to 
succeed.
67
 This particular tactic for gaining publicity through local and national 
newspapers was highly characteristic of the LEL and was not used by other imperial 
activist groups. Furthermore, groups such as the Primrose League, the Tariff Reform 
League, the Junior Imperial League and the Empire Industries Association sought to 
work with the Conservative party and not to attack it. 
 
The League began its publicity seeking activities by demonstrating at the 
Conservative Party Conference at Blackpool in October 1954. Throughout 1955, 
apart from demonstrating at a number of meetings during the general election 
campaigning period and once again at the Conservative Party Conference, it appears 
to have been largely inactive. In 1956, however, the number and potency of 
demonstrations increased considerably. For example, in January a member of the 
League seized the microphone from Anthony Eden, the Prime Minister, at a 
Conservative Party meeting in Bradford
68
; in March and April the League protested, 
using loudspeakers, in front of the Soviet leaders, Bulganin and Khruschev, during 
their visits to London and Birmingham. The League was adept at gaining entry to 
meetings of prominent politicians such as David Marshall, Chief Minister of 
Singapore, (in May) and Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary, (in October).
69
 They 
did so by obtaining tickets from members of the Young Conservatives or, if unable 
to do that, by bluffing their way past stewards.
70
 They attempted to buy tickets from 
delegates to conferences
71
and, on at least one occasion, forged them.  
 
The League’s activities continued in similar vein throughout 1957, 
interrupting Harold Macmillan, the Prime Minister, at meetings in March and July 
and at the Conservative Party Conference in October. At this last incident one of the 
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League’s ‘commandos’ remarked to a steward as he was removed from the hall that 
the League members would always be at Tory meetings. The Conservatives were 
their principal, but not sole, target; for example, a meeting of the Liberal party and 
two held by the Movement for Colonial Freedom were also disrupted and Hugh 
Gaitskell and Aneurin Bevan were heckled at Labour party meetings during the 
general election campaign in 1959.
72
  The Tories, however, were the principal target 
and, in all, between October 1954 and December 1957, a Conservative Party report 
records forty separate demonstrations by League members, of which half were 
directed against the Conservatives, and also lists thirty-six reports of the events in 
the national press.
73
 The League was the only imperial activist group, apart from the 
Empire Crusade, actively and persistently to confront the Conservative party. Both 
organisations fought Tory candidates in parliamentary elections but this was a minor 
activity for the League in comparison to its disruptive tactics. Jon Lawrence has 
described this kind of activity as the ‘politics of disruption’ and argues that it was 
widely accepted in the late nineteenth century in Britain.
74
 It had a violent element to 
it and ‘physical force, and the threat of physical force, was ever present in popular 
politics before the First World War’75 as also were stunts and slogans. It was on the 
latter that the League concentrated its disruptive efforts; using violence at meetings 
was not part of its planned purpose. It did, however, receive publicity when violence 
was used against its members who had disrupted meetings. Its non-violent ‘politics 
of disruption’ was not, therefore, fully akin to the Victorian meaning of the 
expression, but the League made opportunistic use of violence used against it to gain 
publicity and members. Like the suffragettes the League ‘sought to exploit the 
politics of disruption to force their cause onto [the] political agenda’.76 They too 
were the recipients of violence rather than its perpetrators. 
 
As the culmination of a similar stream of activity in 1958, the League 
reached a peak of publicity at the Tory Conference in October when a number of 
League members who repeatedly interrupted the proceedings were violently 
removed from the hall. There was extensive coverage in the national newspapers the 
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next day and throughout the following week. The League does not appear to have 
deliberately sought to provoke violence, but it gained publicity by taking legal action 
against two stewards who, they claimed, had perpetrated the violence. As S.H. 
Pierssené, a Central Office official, wrote in 1956: ‘The League is constantly on the 
watch to involve us in libel action’.77 Others, too, were pursued especially if 
accusations of racism or unpatriotic behaviour were made. Resort to the courts 
provided a useful vehicle with which to publicise the League. The League was not 
unique in this respect. Contemporaneous organisations such as Mosley’s Union 
Movement, the National Socialist Movement and the British National Party ‘have 
been dependent on the provocation of violent clashes and upon court cases for 
attention’78, although Chesterton would have denied that the League ever sought to 
initiate violence.   
  
The disruptive activities of the League leading up to October 1958 had 
brought not only publicity but an increase in membership including many 
Conservatives. Some ‘back-bench MPs, rank and file faithful and Party contributors 
[were] in open sympathy with [the League]’.79 Establishing links with a number of 
back-bench MPs, such as Henry Kerby, and with party officials and Young 
Conservatives was also an important part of the League’s strategy but the League’s 
disruptions had become increasingly irritating to the Conservative leadership and by 
the end of 1958 it was made clear to members that associating with the League was 
political suicide. The League’s membership began to decline. 
 
As well as the loss of members in the aftermath of the 1958 Conservative 
Party conference, the League was increasingly seen as anti-Semitic, although 
Chesterton denied this, and many members decided to resign. The League was also 
repeatedly fissiparous and by 1959 Richard Hilton, R.C. Gleaves and Peter Godfrey-
Bartram had each left to set up their own political parties.
 80
 Membership was also 
affected by defections to Edward Martell’s National Fellowship, with its two 
                                                 
77
 Bodn. CPA CCO3/5/88, S. H. Pierssené to R. Dorman-Smith, 31 October 1956. 
78
 R. J. B. Rose [and others], Colour and Citizenship: a Report on British Race Relations, (London, 
1969), pp. 394-395. 
79
 Thayer, The British Political Fringe, p. 59. 
80
 Thayer, British Political Fringe, p. 69. 
200 
 
backbench Conservative MPs on its advisory committee,
81
 and to the Monday Club, 
a right-wing Conservative group founded by four Conservatives in 1961 in response 
to Harold Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’ speech. 
 
In 1961 the League suffered a major financial crisis when its principal 
sponsor, R.K. Jeffery, died. He had given the League approximately £70,000 during 
the seven years from 1954. Chesterton had expected to be the sole beneficiary of his 
will but it had been amended in favour of another person. Without Jeffery’s funding 
the League had to restrict its activities including the publication of Candour which 
now appeared only at irregular intervals rather than weekly. Fearing for the strength 
and continuity of the League, by 1966, Chesterton, then aged 67, opened 
negotiations with the British National Party, the Racial Preservation Society and the 
Greater Britain Movement. The resultant merger meant the disappearance of the 
League as a separate entity and its remaining membership of less than two hundred 
was absorbed into the National Front in January 1967.  
 
Analyses of the impact of the League that have been made by historians and 
contemporary writers coalesce in the following broad conclusions: the League was 
adept at gaining publicity for itself; it was a useful training ground for young neo-
fascists who went on to form their own political organisations; and its political 
influence was negligible.
82
 To these may be added that it acted as an important agent 
in the creation of the National Front in 1967
83
 and of sustaining a continuing 
audience of those interested in Chesterton’s conspiracy theory of Jewish domination 
of the world’s financial system described in his book The New Unhappy Lords 
(1965). 
 
Beyond this, there has not been much detailed analysis by scholars of the 
amount of publicity the League obtained nor of the League’s effect on the 
Conservative Party. Addressing these matters in detail is problematical because the 
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League’s archives and Chesterton’s post-war correspondence are largely in private 
hands
84
 but by examining, for example, the coverage by The Times of the League’s 
activities and by referring to internal correspondence within the Conservative Party, 
some evaluation of the impact of the League can be attempted. Questions such as 
why so little influence resulted from the League’s messages about the British Empire 
and what conclusions about public interest in the British Empire might be drawn 
from this failure have also received little consideration.  
 
Publicity in the media was a vital means of conveying to the public the fact 
of the League’s existence and its aims. Chesterton was aware of this and designed 
the League’s activities accordingly. Thus ‘stunts’, whose targets were prominent 
persons such as the prime minister, were organised at events at which representatives 
of the newspapers and television would be certain to be present. The League 
members would then ‘ambush’ the event by repeatedly interrupting proceedings, 
shouting out the League’s name and an appropriately provocative slogan. It would be 
wrong to describe this as heckling because it was carefully planned in advance and 
did not engage with what the speaker was saying; words were premeditated and not 
ripostes.
85
 The aim was to create a disturbance and to be thrown out of the meeting
86
 
thereby attracting the attention of reporters and cameramen, and through them the 
general public. For maximum effect they sat apart from each other in the hall in the 
middle seats of rows and individually and successively interrupted the meeting by 
typically calling out: ‘The League of Empire Loyalists say…’ followed by a 
particular message such as ‘Macmillan is a traitor’, thus prolonging any action taken 
by the stewards to remove them. If strong-arm methods were used so much the better 
because ensuing publicity was more likely.  
 
 
The importance the League attached to publicity in national newspapers is 
illustrated by its attitude to Beaverbrook’s Express Newspaper group. The Daily 
Express had indeed campaigned in support of the Empire but had failed, to the 
                                                 
84
 David Baker, the author of Ideology of Obsession, has deposited some papers at Bath University but 
much of the League’s archive is probably held by The A. K. Chesterton Trust, Liss, Hampshire. No 
reply was received to my request to consult it. 
85
 The Spectator, 24 October 1958. 
86
 Bodn. CPA CCO3/5/88, Dorman-Smith to Acting General Director, 15 July 1957. 
202 
 
frustration of the League, to publicise the League’s activities. Why, the League’s 
organising secretary enquired in a letter to Beaverbrook in October 1955, had ‘not 
one line about the League of Empire Loyalists…yet appeared in any of [the Express 
group newspapers]’87 even though almost every other national paper had 
prominently covered their activities? Beaverbrook should use his newspapers to give 
‘assistance…in furthering the cause [of Empire]…which you have so often 
proclaimed to be close to your heart’.88 Early in May 1956, the League conducted 
two days of demonstrations both outside and inside the Daily Express building in 
Fleet Street in an attempt to pressurise Beaverbrook into reporting its activities to 
‘the middle class Empire-proud Conservatives’ who read the Daily Express.89 The 
newspaper, however, took no immediate action to comply even though in the 
following week it launched its campaign to revive interest in Empire Day by 
distributing hundreds of thousands of Union Jacks to the public at 500 points 
throughout the country. In editorials and reports of Empire Day activities and 




A broader measure of the amount of publicity gained by the League 
throughout its existence can be gauged by analysing the coverage in The Times 
newspaper, which regarded itself as the paper of record (See Table 13).  A 
comprehensive analysis of newspaper coverage of the League has not been 
undertaken but, if we accept the data from The Times as an indicator of trends in the 
success of the League, it is clear that its most successful period was between 1955 
and 1959 which contained 64% of all reports during its entire existence. After rising 
quite rapidly from 1955 to 1959, publicity fell from 1960 and by 1965 the League 
had ceased to be newsworthy. Certainly, it would be wrong to suggest that the 112 
news items spread over thirteen years represented an avalanche of publicity but a 
comparison with news coverage in The Times of other, non-regional, minor political 
groups in the nineteen-fifties and sixties shows the relative success of the League in 
gaining publicity (See Table 13).  
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1954 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1955 1 0 0 1 2 0 
1956 8 (2) 1 0 3 12 (2) 0 
1957 6 (2) 5 4 2 17 (2) 2 
1958 12 (6) 3 (4) 0 6 (11) 21(21) 5 
1959 10 (2) 8 (2) 3 1 22 (4) 5 
1960 6 (1) 2 0 1  9 (1) 2 
1961 6 (1) 1 0 4 11(1) 1 
1962 6 1 0 0 7 2 
1963 0 0 0 2 2 0 
1964 3 0 2 1 6 1 
1965 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1966 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1967 0 1 2 0 3 1 
Totals 58 (14) 22 (6) 11 21(11) 112(31) 19 
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No. of news 
items in 







All Party Alliance 1967-68 25 1966-85 1.3 
British National 
Party 
1964-66 61 1960-70 5.5 
British Empire 
Party 
1951 1 1951 1.0 
Fellowship Party 1959-79 12 1963-69 1.7 
National Democrat 
Pty 
1964-74 3 1961-69 0.3 
National 
Fellowship 
1963-67 31 1956-81 1.9 
National Front 1968-79 68 1967-70 17.0 
League of Empire 
Loyalists 
1957-64 112 1954-67 8.0 
 
 
To compensate for the different time periods during which these groups 
operated, the average items per year have been calculated and show that, on this 
measure, no other party except the British National Party and the National Front 
gained publicity similar to or greater than the League. Its propaganda methods 
therefore were relatively successful within the context of the political fringe of 
British politics especially in an electoral system which did not give minor parties the 
encouragement of proportional representation and in which the two main parties 
were powerfully dominant. In the 1955 General Election their combined share of the 
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Chesterton’s contempt for political parties and his belief that they all simply 
became ‘tool[s] of the money power’94, meant that the League only rarely took part 
in parliamentary elections. This reluctance to engage in electoral activity was seen as 
a weakness by the younger members such as John Bean; it meant that opportunities 
to gain publicity were missed. Fighting elections cost money but when three League 
officials stood as independent candidates in 1964, to Chesterton’s ‘delight and 
surprise’95 money to support the campaign was easily raised. The election campaigns 
of Austen Brooks, Rosine de Bounevialle and Leslie Greene, in that year, illustrate 
the policies of the League.  In addition to arguing for the greater cohesion of ‘the 
British nations’ and against the loss of individual colonies, there was a racial 
element.  
 
Rosine de Bounevialle had resigned from the Conservative party over Suez in 
1956 and joined the Empire Loyalists together with a number of Young 
Conservative members of the Liss branch. During her campaign at Petersfield, she 
argued that the colonies ‘we have abandoned have been left to terrorists and 
demagogues. Look at Ghana…You just can’t take people from the Stone Age to self-
government in no time at all...the Government has scuttled from Kenya absolutely 
betraying the patriotism of the people there.’96  At Streatham, campaigning against 
Duncan Sandys, Brooks, the son of Collin Brooks, editor of Truth, was also openly 
racist. He wanted ‘to keep coloured people out of Britain and supports white 
government in Africa’.97 At East Fife, Leslie Greene, the daughter of Ben Greene, 
attempted to eschew racism. She wanted ‘to urge, with unrelenting determination but 
without race hatred, the need to protect the European character of the British stock 
against floods of coloured immigrants’ into Britain.98 The preservation of the 
Empire, however, remained the League’s priority. The main campaign objectives 
were ‘the preservation, and where necessary the restoration, of the distinctive 
national sovereignties of the British nations’; ‘work[ing] for the preservation and 
strengthening of the spiritual, economic and military links between the British 
nations’; and ‘resum[ing] imperial responsibilities…towards former colonial 
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peoples’ who had been granted independence.99 These themes were repeated during 
the election campaign of 1966.  Austen Brooks drafted a letter to be sent to all 
parliamentary candidates calling on them to ‘work for the development of an 
association of the British nations, to include the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand…Rhodesia and South Africa’ and ‘to persistently demand the 
cessation of coloured immigration into the United Kingdom’.100The former idea can 
be traced back to the Imperial Federation League in the 1880s. 
 
The analysis of The Times’ news coverage clearly shows the falling away of 
the League’s publicity campaign from 1960. The League itself was aware of this; at 
its Annual General meeting that year, the organising secretary commented that ‘we 
have…hit the big headlines less than in previous years’.101 The reasons for this loss 
of momentum may lie, paradoxically, in one of the League’s major publicity 
successes, the Conservative Party Conference in 1958, at which several League 
members were violently removed from the proceedings. This proved to be a turning 
point for the League as Chesterton recognised when he reviewed progress in 
September 1960, complaining that many members had ‘run away…frightened into 
retreat after…the savage beating-up of Loyalists by Conservative hoodlums at 
Blackpool [in 1958]’.102  Although such a remark may be seen as a self-serving 
excuse for declining membership, perhaps it was a particular disappointment for 
Chesterton whose pre-war experience of violent meetings may have caused him to 
believe that being the recipient of violence was a way of increasing membership. He 
was present, for example, in 1936 at the BUF meeting at Olympia at which there had 
been widely reported violence. A police report of the meeting concluded that events 
there had ‘provided an unprecedented fillip to [BUF] recruitment’. 103 More 
generally, Stephen Cullen has argued that ‘large scale violence at BUF events, 
usually engineered by anti-fascist opposition, aided BUF recruitment.’104 This, 
however, was not the experience of the League at Blackpool in 1958 and there is 
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evidence that the Conservative party was successful in its intolerance of its members 
belonging to the League. This outcome is exceptional in the history of imperial 
activist groups and their relationships with the Conservative party. Many groups, 
such as the Primrose League and the Junior Imperial League, worked closely with 
the Conservatives, the self-proclaimed party of Empire; the ERDC claimed 216 
backbench Tory MPs as members and the BCU funded parliamentary candidates. 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the League had difficulties in putting its 
case to Conservatives according to Leslie Greene, speaking in 1957 at a debate at 
Cambridge University Conservative Association.
105
 Certainly, Chesterton and the 
League had a complex relationship with the Conservative party: in public they 
attacked it to gain publicity; privately they expected a few Tory backbenchers and 
prospective parliamentary candidates to assist their cause. They also exploited the 
overlap in the membership of the two organisations by infiltrating the management 
of the party’s local associations. For example, Sir Fergus Graham, a Tory candidate 
in the 1955 general election, wrote to the Director General at Central Office, Sir 
Stephen Pierrsené, complaining that: ‘I have found that my most…helpful Lieut. in 
this area [County Borough of Darlington] is a supporter of the League of Empire 
Loyalists…’.106 Graham sought advice from central office about ‘the full case 
against the League’, suspecting them of being anti-Semitic but Central Office was 
concerned that any written case would fall into the hands of League members in the 
Conservative party and afford them the opportunity of legal action.
107
 Graham’s 
suspicion of anti-Semitism may have arisen from Chesterton’s pre-war membership 
of the British Union of Fascists when he had attacked Jews ‘vigorously and 
unrelentingly’ accusing them of financial greed and treachery.108  
 
Further evidence of membership of both the party and the League at senior 
levels in the constituencies is provided by the Secretary and Agent for 
Cambridgeshire who wrote to Pierrsené: ‘We have had some trouble with [the 
League] locally and one of our Branch Chairmen was an active member…his brother 
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is also a member of the League, and a Vice Chairman of the Association’.109 Nor 
were junior levels of the Conservative organisation immune. Another senior official 
wrote to Central Office: ‘ in Liss [Hampshire, we] have been beset by a plague of 
‘Empire Loyalists’. They have raped my Young Conservative Branch’. 110 
 
The attitude of central office to these infiltrations and dual memberships 
developed from one of mild disapproval at first, to eventual open hostility. In May 
1955, a Conservative official advised Pierrsené ‘that many sincere Conservatives are 
members of the League of Empire Loyalists because of their belief in the Empire’ 
but he was sure that they would nevertheless remain loyal to the party.
111
 However, 
in late 1956, Pierrsené was noting that: ‘This organisation [the League] has been a 
source of trouble to us for about three years… [Party members] should be 
strenuously discouraged from having anything to do with it’.112  
 
By the following summer, the Chief Operating Officer at Central office was 
responding to a request by the Director General ‘to advise him what action, if any, 
we should be taking regarding the League…e.g. whether we should write round to 
say that membership of [it] was incompatible with membership of the Conservative 
Association’.113 The memorandum argued that the League, although mostly Tory in 
its membership, was ‘deliberately fighting against Conservative [parliamentary] 
candidates’. Furthermore,  the League’s interruptions at ‘Conservative conferences 
and meetings…[with their] Empire theme…[appeal] to the young and ex-
officers…[t]he League is also proselytizing the Young Conservative movement’114 
(perhaps in an attempt to recruit energetic young people to be part of the League’s 
‘commando’ designed to disrupt meetings). The memorandum referred to ‘a number 
of the Executive Council of the League of Empire Loyalists [who] are known 
Conservatives and in some cases officers in their local associations’, and concluded 
that the League’s membership was static and that it was having little impact on the 
Young Conservative movement. Nevertheless the question of dual membership 
needed to be dealt with but not by its prohibition which would simply give the 
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League publicity. Any written advice to party organisations and constituencies 
would fall into the hands of the League …’the Chairman might…in private 
conversation with Constituency chairmen…suggest a course of action’.115 The 
chairman declined to do so; a hand-written note recorded that the ‘Chairman says No 
action…’.116  
 
How was it that, although Conservative Central Office was opposed to dual 
membership and saw the League as pursuing policies distinct from its own, League 
members were active in Conservative party associations? It has been suggested that 
local party organisations in Britain, being composed of enthusiasts, ‘are more 
tolerant of leaning to extremism than of deviation to the centre…’.117 The League’s 
activities in the Bournemouth Conservative party are an example of this. In 1958, 
Major James Friend had been appointed as the prospective parliamentary candidate 
for Bournemouth to replace the sitting Tory MP, Nigel Nicolson. However, ‘it 
having become no longer acceptable for a good Conservative to associate with 
Loyalists’,118 Nicolson’s supporters accused Friend of encouraging local members of 
the League, of helping them financially and infiltrating them into the local 
Association’s committees. Friend’s denial of this in a letter to The Times in 
December 1958 provoked Chesterton into publishing details of Friend’s dealings 
with the League that showed the accusations to be true. Following intervention by 
Lord Hailsham, the Chairman of the Conservative party, who later described the 
League at the time as ‘our sworn enemies’,119 Friend resigned his candidature.  
 
It is not exactly clear why there was such hostility in the Conservative party 
to the League. Hailsham’s strong words may reflect the personal animosity between 
him and Chesterton. In an exchange of letters in The Times
120
 he may have over-
reacted in calling on the League’s members not to attend private or public meetings 
of the party. The Manchester Guardian thought so, asking in an editorial: ‘How can 
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any association undertake that its members will not attend public meetings?’ .121 The 
violence at the 1958 Tory conference may be a further cause of the hostility. It was 
seen as damaging to the party and arose from its determination to deal with the 
constant and irritatingly disruptive tactics of the League over a three year period. 
Violence and anti-Semitism had echoes of pre-war fascism and the overlapping 
membership, though small, may have caused the party to fear that it was in some 
way associated with extreme right-wing methods. As Lawrence has argued political 
violence can alienate supporters. In discussing the violence that occurred at a British 
Union of Fascists meeting at Olympia in 1934, he concludes that it had become 
unacceptable to maintain order at a public meeting by using violent stewarding and 
that the fascist leadership saw the events at Olympia as a ‘propaganda disaster of the 
first order’.122 It was the events at Olympia that illustrate Chesterton’s attitude to 
violence at public meetings. Doris Chesterton describes how he returned from the 
meeting angry at the violence of ‘two fascists holding down a communist while 
another kicked the prostrate figure’. Chesterton intervened to help the communist 
and told Doris later that evening that he would resign from the BUF, a decision that 
he rescinded the following day.
123
 Nevertheless Chesterton was consistently opposed 
to the initiation of violence at meetings attended by League members.  
 
The 1958 annual Conservative Party Conference in October had a litigious 
aftermath. It was a period during which the League simultaneously reached the 
apotheosis of its publicity seeking activities and the nadir of its relationship with the 
Conservative party and its members. According to Martin Walker the Conservative 
party was so concerned about the effective disruption of its conferences by League 
members that it ‘let it be known that [its] stewards would make a determined effort 
to control them’.124 The ensuing violent methods used at Blackpool received 
extensive coverage in the national press. A Conservative party file on the incident 
contains fifty-one newspaper reports in the national press in the week following the 
incident, a significant volume when compared with the normal rate of coverage. In 
the words of six leading political journalists who had witnessed events, it was the 
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‘excessive violence amounting to brutality’125 that had drawn the attention of the 
press. Ordinary party members were also critical of the violence; the Central Office 
file contains sixty-one letters to the prime minister or party chairman complaining of 
excessive violence that would damage the reputation of the party.
126
 Hailsham 
sought an assurance from Chesterton that League members would no longer cause 
breaches of the peace at Conservative meetings but this was refused by Chesterton. 
The League, he asserted, would continue its policy of ‘Protest[ing] against 
Government policy which we believe…to be harmful to this country’s interests’.127 
This public argument in the columns of The Times and the events at Blackpool made 
it clear to Conservative members that they could no longer expect dual membership 
to be tolerated. Thayer has said that ‘[b]y the end of [1958], continued association 
with the Empire Loyalists meant political death for any Tory who still had political 
ambitions…Members began to fade as fast as they had joined’128, a conclusion that 
accords with Chesterton’s own analysis, as we have seen.  
 
This loss of largely Tory membership weakened the League’s ability to 
influence matters within the Conservative constituencies. Relations with Tory 
backbench MPs appear to have been no more effective. Looking back in 1972, 
Chesterton wrote: ‘In the middle ‘fifties…Henry Kerby, Conservative MP for 
Arundel…[told] …me that he and very many of his colleagues greatly admired the 
work I was doing in defence of British interests at home and overseas. I [replied] that 
it would be even more encouraging were Members to defend these causes from the 
floor of the House.’129 As time passed, Chesterton records, no such defence occurred 
and, seeking an explanation from Kerby, he concluded that backbenchers feared for 
their political futures if they spoke in Parliament in support of League policies.
130
 




In litigious matters the League was more effective. In April 1959 the League 
was ‘granted summonses for assault and battery against’ a commissionaire and a 
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Conservative party agent at the 1958 conference. At the subsequent hearing in June 
the defendants were acquitted; the court heard that ‘the League’s tactics were to 
create situations at meetings where the use of some force…will be inevitable’.132  
This case is an example of the League’s propensity for litigation. Baker refers to 
Walker’s belief that Chesterton ‘fought fourteen successful libel actions against 
individuals and newspapers unwise enough to insinuate that he had ever been a 
traitor, or anti-British’133 but states that he (Baker) could only find nine in the 
Chesterton Papers.
134
 In an undated document prepared by Chesterton, probably in 
1962, for his case against the Bank of Chile, reference is made to the League ‘having 
won twelve of the twelve actions for defamation which I have brought in various 
parts of the world’. There were at least two more court actions by the League after 
this date. 
 
Some of these cases were reported in The Times: a sermon preached in St. 
Paul’s in which  Canon Collins had claimed that the League had used ‘thugs to 
provoke [racial] violence’; an article in the Glasgow Evening Times saying that 
Chesterton was ‘disloyal to the Crown’;  a report in the Sheffield Star suggesting the 
League had ‘incited racial violence’; a claim in Thayer’s book The British Political 
Fringe that the League had been involved in racial riots; and an attack on 
Chesterton’s patriotism in The Hull Daily Mail.135 Through these successful actions 
Chesterton and the League demonstrated, at least in legal terms, that they were not 
racist, violent or unpatriotic but they also benefitted financially; Chesterton claimed 
in 1960 to have contributed £1200 to League funds from damages awarded to him
136
 
and in 1961 received £3000 for damages awarded against the Sydney Daily 
Telegraph which helped ‘to ‘give the movement a longer spell of life’.137 
 
Damages awarded to the League were a useful addition to its finances 
especially after the death of Jeffery in 1961 and the consequent loss of his donations. 
From time to time Chesterton appealed to the subscribers of Candour for donations 
but complained that only a small fraction of them responded and in 1964 he wrote 
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that ‘I think we will continue to have a rough time financially’138. Litigation as a 
source of funds could be risky. As late as 1967, the year in which the League merged 
with other organisations to form the National Front, Chesterton  believed that if 
two’[ legal] cases [against the Bristol Evening Post and the Daily Mail] went against 
us’ he would have to declare himself bankrupt ‘and certainly abandon any further 
financial responsibility for the movement’. 139It is unclear to what extent the League 
relied, for its survival, on the damages won from libel cases but donations and 
perhaps legacies were an essential part of its finances. In 1966, Chesterton’s relative, 
Miss M.M. Chesterton, left him £7,148 a sum which he may well have made 
available to the League.   
 
The League’s activities were intended to shape public opinion to which 
elected politicians were subject. But there is little evidence to that the League 
successfully influenced the opinions of MPs in the way that Chesterton had proposed 
in his Candour article in 1954 inaugurating the League. Why did the League’s 
imperial message have so little impact? This is a difficult question but within the 
context of the evidence of this chapter four reasons can be mooted. First, 
propaganda, however widely and stridently promulgated is not necessarily accepted 
by its audience. For example, shouting at a public meeting that the prime minister, 
Macmillan, was a traitor does not win the argument. Secondly, the League’s strategy 
was self-contradictory; it tried simultaneously to annoy and disrupt the Conservative 
Party whilst seeking the co-operation of its imperially-minded members in 
supporting its cause. When it became clear that these Conservatives had to choose 
between Conservatism and the League they overwhelmingly chose the former. In 
doing so they suggest a third issue: was there an imperial cause worth fighting for? 
In an analysis of key issues in candidates’ electoral addresses in the 1959 General 
Election the words ‘empire’ and ‘Commonwealth’ do not appear. The major issues 
then, and during the 1955 election, were the cost of living, social services and 
foreign policy. The Empire was not an issue: 47% of Conservative addresses failed 
to mention even a single Commonwealth country.
140
 Fourthly, geo-political reasons 
may have rendered the League’s imperial mission unachievable however effective its 
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tactics might have been. Darwin has identified these as Britain’s economic 
weakness; the widespread perception that it was a declining power in a world 
dominated by two super-powers; a belief that the empire was ‘too 
burdensome…[and] no longer served a useful purpose’; a growing realisation of the 






The League was created by Chesterton partly out of his own pressing need to 
provide himself with a living and partly out of his strong belief in the need to 
preserve the political cohesion of white British people throughout the world and thus 
British power and sovereignty. After the defeat of fascism and the realisation of its 
appalling persecution of the Jews, he saw clearly the need at least to appear to live 
down his past association with fascism. He recognised how difficult this would be. 
He was clear that the League must not be a political party; its strategy was to act as a 
pressure group that publicly attacked politicians, particularly those in the 
Conservative governing party, whom he accused of not supporting British imperial 
power and sovereignty.   
 
The League was not successful in its endeavours to affect the process of 
decolonisation. First, the geo-political circumstances were such that forces causing 
decolonisation were irresistible. Secondly, the empire was not a major concern in 
British people’s identity. There was a wide range of identities that people could 
adopt and even if they prioritised identity in terms of their Britishness, such 
Britishness could take many forms. Britishness generally was not founded on empire 
but on memories of Britain’s successful role in the Second World War and on the 
unifying symbolism of the monarchy.  Thus, thirdly, it would seem that only a very 
small section of society did give priority to imperial Britishness in choosing its 
identity. This social group was placed in the upper regions of society, privately 
educated and military. Many were members of the Conservative party.  It was this 
social group that formed the backbone of the League and who were arguably those 
who were dedicated to imperial Britishness.  
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Within these strategic reasons for the League’s failure to make an impact, the 
League’s tactics can be seen to be flawed. They recognised that many of those who 
sympathised with their imperialism were within the Conservative party and so 
sought to infiltrate local associations and to woo the support of backbench MPs. But 
their publicity seeking tactics relied on disrupting political meetings and this 
alienated the Tory leadership to the extent that it was no longer tenable for Tories to 
belong to, or assist, the League. The consequent loss of membership to the League 
proved damaging. 
 
There is no firm consensus among historians about the political nature of the 
League; some have seen it as fascist, others as the right-wing of the Tories. I shall 
argue in the next chapter that the League was not a fascist organisation. To 
categorise it as such obscures the opportunity to examine in detail its imperialist 
nature and the possible meaning, in British imperialism in post-war Britain, of the 
League’s failure. In a period of overwhelming domination of the political scene by 
only two powerful political parties, it was perhaps inevitable that a small 
organisation like the League would have difficulty in promulgating its message. 
However, it was relatively successful within the context of minor political groups, 
existing for longer and gaining more publicity that almost any other. This suggests 
that there remained in post-war Britain a weak strain of imperial Britishness which 
the League was, to a degree, able to stimulate. More importantly the relative 
insignificance of the League suggests that the empire was largely irrelevant to all but 
a small minority of Britons in the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
  
Chapter 6. The League of Empire Loyalists, imperialism, and right-wing 
extremism 
 
In so far as it has been discussed at all, the League has typically been seen by 
historians as merely a right-wing, even fascist, group and this has tended to obscure 
its relevance to late expressions of imperialism in the twentieth century. This chapter 
will address this issue and argue that the League should also be recognised for its 
imperialism and its relationship to imperial ideas earlier in the century. If, as will be 
argued in the first part of this chapter, the League can be seen as an ultra-nationalist 
imperial activist group concerned about the loss of Britain’s Empire, it is important 
to understand what the League was, the nature of its imperialism and its origins, 
matters which will be discussed in the second part of the chapter.  
 
Largely because of Chesterton’s pre-war fascist activities, the League of 
Empire Loyalists has been seen variously as fascist (by contemporary Conservative 
party officials), as post-fascist or neo-fascist by historians (such as David Baker, 
Michael Billig and Richard Thurlow, for example). Others such as D.S. Lewis and 
Martin Walker have argued that it was simply reactionary, or an expression of right-
wing Conservatism. I shall argue that Chesterton’s relatively short period of being 
directly involved in fascism between 1933 and 1938 was not, as David Baker has 
implied, the inevitable consequence of his upbringing and military experiences but 
an aberration. He seems almost literally to have wandered into the BUF but resigned 
from it in 1938 and later came to regret his association with fascism. His real 
concern in later life was with British power and sovereignty especially as manifested 
through the British Empire. He was not primarily a politician but a dedicated and 
prolific journalist. He combined these two driving forces in forming the League of 
Empire Loyalists. In addition he sought support from like-minded right-wing 
Conservative MPs who were concerned with the continuity of Britain’s imperial 
power, some of whom were members of the Expanding Commonwealth Group and 
the ‘Empire Stalwarts’, groups discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis.   
 
The League of Empire Loyalists has not been fully examined by historians 
but by doing so, we can see that to some extent it was mainly a publicity vehicle for 
Chesterton’s nationalistic and imperial ideas and enabled him to make a living as a 
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journalist. Chesterton was sometimes an abrasive man whose principles often 
overrode practical considerations. Perhaps characteristically, he disagreed with the 
new owner of Truth about policy and left, in 1954, after eleven years as deputy 
editor, aware that his earlier fascist beliefs made his employment in journalism 
problematical. Chesterton’s pre-war membership of Mosley’s BUF had left him, in 
his own words, with ‘guilt by association’. 
 
In 1953, during a brief and typically fractious period of employment by 
Beaverbrook, he began to publish a weekly views-letter Candour. This drew the 
backing of a wealthy British expatriate businessman on whom Chesterton became 
financially dependent. Shortly afterwards in early 1954 he formed the League of 
Empire Loyalists which operated largely as a propaganda and publicity seeking 
group and which seemed more in keeping with his long-established patriotic imperial 
beliefs than his relatively brief association with the BUF. He tried to give it an air of 
respectability by appointing ‘names’ to its Council and Executive Committee and 
also organised a ‘commando’ of activists skilled in disrupting public meetings 
especially those of the Conservative Party. Recourse to litigation was an eagerly 
exploited opportunity to bring the League publicity.  
 
The League was a political group that never wholeheartedly sought 
representation in local or Westminster government. Chesterton strove to preserve its 
exclusive, middle class image rather than gain political power. His main political 
arena was the Conservative Party which he sought to disrupt whilst at the same time 
seeking support from its right-wing members, including backbench MPs. Thus the 
League never achieved mass membership or representative power; it rarely 
promulgated positive policies for the retention of Empire and Commonwealth but it 
served as a right-wing publicity machine providing a self-employed role for 
Chesterton. 
 
The League pursued imperialist arguments and can be placed in a wider 
context from which tentative conclusions about Britishness and Empire in the 1950s 
can be drawn that help to understand how Britishness was changing. Britishness is, 
to use Anderson’s terminology, an ‘imagined community’ and is therefore subjective 
and perceived in different ways by different groups. Furthermore, because the British 
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Empire was not a homogeneous group of polities, we can look at it simultaneously in 
the racist terms of Stuart Ward’s ‘sameness’ of the white settler (‘kith and kin’) 
communities and Colley’s ‘other’ of the non-white colonies.1 At the same time 
different groups expressing an interest in Empire can emphasise either its political, 
economic or cultural features. The social make-up of the League (white, middle and 
upper-class, military) meant that Chesterton and the League emphasised a racist, 
cultural, ‘kith and kin’ approach to their imperial Britishness. Their ambiguous 
impact on the Conservative Party is exemplified by their disruptive tactics and by 
their amicable relationships with some Tory backbenchers who, similarly, were 
white, middle class military men with an anglo-centric economic and political view 
of imperial Britishness.   
 
The League failed to influence the direction in which Britain’s role 
developed in the 1950s because it was narrowly focused on an outdated view of 
imperial Britishness that could not counter Britain’s declining economic and political 
power, and a modern form of patriotism based more on memories of war and 
monarchy than on empire.  For example, Chesterton’s patriotism was a mid-
twentieth century expression of a white Greater Britain, a concept that had been 
pursued unsuccessfully by the Imperial Federation League in the 1880s and 1890s. 
The League, it will be argued, was a last expression of imperial Britishness that had 
connections with imperial ideas from the end of the nineteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth. Of all the parameters that might describe ‘Britishness’, 
Empire was perhaps of most rapidly declining relevance. The ideology and beliefs of 
the League in the 1950s help to explain Britain’s anachronistic residual imperial 
Britishness. Historians’ preoccupation with its fascist associations has caused this 
opportunity to be largely overlooked.   
 
The right-wing nature of the League 
Even though Chesterton denied that the League was fascist,
2
 historians and 
contemporaries have generally contested this for various reasons. As we have seen, 
the League provided a training ground for a new generation of fascists and it also 
                                                 
1
 Stuart Ward, ‘The end of empire and the fate of Britishness’, History, Nationhood and the Question 
of Britain, Helen Brocklehurst and Robert Phillips (eds.) (Basingstoke, 2004) p.245. 
2
 Thurlow, Fascism in Britain, p. 237. 
219 
 
attracted a small number of pre-war fascists such as Chambers-Hunter, a former 
BUF activist in Aberdeen.
3
  A contemporary commentator wrote that there was ‘a 
distinct odour of [Defence Regulation] 18B about the organisation’4, a reference to 
the detention of right-wing extremists during the war. Certainly Frank Clifford, a 
member of the League’s National Council, and Ben Greene, father of M.C. Greene, 
the League’s organising secretary, were so detained. Perceptions of racism and anti-
Semitism, although denied by Chesterton, also contributed to the League being seen 
as fascist and, after the Second World War, ‘the extreme right [was] widely 
portrayed as…fascist’5 particularly because of the political re-emergence of Oswald 
Mosley and his supporters in 1948. 
 
Roger Eatwell has referred to a ‘strand of British fascism…during the 1940s 
and early 1950s…nurtured by A.K. Chesterton’6 Richard Thurlow has described 
Chesterton as ‘the key instigator of…the main surface tradition in post-1945 British 
fascism…as expanded in the programme of the [League]’.7 Grant Kamanju 
unequivocally described the League as ‘out and out fascist’.8 Contemporaries, in the 
Conservative Party, also saw the League as fascist. Thus Herbert Lee, the Chief 
Conservative agent in Bradford, in a speech in January 1956 said: ‘This organisation 
appears to be of a similar character to that of the pre-war British Fascist Movement’, 
to which the League responded by threatening legal action.
9
 Barbara Brooks, an 
official at the Conservative Party’s Central Office, wrote to MPs and party 
candidates in 1956: ‘[The League’s] outlook is fascist’; and D. Kaberry, a 
Conservative MP, held the view that there was ‘no reason to believe 
that…contributions to [Candour] are…not fascist minded’.10 Perceptions of the 
League’s fascism were not unanimous, however. In his analysis of the nature of the 
League, Neill Nugent concludes that despite it being ‘widely portrayed …as 
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following the classic fascist tradition’, and ‘displaying fascist characteristics…it is 
hardly legitimate to view them as pure fascists’.11   
 
If then, historians and contemporary commentators of the League have stated 
that it was fascist, it is important to be precise and rigorous in examining this belief. 
Any valid examination therefore requires a definition of fascism. Defining fascism, 
however, is problematical but, using scholars of fascism and looking closely at the 
ideology of the League, I shall argue that the League was not truly fascist. In doing 
so, however, it is important to recognise that Chesterton’s denial of fascism was 
pragmatic; he needed to secure a living that depended on the continued viability of 
the League and Candour. His post-war actions and journalism may well have been 
tempered by his need to hide his true beliefs and thus his rejection of fascism can be 
seen as ambiguous.  
 
Paxton refers to the difficulty of finding ‘the famous “fascist minimum” 
which is supposed to allow us to formulate a neat general definition of fascism’12, 
and yet if a group of people is referred to as fascist some working definition is 
necessary if the validity of the description is to be tested.  By examining the 
definitions suggested by scholars of fascism it is possible to identify common ground 
and thus suggest such a working definition. Neill Nugent has suggested that fascism 
includes: rejection of liberal democracy and parliamentary government and their 
replacement by authoritarian rule by an elite; the centrality of racially pure ultra-
nationalism that looks back to a ‘golden age’; aggressively expansionist and 
imperialist policies; economic activity controlled by a corporate state at the heart of a 
supportive Empire; and mystical appeals to the masses that direct them to seek a new 
beginning.
13
 Roger Griffin agrees with this analysis: ‘[f]ascism is a genus of political 
ideology whose mythical core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of 
populist ultra-nationalism’.14 The desire for this ‘re-birth’ is created in the minds of 
the people ‘after a period of crisis or decline’15 and its effectiveness depends on what 
Benedict Anderson has called an ‘imagined community’. Robert Paxton has 
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examined what he calls the ‘mobilising passions’ of fascism. These include feelings 
of decline, overwhelming crisis and victimhood in a group which has supremacy 
over the individuals who comprise it; a requirement that the group be made more 
homogeneous and closely integrated and led by a ‘national chieftain’ whose 
leadership is intuitive and superior to ‘abstract and universal reason’. The group 
believes in the ‘beauty of violence’ and its right to ‘dominate others without 
restraint’ in a Darwinian world.16 Finally, Michael Mann defines fascism as ‘the 
pursuit of a transcendent and cleansing nation-statism’ through paramilitarism. He 
sees the fascists’ idea of nation as one to which they are deeply committed and 
containing ‘an unusually strong sense of its enemies’. The totalitarian, corporate 
state is the key actor in dealing with crises in which social unrest is suppressed and 
the nation purified of its enemies using the fascist party’s own paramilitary forces.17 
 
From this brief and selective analysis the following suggested definition 
provides a framework for the discussion of the fascist content of the beliefs and 
values of Chesterton and thus the League: fascism seeks to create a corporate state 
led by an authoritarian elite that, following a period of decline or crisis, desires a re-
birth or new beginning of the nation that draws on a belief in a ‘golden age’ or 
mystical past; and by appealing to the masses the ruling elite seeks to inculcate 
racially pure ultra-nationalism and uses violent paramilitary means to deal with its 
enemies. To what extent did the League contain these elements of fascism? 
 
In any attempt to assess the League’s belief and values, it would be wrong to 
under-estimate the perceptions of fascism that surrounded the League. Chesterton 
had most certainly been a fascist in the 1930s and this and his continuing anti-
Semitism suggest that it was likely that the League would be, to a degree, seen as 
fascist. Even though in 1938 in a pamphlet Why I Left Mosley he had denounced 
Mosley, Chesterton, in 1953, still regarded his association with him as an ‘accursed 
spectre’.18 Nevertheless the League’s objects emphasise Britishness, sovereignty and 
imperial power, not fascism. Did the League, then, stand for what its aims and title 
suggest, that is, simply a group of patriotic imperialists; or was it fascist? In 
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attempting to answer this question, it is reasonable to focus on Chesterton himself.  
He rejected the idea that the League was ‘Chesterton’s movement’19 but he was such 
a central figure to Candour and the League, editing the former, head of policy of the 
latter and controlling the finances of both through his personal connection with 
Jeffery, that we may assume that he accurately represented the League’s ideology. 
What was Chesterton’s personal response to post-war accusations that he and the 
League were fascist?  
 
In a letter written to Beaverbrook in 1953, Chesterton refers to the rejection 
of Mosley rather than an ideology: ‘When I found I was having too much of Mosley, 
I gave up the habit’.20 It would appear, therefore, that it was Mosley rather than 
fascism that was Chesterton’s ‘accursed spectre’. This is consistent with 
Chesterton’s explanation in 1938 of his reasons for his resignation in Why I Left 
Mosley: ‘I left because I became convinced that the BUF was playing about with a 
great idea and producing…a parody on National-Socialism thought and principle’.21 
Nowhere in the four-page pamphlet does he renounce National-Socialism; his 
disillusionment is with Mosley’s ineffective leadership in serving ‘a new and vital 
creed’, suggesting that Chesterton saw the BUF as insufficiently fascist. However, 
David Baker argues that ‘Chesterton’s loss of faith in fascism…[was caused 
by]…the failure of the Mosley movement and the annexation, war and genocide 
perpetrated by the Nazis’ (emphasis added).22  That these events came after 
Chesterton’s resignation from the BUF suggests that Chesterton’s retreat from 
fascism evolved over a period of months, even years. In his post-war denial of 
fascism, Laying the Fascist Ghost, he refers to his belief in the nineteen-thirties that 
‘the Fascist Corporate State [was] a possible means of harmonising sectional 
differences, of securing industrial peace…and of introducing a more realistic method 
of popular representation through the occupational franchise. Whether or not these 
were good ideas it would now be profitless to argue’ but the ‘regimes which 
espoused them, turning criminally insane…left as their memorials the foulness of 
Ravensbruck…’23. Chesterton argues that he ‘recoiled with horror from such 
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outrages’, had fought for his country in the war and yet was (falsely) accused of 
being fascist. Both here and in his letter to Beaverbrook, Chesterton seems to be 
adopting the position that it is not fascism per se that must be rejected but its 
leadership and implementation. Even if his denial of fascism was ambiguous or 
insincere, it was pragmatic because he saw that accusations of fascism were harmful 
to the League and its members: ‘great damage [could be done] to what I believe is 
the most promising movement to arise in post-war Britain’.24 If we accept 
Chesterton’s personal declaration of his rejection of fascism, how was it possible for 
him to espouse with similar fervour the cause of British sovereignty and Empire?  
The development of Chesterton’s sociological profile suggests that he was readily 
able to take up first, fascism, and subsequently, imperialism as his creed. 
 
Terms such as fascism, nationalism, patriotism and imperialism have no 
universally agreed definitions and thus remain matters of subjective perception and 
carry with them the possibility that their meanings can be partly conflated. 
Chesterton’s fascist past and his later British imperial patriotism arguably illustrate 
such perceived blending. For example, in November 1954, a member of the League 
Executive Committee resigned accusing Chesterton of using Candour to argue a 
neo-fascist line. His colleague’s claim arose from Chesterton’s approval of what he 
termed Hitler’s ‘revolt in the thirties against the tyranny of the Money Power’. 
Chesterton had used this as an argument to support his case for ‘a strong system of 
Imperial Preference which would enable the British nations within an integrated 
Empire system to insulate themselves against the wiles…of international finance’.25 
What Chesterton saw as British imperialism, it seems, others might see as fascism 
but he vigorously denied the charge of fascism: ‘I give…my solemn word of honour 
that neither through Candour nor the League, have I, or will I at any future time 
espouse…any Fascist doctrine’.26  
 
A further explanation for Chesterton’s transition from fascism to imperialism 
may lie in part in David Baker’s analysis of the causes of Chesterton’s fascism 
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‘through studying [his] development from childhood sentiment to full Fascist 
consciousness’.27  
 
[The] ‘ideas and events crucial to his ideological evolution’ [include] his childhood spent amongst 
jingoistic patriotism…of fin de siècle British South Africa; his cloistered private education in 
England; his dreadful and yet uplifting experience of war while still intellectually and emotionally 
immature, and the bleak disillusionment of peace…[his opposition to] Afrikaner nationalism…aimed 
at removing [South Africa] from his beloved British Empire…his immersion in the small-minded 
world of the British cultural elite of the 1920s and early thirties; and finally the impact of Fascism 
itself…Together, in the wake of his collapse of faith in Fascism, these experiences produced a man in 
whom the ‘needle stuck’ on [an]…ideology which mixed conspiratorial anti-Semitism and racist 
Empire Loyalism…
28
   
 
Chesterton’s fascism and British empire loyalism thus had common roots but 
he was a British fascist and his patriotism was stronger than his fascism. As 
Skidelsky has observed Chesterton was, unlike his BUF colleagues, critical of 
Germany and this difference was ‘one of the issues that led to the break with 
Mosley’.29 Evidence of the strength of his British patriotism is also apparent from his 
military career; he fought for his country in two world wars, volunteering on both 
occasions, the first at the age of sixteen, and had won the Military Cross in 1918.
30
   
 
The idea of common roots to Chesterton’s fascism and British imperial 
patriotism is echoed in his social similarity to those on the right-wing of the 
Conservative Party. Baker refers to W.F. Mandle’s analysis of the characteristics of 
leading British fascists in the nineteen thirties which fits Chesterton (middle-class, 
public school, ex-officer in the First World War and widely travelled) and argues 
that these sociological features could have brought Chesterton into the Conservative 
party instead of the BUF were it not for his belief in fascist ideas. But as we have 
seen, these ideas were soured for Chesterton initially because of his frustration with 
Mosley and then by his abhorrence of Nazism, leaving Chesterton to take a less 
extreme right-wing position and to resemble a right-wing Conservative manqué.  
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Through his control of League committees, policy, finance and the content of 
Candour, Chesterton was a powerful force in the League. The ethos of the League 
rested largely in his hands. We cannot know his innermost beliefs about fascism after 
the end of the Second World War but if we accept his stated abhorrence of Nazism 
and his patriotic willingness to criticise Hitler’s Germany as genuine then we must at 
least have serious doubts that he wished to lead the League in a fascist direction. 
Chesterton’s roots allowed him to be either fascist or imperialist and to move from 
the former to the full expression of the latter. The people in the League National 
Council and Executive Committee were those with whom he wished to be associated 
and, as I have argued, they bore close sociological similarities to right-wing 
Conservative imperialist parliamentarians. Right-wing conservatism and fascism are 
not necessarily bedfellows. Robert Paxton has noted that, ‘one cannot consider 
fascism simply as a more muscular form of conservatism’.31 Thus if, because of their 
party membership and military experiences of  fighting fascism, these Conservative 
right-wing MPs were not fascist, then members of the League of such similar 
sociological roots and experiences may also not have been fascist but simply the 
imperialists they claimed to be.  
 
This discussion of the values of the League so far has rested on subjective 
and circumstantial bases. Another source from which to assess the ideology of the 
League, in the context of the suggested definition of fascism, is Chesterton’s series 
of articles in Candour, whose aim was ‘to serve as a link between Britons all over 
the world in protest against the surrender of their world heritage’.32 Chesterton was a 
prolific journalist and one can only, here, consider a fraction of his writings in 
Candour, the more significant of which occasionally appeared as reprinted 
pamphlets such as Sound the Alarm; A Warning to the British Nations (1954); 
Britain Faces the Abyss (1955); and  Tomorrow; A Plan for the British Future 
(1961). Chesterton’s most lasting publication, The New Unhappy Lords (first 
published in 1965), is also relevant to analysing his beliefs.   
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There is considerable evidence of a racially pure nationalism in the League’s 
ideology that differed from that of other imperial activist groups. In the latter part of 
the nineteenth century a racist view of Empire was held by some imperial thinkers 
but it was unlike that of Chesterton and the LEL. Almost all other imperial activist 
groups did not take such an aggressively racist view as the LEL, who believed that 
race was of key importance to their policies. Generally, other groups concentrated on 
trade, defence or education, albeit often solely with the white Dominions, without 
articulating a very pronounced racist ideology. Nevertheless, this emphasis on the 
white Dominions, and belief in the superiority of Great Britain did create a form of 
racism. Exceptionally, the hatred of the British Empire Union for Germans came 
closest to the LEL’s racism in its extremism but it was aimed at white Europeans, 
not black Africans; and the Victoria League discouraged relations between its female 
members and visiting Indian men. The nation that Chesterton imagined was the 
‘British peoples throughout the world’. He distinguished between the white 
Dominions and white settlers on the one hand, and indigenous people on the other, in 
strongly racial terms. Thus, for example, in discussing the Conservative 
government’s constitutional proposals for Kenya in 1954, he complained that they: 
 
 [allow] Africans and Asians to occupy positions that would bring European affairs to some extent 
within their purview and place European officials in a position of subordination to them…it may very 
well mean an end of Britain in Africa…sooner or later the settlers must boil over at the absurdity of 




In a speech at the League’s annual general meeting in 1960 he consistently 
pursued his racist point, explaining to members that the League would never ‘accept 
the obscene humbug that the Black man has the brains, the know-how, the self-
control to warrant his being given power over helpless White minorities anywhere on 
earth’.34 This was greeted with loud applause. 
 
His racism was not confined to Africa. It was expressed when black 
immigrants to Britain arrived during the nineteen-fifties and called for racial purity 
in Britain: the Conservative Party had failed to ‘stop successive waves of coloured 
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immigration…an invasion which, unless checked, will one day obliterate every 
characteristic feature which has brought renown to the British people’.35 And it was 
not simply the colour of a man’s skin that provoked Chesterton’s racism. He had 
been strongly anti-Semitic during his days with the BUF and although he denied that 
he and the League were anti-Semitic, his conspiratorial theory of the Jewish Money 
Power that sought to destroy the British world and to attain world government 
formed the continuous core of his philosophy. His attacks on Jews were concentrated 
on their dominating influence of world institutions such as the World Bank and his 
post-war anti-Semitism was specifically against Jewish financiers rather than Jews in 
their entirety. Certainly David Baker concludes that Chesterton’s anti-Semitism was 
cultural rather than biological.
36
 Nevertheless any attack on Jews in post-war Britain 
could expect to be seen in the context of the Nazi extermination of Jews and thus 
associate the League with anti-Semitism and fascism. 
 
The League’s perception of its ‘nation’ drew on its white, racist view of the 
Commonwealth. The white Dominions and the African white settler colonies were 
its ‘imagined community’ and these were the countries in which the League had its 
branches. The ‘nation’ was thus white British people in Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, South Africa, Kenya and the Rhodesias as well as those in Britain itself. 
These were the people to which Chesterton repeatedly referred to as kith and kin. 
The cornerstone of the League’s nationalism was the preservation of British 
sovereignty which, it argued, was threatened by international institutions and its 
campaign was ‘on the sole issue of national and imperial survival’.37 Chesterton’s 
belief that nations had existed since antiquity and depended on ‘centuries of common 
effort, of living together, striving together, being bound together in times of hardship 
and adversity’ 38 is profoundly exclusive and resonates with Ernest Renan’s idea 
that: ‘[t]o have common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have 
accomplished great things together; to wish to do so again, that is the essential 
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condition of being a nation’.39 For Chesterton, only those who had shared the 
nation’s long imperial history could belong to it.  
 
Renan’s statement is one of many attempts to define the nation but another, 
Hobsbawm’s basic idea that it is ‘a body of people whose members regard 
themselves as…a “nation” ‘,40 helps to explain how a self-selecting group such as the 
League, with their common culture and white imperial heritage could seek to cohere 
worldwide. Chesterton’s declaration that the League should fight for national and 
imperial survival and his belief that ‘[m]ost of the people who feel passionately 
about the betrayal of Britain are Britons who were born abroad or who have lived 
abroad’41 is evidence of this and that a sense of imperial kinship defined those who 
belonged to the same ‘nation’. To understand fully the League’s nationalism requires 
acceptance of nationalism as ‘loyalty to the nation’ 42 rather than as meaning seeking 
the congruence of the nation and the state. The League’s persistent and extreme 
insistence on this loyalty, its sentiments of racial kinship and its extreme view of 
what Britain’s sovereignty should be, meant that it was ultra-nationalist.   
 
Chesterton’s writings contain repetitive references that resonate with other 
parameters of fascism: a golden age, decline and crisis, and re-birth. For example, 
the titles of his pamphlets published by the League contain words such as ‘abyss’, 
‘betrayal’, ‘suicide’, ‘graveyard’ and ‘alarm’. A three-page pamphlet, Britain Faces 
the Abyss
43
 typifies these aspects of fascism. Chesterton begins by saying that a man 
‘who has no romantic vision of his country’s past’ is either a prig or a ‘materialist 
clod’. To prove that this is so it is necessary only to ‘recall the spirit of times 
past…and the emotional climate of one’s youth’. He saw that the changes since the 
beginning of the century were amazing and perplexing. Once we were proud of 
‘what our kinsmen were and what they achieved’ and our ‘Imperial destiny’ was an 
‘intensification of this feeling of kinship’. But ‘today the vision has faded’ and the 
‘ecstasy [of the beginning of the twentieth century] is dead and we shall never know 
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its like again’. Chesterton lyrically personalises this belief in a golden age before the 
First World War: ‘…all too brief were my brisk winter evenings on the Rugby field, 
my tranquil summer evenings at the wicket’. His childhood, he explains, had been 




According to Chesterton, after this golden age came decline and crisis. The 
aftermath of the war, he believed, had seen the first serious questioning of belief in 
patriotism. The reasons for this may lie in the enormous loss of life and the Russian 
Revolution and its global message to workers to unite but ‘much more importantly 
[in] the shift of financial power from London to New York’. 45  There Jewish money 
power had set about undermining British sovereignty. The decline continued after 
the Second World War when British sovereignty had been undermined by 
‘international agencies brought into being by Wall St. to secure…domination of the 
world’ and ‘choke to death [Britain’s] distinctive nationhood’.46  
 
Drawing on this backward-looking analysis of a lost ‘golden age’ and deeply 
felt sense of British decline and crisis, Chesterton saw the necessity of national 
resurgence. In March 1954, when he called for the setting up of the League, he 
argued that international forces sought to destroy the British Empire and nations and 
that they must be opposed by ‘[awakening] the national spirit. The League should 
not adopt any particular social or economic reforms because’ British resurgence was 
the essential first condition’ of better economic and social conditions.47  The 
emphasis here is on strengthening nationalist feelings rather than the palingenetic 
ultra-nationalism that Roger Griffin argues is the essence of fascism.
48
 There was no 
sense of ‘structural dysfunction, socio-political and economic collapse in Britain’ 49 
at that time. Indeed Chesterton himself saw this, complaining that the British people 
had been seduced by the Macmillan government’s facilitation of the availability of 
consumer goods and thus too content to be concerned with any threat to British 
sovereignty. 
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Chesterton and the League saw the importance of appealing to the masses 
and thus gaining publicity for their ideas. They did not organise rallies, marches or 
demonstrations 
50
 but concentrated on disrupting meetings and events, such as 
Conservative party conferences and visits by foreign politicians such as Archbishop 
Makarios, at which the press and television cameras would in any case be present. 
Such activities brought them publicity and helped to increase membership to its peak 
of 3000 but this does not compare well with the mass support gained by, for 
example, Mosley’s pre-war BUF whose membership reached an estimated 40,000 in 
1939.
51
 Although Chesterton wished to retain an elite membership, nevertheless its 
search for mass appeal is characteristic of fascist movements even if it did not 
succeed. Although the League may have failed in this respect it saw it as an 
important part of its strategy; Chesterton sought to generate ‘nation-wide protest [to] 
compel politicians…to face the realities of an awakened national spirit’.52  It did not, 
however, seek violent or terrorist means in attempting to become a significant 
political pressure group.
53
   
 
What conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the ideology of the 
League against the suggested framework of fascist characteristics? The League 
expressed its imperial and domestic policies in racist terms; it was ultra-nationalist; 
and it looked back to a golden age. These were its fascist components. It tried to 
generate a sense of crisis and of degeneration and called for a resurgence of the 
national spirit. It did not employ political violence and although aware of the central 
importance of mass support, did not achieve it. These are the parts of fascism at 
which it failed or which it eschewed. The League did not wish to be a political party 
seeking executive power but was an ultra-nationalist imperial pressure group 
determined to alert British people to the potential loss of sovereignty and empire. It 
had some fascist elements in its ideology and Chesterton’s ambiguous denials of his 
personal belief in fascism assist this conclusion, but it was far from being fully and 
virulently fascist.  
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If the League was not fascist, what were its predominant values and beliefs? 
What form did its version of British imperialism take?  And what were its roots? 
 
 
The nature and roots of the League’s imperialism 
Because A.K. Chesterton was such a dominant force within the League, it is 
reasonable to look for the origins and development of the League’s ideology in 
Chesterton’s own imperial background and beliefs and in the light of the imperial 
thinking of other groups such as the IFL who, like Chesterton, believed in the 
necessity of the global dominance of Britain and the Dominions. Although David 
Baker, in Ideology of Obsession, has closely examined the nature of Chesterton’s 
fascism and how it arose from his early years, he has not considered how these same 
years could have created his love for the British Empire. He observes that the 
‘general over-concentration [by historians such as W.F. Mandle and Colin Holmes] 
on the anti-Semitic aspects of [Chesterton’s] fascist ideology has tended to draw 
scholars away from wider understanding of his fascism…’54 In a similar vein it could 
be argued that ‘over-concentration’ on Chesterton’s fascism has caused his 
imperialism to be neglected. This is especially the case when one considers that he 
spent only five years, from 1933, as a fascist activist and propagandist compared 
with almost thirty years, from 1944, writing and campaigning for the British Empire 
and the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. From the beginning of his association 
with the BUF until his death, Chesterton stuck steadfastly to his racist, anti-Semitic 
and conspiracy theory beliefs. Arguably, however, he replaced fascism, his principal 
ideology in the 1930s, with a passionate and active belief in Britain and its Empire. 
Indeed in tracing the causes of Chesterton’s fascism, David Baker indicates this 
outcome.
55
 As we saw earlier in the chapter he identifies important events in 
Chesterton’s early years that caused his fascism and it is notable how some of these 
same events contain the seeds of an imperialist attitude.  
 
Furthermore, during his time with Oswald Mosley, Chesterton did not allow 
fascism to monopolise his journalism. He wrote articles on imperialism for  
Blackshirt, such as Empire Trade Before Foreign Trade, Rudyard Kipling: Poet and 
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Prophet of Empire and Should the British Empire be Disestablished?  This is 
evidence that Chesterton maintained a much more tenacious belief in the British 
Empire throughout his life than he did on fascism and to neglect this is to arrive at an 
incomplete understanding of Chesterton’s beliefs and the policies he established in 
the League of Empire Loyalists. From 1944 until 1954, when he wrote for Truth, and 
from the latter year until his death in 1973, Chesterton wrote almost weekly about 
politics in Britain and in its Empire. This journalism, which has been neglected by 
historians, provides a valuable source from which to describe and analyse 
Chesterton’s, and thus the League’s, imperialism. (Although Chesterton also wrote 
regularly during this period about conspiracy theories of domination by Jewish 
financiers of international governance, it is not the purpose of this chapter to discuss 
these issues in detail, except in so far as they relate directly, in Chesterton’s view, to 
the British Empire.)  
 
There are a number of dominant themes to the imperialism of Chesterton and 
the League, some of which, as will be discussed later, can be traced back to the end 
of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth. This atavistic imperialism 
of Chesterton after the Second World War is clearly illustrated by his wife’s 
comment, in 1978: 
 
He was one of those who really believed in the [First World] war and the principle for which it was 
fought: the preservation of the British Empire…Kenneth considered the British Empire to have been 




She believed his attitude was similar to Kipling’s and that it was ‘frozen in 
the period 1914-18’. Collin Brooks, however, saw Chesterton as influenced by an 
even earlier period in British history, opining that Chesterton was stuck, not in 1915, 
but in 1815.  Similarly, his enduring and repetitive discussion of conspiracy theory 
also looked back to former times; it was derived from his second cousin, Cecil 
Chesterton, brother of G.K. Chesterton. A.K. Chesterton wrote in his unpublished 
autobiography, Blame Not My Lute, written between 1966 and 1973,
57
: ‘It was 
inevitable…that I should feel impelled to carry on Cecil’s crusade from the point 
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where death [in 1918] had forced him to abandon it’.58 Thus one of the keys to 
understanding Chesterton’s beliefs, certainly his conspiracy theory and imperialism, 
is that he formed them early in his life and stuck unwaveringly to them. The 
remainder of this chapter, therefore, will describe Chesterton’s dominant imperial 
themes and attempt to show ways in which they can be related to the ideas of 
Hobson and imperialists such as Seeley, Dilke, Froude, Milner and Joseph 
Chamberlain. It is thus necessary, first of all, to establish the nature of the 
imperialism in which Chesterton believed. 
 
In June 1954, ‘sponsors and subscribers of Candour and their friends’59 met 
at Caxton Hall to elect a Council to draw up a constitution for the League. The basic 
constitutional objects of the League were explicitly and briefly stated in various of 
its pamphlets. Some of them resonate with the purposes of earlier imperial activist 
groups such as the Overseas Club which had sought to draw British people together 
throughout the world in comradeship; and the Imperial Federation League and 
Round Table who believed in the integration of Great Britain and the Dominions. 
The LEL’s aims were: ‘1. [t]he maintenance and, where necessary, the recovery of 
the sovereign independence of the British Peoples throughout the world; 2. [t]he 
strengthening of the spiritual and material bonds between the British Peoples 
throughout the world; 3. [t]he conscientious development of the British Colonial 
Empire under British direction and local British leadership; 4. [t]he resurgence at 
home and abroad of the British spirit.’60 What the League sought was a ‘world 
system based on the former White Dominions’ and rejection of all international 
institutions that limited British sovereignty. Without providing specific evidence, 
Chesterton argued that there was a conspiracy of the ‘Money Power’ of bankers 
operating in New York and working closely with Moscow, whose purpose was to 
destroy the overseas empires of European nations and to replace them with a Jewish 
led world government. From a British viewpoint, the white Dominions, with their 
shared British heritage, were capable of breaking up this conspiracy and thus 
becoming the dominant force in the world. This was the only lasting way in which 
worldwide British sovereignty could be recovered. Chesterton was fully aware that 
                                                 
58
 Bath Univ. Chesterton Archive, B5, Blame Not My Lute, Chapter 9. 
59
 Candour, 28 May 1954. 
60
 A. K. Chesterton, Tomorrow: A Plan for the British Future (Croydon, undated but c.1961), p. 25. 
234 
 
the direction in which Britain’s foreign policy was developing was directly counter 
to the League’s objectives but, writing in 1961, seven years after founding the 
League (a period during which Britain had granted independence to Ghana, Malaya, 
Cyprus, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Tanganyika, and was actively considering an 
application to join the European Economic Community), he saw no need to change 
the League’s principles. The case for ‘the survival of the British world’ needed 
simply to be restated.
61
 This is further evidence of Chesterton’s adamantine 
conservatism and failure to modify beliefs formed in his early life. 
 
To achieve the dominance of the white Dominions, Chesterton argued, all 
international agencies that impaired British sovereignty, such as the United Nations, 
the IMF and World Bank should be rejected. Britain should also leave the 
Commonwealth because it was no longer British; its Afro-Asian members were 
acting to undermine British power. In place of the Commonwealth there would arise 
the white Dominions acting together in order to protect their national sovereignty. If 
Afro-Asian countries wished to associate with the Dominions they would have to do 
so on terms laid down by the ‘White nations of the British world’, whose ‘supreme 
unifying factor…should be the British Crown’. 62 To bring about this new world 
system, Chesterton argued, required that the British people, especially those in 
Britain itself, be alerted and the issues clarified in their minds.  
 
From this broad summary, one can divide the League’s imperialism into four 
basic pillars that supported the League’s over-arching view of what British 
imperialism should be, that is, a white, worldwide British kith and kin led by the 
Motherland towards greater cohesion and headed by the monarchy. The first of these 
themes was a catalyst: a sense of foreboding about international rivalries and the 
relative decline of Britain and her empire. There was an urgent need to address the 
issue.  Secondly, there was a racist belief in the innate superiority of Britain and the 
Dominions both relative to other, developed, nations and also to the dependent 
colonies of the British Empire. The latter were seen as barbaric and incapable of 
effective self-government and independence.  Thirdly, the League was nationalistic 
and fiercely opposed to any loss of British sovereignty through membership of 
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supra-national bodies such as the United Nations, NATO and GATT. Finally, 
Britain’s relative decline and the threat of the loss of Empire could be overcome 
through greater cooperation in imperial trade and by the strengthening of imperial 
defence. The ideas and beliefs underlying these pillars of the League’s ideology were 
not new. As Robert Pearce has observed: ‘[r]ight-wing organisations such as the 
League of Empire Loyalists…which can be so difficult…to understand, will be 
readily understood by historians familiar with the climate of imperial thinking in 
Britain at the start of the twentieth century’.63 Pearce’s statement supports the view 
that the League should be seen as an imperial organisation but he makes no detailed 
analysis to support this even though there is a substantial body of writing and 
speeches in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by Seeley, Dilke, 
Froude, Milner, Joseph Chamberlain and others to which the ideas of the League can 
be related. The League was not alone in this: for example, Milner and Chamberlain, 
as we have seen, were influential in groups such as the ISAA, the Victoria League, 
the Tariff Reform League and the Junior Imperial League.  
 
Thus, for example, the threat of imperial disintegration and public apathy 
were long-standing concerns of imperialist activists.  When Chesterton wrote in 1954 
‘[t]he British Empire is disintegrating’,64 he was directly echoing the words of John 
Edward Jenkins, an Australian barrister, writer and Liberal MP at Westminster, who 
wrote in 1871 ‘we are drifting to the disintegration of our Empire’.65 Jenkins’ use of 
the word ‘drifting’ suggests a belief that many British people were indifferent to, or 
unaware of, the threats to British global power and this too is echoed by Chesterton: 
the purpose of Candour, he repeatedly stated, was to alert the British people to 
threats to British power and imperialism. For Jenkins, Chesterton, and other 
imperialists, the existence of a strong, integrated Empire mattered because it was 
essential to the relative politico-economic power of Great Britain in world affairs. 
Lord Milner, for example, was unequivocal when he said in 1906 that ‘[t]his country 
must remain a great Power or she will become a poor country’. To do so, he argued, 
it was necessary that Britain become Greater Britain, by which he meant Britain and 
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her white Dominions acting together in some form of economic and political union.
66
 
Milner’s ideas about the development of the Empire, that not only the closer union of 
the Dominions should be brought about, but also that Britain had a responsibility to 
develop the dependent colonies,
67
 are direct antecedents of the League of Empire 
Loyalists’ second and third constitutional objectives set in 1954.  
 
A further example of the League’s thinking that was derived from earlier 
imperialists’ ideas is Seeley’s perception that Russia and the USA were a threat to 
British power and also examples of how Britain could retain its status as a great 
Power. Modern developments in communications and transport had enabled these 
two ‘vast political unions’ to emerge. If Britain did not expand likewise, thus 
becoming Greater Britain, Russia and America would ‘completely dwarf’ Britain68 
who would thus be ‘reduce[d] to the level of a purely European Power looking 
back…to the great days when she pretended to be a world-state’.69 The threatened 
fulfilment of Seeley’s prediction was what Chesterton was to rail against sixty years 
later. 
 
The idea of Greater Britain pervaded imperial activism in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries and had been supported by the Imperial Federation 
League and the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee.
70
 It certainly cannot, 
however, be said to have been pervasive when the League of Empire Loyalists was 
active, but nevertheless it was propounded by Chesterton in his pamphlet Tomorrow: 
A Plan for the British Future which he wrote in the early 1960s. Nineteenth century 
imperial thinkers supported various incompletely defined versions of Greater Britain 
and, subsequently, Chesterton too was vague about his plan for Britain and her white 
Dominions, but the important point here is that Chesterton persisted with an 
anachronistic idea that was first formulated decades before, and which had been 
seen,  in both its political form in the 1890s, and later in its economic form in 1906 
to be unfeasible (though imperial preference was, at last, introduced in the 1930s). 
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Additionally, Chesterton was in favour of the radical idea that the white Dominions 
should be separated from the rest of the Commonwealth and this plan is an echo of 
Milner’s preference for the Dominions, or the self-governing colonies as they were 




If I had to choose between an effective union of the self-governing states of the Empire without the 
dependent states, and the retention of the dependent states accompanied by complete separation from 
the distant communities of our own blood and language, I should choose the former.  
 
This was a view that arose from a perception that the Empire comprised two 
distinctive parts: the self-governing colonies and the dependent colonies. 
Furthermore, Milner, Seeley and others believed that the self-governing colonies, i.e. 
the Dominions, were superior to the dependent colonies.  It was a belief that had 
racial connotations and it forms another connection between Chesterton and his 
imperialist antecedents. It is important, however, to understand that the racist beliefs 
of Chesterton were very different from those of earlier imperialists.  The former 
expressed an aggressive, abusive racism that denigrated non-white peoples, whereas 
the latter belief was a patriotic view of a superior white civilisation (that is, the 
people of Great Britain, or England, as it was commonly referred to) that had a duty 
to protect and nurture local people in the British dependencies who were deemed to 
be incapable, for decades to come, of governing themselves.  
 
As Bell has observed, this nineteenth century racist view of the British 
Empire was regularly expressed by imperial thinkers and others. They believed that 
there was a ‘natural [biological] superiority of white Europeans over their colonial 
subjects’.72 Biological or not, the superiority of British civilisation justified rule over 
people of much less advanced accomplishments and it was right and proper that the 
British undertook this civilising mission. The British were, in the words of Joseph 
Chamberlain, spoken in 1895, ‘the greatest of the governing races that the world has 
ever seen’.73 In Africa, for example, dependent colonies were not mere possessions; 
perceptions of ownership had been replaced by a ‘sense of obligation’ to undertake 
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the ‘work of civilis[ing]’ the local people.74 Thus the ‘fact’ of white racial superiority 
should, it was believed, be used to the benefit of subject races. Lord Milner 
concurred: white Europeans were obliged to rule the black races because it was the 




The other part of the British Empire, the self-governing colonies, was also 
perceived in a racial way, but one that was quite different. It recognised racial 
similarity, not difference.  ‘Our chief duty [to them is] to give effect to that sentiment 
of kinship [that is] deep in the heart of every Briton…a closer union between all 
members of the British race’, declared Joseph Chamberlain in a speech to the Royal 
Colonial Institute in 1897.
76
 Charles Dilke refers to ‘the Anglo-Saxon of the 
future…not everywhere be[ing] the same…but essentially the race continues 
everywhere to be ours’;77 and it was, in the opinion of Milner, ‘the ‘affinity of race’ 
that was the strongest factor in the cohesion of Britain and its self-governing 
colonies.
78
 This closer union of the white Dominions is echoed in the slogan of 
Candour, the League’s paper, which declared each week that it existed ‘[t]o serve as 
a link between Britons all over the world to protest against the surrender of their 
world heritage’. The League’s racist imperialism, however, was much more virulent; 
the superiority of white Britain, Chesterton argued,  meant that black people, for 
example, should not be permitted to govern themselves and should be prevented 
from settling in Britain. Conversely, the question of settling in Britain was 
immaterial in Milner’s day but he, unlike Chesterton, believed that the colonies 
should be enabled to arrive at self-government. 
 
It is the malign denigration of black Africa that is a defining element of the 
League’s imperialism and distinguishes it from the late Victorian and Edwardian 
racially imperialistic views described earlier.  Chesterton never emphasised Britain’s 
civilising mission or the potential of Africans to govern themselves.  Black Africans, 
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he asserted, were barbaric, stone-age people who could not be trusted with power.
79
 
Any moves towards granting them independence should be vigorously opposed. 
When the Bishop of Johannesburg publicly declared to a meeting in Oxford that ‘the 
day of White supremacy in Africa was at an end’, Chesterton denounced him as a 
traitor to ‘the cause of civilisation in Africa’.80  It was, however, not merely a 
question of preventing the participation of black people in their own governance in 
Africa. Chesterton also adamantly opposed black immigration in Britain, thereby 
revealing that his attitude was not based on grounds of superior competence of 
governance but on pure racism. 
 
The corollary to this racist view of black Africans was the League’s policy 
towards the white Dominions, a policy similar in some ways to that of its imperial 
antecedents but which also had important differences. The League argued that the 
‘British nations’ should be integrated, without explaining in detail how this might be 
achieved. This vagueness differed from the specific plans of nineteenth century 
imperial federalists; their difficulty was that they had too many versions of how 
integration should come about and were therefore fragmented. Another difference 
between the two imperial eras was their respective perceptions of contemporary geo-
political threat. Earlier imperialists, as we have seen, were concerned with the 
growing economic and political strength of nations: Germany, Russia and the USA. 
The League was virulently opposed to internationalism, manifested by the United 
Nations, the IMF and the World Bank. Thus Chesterton wrote that ‘the United 
Nations [is] in essence a conspiracy against my Sovereign and Her people…’81 and 
his colleague Aidan Mackey argued that Britain’s politicians should put the interests 
of Britain first, the Empire second and international bodies last.
82
  Above all, the 
League abhorred the plans for European integration that gathered force in the 1950s: 
any supranational or intergovernmental institution that threatened British power and 
sovereignty must be vigorously opposed.  In spite of these differences, brought about 
to some extent by the changing nature of international politics, a common theme of 
imperialists of both eras was a sense of Britishness and British power and 
sovereignty that was dependent on the Empire. 
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Throughout the period, some imperial activists believed that Britain and her 
white Dominions comprised a scattered British nation that fell short of the global 
power of which it was capable because it was not a single state. This lack of 
congruency of state and nation, they argued, was a limiting factor in Britain’s 
influence over world events. In other words, an extended nationality without an 
extension of the state brought ‘no increase in political power’, according to Seeley.83 
It is the desire for the congruency of the world-wide British nation and state that is 
an essential ingredient of many of the campaigns of imperial pressure groups from 
the late nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth, whether it be sought 
through political, economic or cultural means. It emphasises the institutions of the 
state and the common nationality, language and interests of the people. Conversely, 
it often fails to recognise the importance of minor nationalities, such as the French in 
Canada, the Dutch in South Africa and indigenous peoples. It can also overlook the 
centrifugal effects of the lack of contiguity, although Dilke, unlike Seeley, was alert 
to them.
84
 This notion of an extended British nationalism and sovereignty 
comprising Britain and her Dominions that needed to develop common institutions 
of the state, is another theme in which there were connections between the ideas of 
Victorian and Edwardian imperialists and those of the League of Empire Loyalists. 
 
One of the undoubted common institutions was the monarchy. For Milner, 
the throne, combined with the flag and common citizenship, was ‘ a [link] of 
inestimable value’ that bound the Empire together.85 This was a belief fully shared 
by Chesterton who believed that the Queen was central to the survival of the Empire. 
Chesterton also expressed his imperial thoughts in strong nationalistic terms that 
would have been recognised by Seeley. He opposed the power and influence of 
international bodies but saw the need for Britain to cooperate with other countries 
but only if they were part of what he called the British nation. By combining this 
nation with common institutions of state, Chesterton was arguing for the same polity 
as Seeley who saw the white Dominions and Britain not as an Empire but as ‘a very 
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large state’ capable of matching Russia, Germany and the USA.86 Seeley’s aim, 
however, lost favour during the Edwardian period and was replaced by the idea of a 
multinational commonwealth.
87
 Chesterton’s support for a theoretical polity whose 
realisation had been seen to be unattainable several decades earlier again illustrates 
his anachronistic and deeply conservative imperial ideas. Another, the idea that the 
people of Greater Britain were of one nationality that was common in late Victorian 
times, according to Bell, was also a central part of Chesterton’s imperial vision over 
fifty years later. Also central to his anachronistic imperialism was the belief that the 
‘independence of the British nation’ could only be secured through ‘Imperial 
economic cooperation’.88  
 
Conclusion  
Historians have commonly regarded the League of Empire Loyalists as an 
extreme right-wing organisation with fascist characteristics. There is some validity in 
this perception but it masks the true essence of the League, that it was a group of 
anachronistic imperial activists who looked back to the beginning of the twentieth 
century when Britain and her Empire was a powerful geopolitical force. Even at the 
apotheosis of Empire, metropolitan politicians had forebodings about the 
fragmentation of the Empire and so sought to strengthen its coherence. The 
imperialism of Chesterton and the League was a late manifestation, mutatis 
mutandis, of these early forebodings and, as before, was a response to threats to 
British sovereignty and power.  Britain, the League and its antecedents believed, was 
intrinsically and racially superior to other nations and yet that superiority was under 
threat from international institutions such as the World Bank, NATO and the IMF in 
the middle of the twentieth century and from rival nation-states at the beginning of 
the century. The way to retain global prestige and power was to retain and unite the 
Empire.  
 
The League believed that British imperialism was the sine qua non of 
Britishness; without an empire there could be no worthwhile Britishness. It believed 
that the Empire it wished to preserve consisted of three parts: Britain itself, 
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unadulterated by black immigration; the imagined community of white kith and kin 
in the Dominions; and the black colonies, incapable of self-government. This was a 
racial view of empire whose connections with the racial attitudes of late Victorian 
and Edwardian imperial activists have been discussed in this chapter. For the earlier 
imperialists and for the League, to lose any part of the Empire, or to fail to bring 
about greater cohesion, was deplorable and represented a loss of British power and 
sovereignty that was destructive of Britishness itself.  Robert Pearce’s suggestion 
that the League can only be fully understood by connecting it to earlier imperial 
activists is perceptive. If Chesterton and the League had somehow been transposed 
to the beginning of the twentieth century their arguments would have been more 
pertinent and apposite but because ‘the needle had become stuck’ (to use David 
Baker’s metaphor describing Chesterton’s fascism) they repeated, over and over 
again, lost and anachronistic arguments. Chesterton and the League kept steadfastly, 
wittingly or not, to ideas formulated at the end of the nineteenth century and 
beginning of the twentieth. 
  
Chapter 7. Caring about the British Empire 
 
The preceding chapters have described a gallimaufry of groups, some briefly, 
and two others, largely overlooked by historians, in detail.  From this medley of 
imperial activism it is appropriate to suggest, by addressing some key questions, 
general conclusions about awareness of the Empire in Britain in the twentieth 
century. As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the fundamental question of 
who cared about the Empire has been considered by historians such as Bernard 
Porter, John Mackenzie, Richard Price and others and will be explored further in this 
chapter from the perspective of imperial groups. There are, however, other questions 
which are important to consider. What motivated individuals to become involved in 
imperial groups? What specific issues and imperial themes did they value? How did 
their interests change over time? How salient in Britain was active concern about, 
and interest in, the Empire? And how do the Junior Imperial League and the League 
of Empire Loyalists fit into the overall milieu of imperial activism? Addressing these 
matters forms the substance of this chapter.  
 
It is important to distinguish between what the British Empire actually was 
and how it was perceived or ‘imagined’, in Benedict Anderson’s sense of the word, 
by imperial activists.
1
 In discussing the question of who cared about empire, 
therefore, we need to consider the expression ‘British Empire’ and what it meant. In 
their authoritative history of the word ‘imperialism’, R. Koebner and H.D. Schmidt 
discuss its changing meaning between 1840 and 1960.
2
 This encompasses the period 
under consideration here  and, thus, in coming to terms with the question of 
perceiving and caring about the British Empire, their work provides a valuable 
source for enquiring into the various ways imperial activists did so. Imperial activists 
in Britain, it will be argued, did not see the British Empire as a monolith whose 
every aspect should be unchangingly embraced.  They were generally selective, 
addressing specific imperial themes, and often reflected, sometimes helped to create, 
and occasionally opposed, the changing debates and meanings of the British Empire 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.   
Early imperial activist groups and the meaning of empire 
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Koebner and Schmidt have shown that by 1865:  
 
the three major issues between Britain and her colonies—self-government, the abolition of the old 
colonial trade system, and colonial defence—gave the term Empire a new prominence and a more 
definite meaning in the minds of statesmen, politicians and colonial administrators who debated 
them…[However] there was little evidence to show that the wider public showed an interest in the 




Although public awareness of this new meaning of Empire grew in the 
ensuing years, in 1865 it was only ‘public men’ who were interested in the concept. 
One of these public men was Joseph Howe, a Canadian politician, who in 1866, two 
years before the RCI was founded, described in a pamphlet how the British Empire 
had been ‘got together’ over a long period. The recurrent question now, he wrote, 
was ‘what is now to be done with it’.4 This question continued to be addressed by the 
imperial groups described in Chapter 1, in various ways, for the next one hundred 
years.  
 
Although defence and trade were long-standing imperial issues, the ‘new 
meaning’ of the Empire emphasised relations between Great Britain and its self-
governing colonies, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Its essence 
was a desire to draw more closely together the parts of the Empire that had common 
descent, race, religion, language and values. A number of upper-middle class 
political or academic men were prominent in this debate about imperial integration.  
Charles Dilke in Greater Britain (1868) suggested that the Empire was the ‘English-
speaking, white-inhabited, and self-governed lands’5; J.R. Seeley in Expansion of 
England (1883) described the ‘Colonial Empire’ as ‘an enlargement of the English 
state’6; and J. A. Froude in Oceana (1885) argued that there was a 
‘strong…sentimental attachment to Britain…among the colonists’.7 It would be 
wrong, however, to assert unequivocally that only the self-governing colonies 
mattered. For example, in 1876 Disraeli showed the imperial relevance of India by 
proposing that the Queen be designated Empress of India but nevertheless some 
                                                 
3
 Koebner and Schmidt, Imperialism, p. 80. 
4
 ibid., p. 85. 
5
 Charles Wentworth Dilke, Greater Britain (London, 1868), Vol. 2, p. 149. 
6
 Koebner and Schmidt, Imperialism, p. 173. 
7
 ibid., p. 182. 
245 
 
perceived the eastern Empire as peopled by aliens, unlike the self-governing, settler 
colonies whose populations were seen as English (thereby, it should be noted, 
ignoring the aborigines in Australasia, the French in Canada, and the Dutch and 
black people in South Africa).  It was against this background, in a period when the 
Empire was equated by many people with the British settler colonies, that the 
Imperial Federation League (IFL) came into being in 1884. Its pursuit of imperial 
federation embraced only the settler colonies and the Colonial Conference it was 
influential in organising in 1887 confined the Crown Colonies to the opening session 
and excluded them and India from its substantive sessions.
8
 The Indian element of 
the Empire had moved into the background. Thus, ‘Empire’, insofar as one 
attempted actively to answer Joseph Howe’s question, was identified with Anglo-
Saxon British settlers. In the 1880s and 1890s, however, the territorial nature of the 
Empire changed; in twenty years, Britain acquired 37 new territories in Africa and 




According to Koebner and Schmidt, the African acquisitions ‘made a purely 
Anglo-Saxon view of Empire somewhat obsolete’ and yet they argue that they were 
not seen as important to the Empire and failed to ‘rouse wide enthusiasm in England’ 
at that time.
10
 Certainly, the evidence of imperial groups supports the latter view. In 
the last two decades of the nineteenth century six imperial groups were founded and 
of these only the Imperial South African Association  had a particular interest in 
Africa. Of the remaining five, the IFL disbanded in 1893 having failed to progress its 
agenda of promoting imperial unity; its successors, the Imperial Federation 
(Defence) Committee , the British Empire League and the United Empire Trade 
League had defence, imperial unity and trade respectively as their special interests.  
The Primrose League’s imperialism was not its main preoccupation but an essential 
part of its toryism. Its total official enrolments (not live membership) reached over 
one million by 1900, probably an exaggerated figure, and membership of the other 
groups, who practised a much more focussed form of imperial activism, probably did 
not total more than a few thousands. In terms of imperialist activist groups, therefore, 
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we may reasonably conclude that Africa and the new Asian acquisitions, insofar as 
they did not form part of India perhaps, were almost irrelevant in the 1880s and early 
1890s. One might go further and suggest that the imperial conference in 1887 and 
the new wave of British acquisitions were not accompanied by an increase in the 
number of people who actively cared especially deeply about the British Empire.  
This relatively quiet period of imperial activism, however, was, according to 
Koebner and Schmidt, followed by a ‘remarkably sudden…surge of imperial 
sentiment in 1898’, ‘a climax in popular enthusiasm for imperialism’. The origins of 
this surge lay in increased international rivalries (manifested by specific incidents 
such as Fashoda and Omdurman); feelings of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority; and a 
sense of moral obligation towards backward people.  There were two separate parts 
to the Empire: ‘one…white and British; the other…coloured and backward’, 
according to the Liberal MP J.L. Walton. Joseph Chamberlain also argued that 
Britain’s African and Asian possessions had created a greater sense of obligation, but 
added, more materialistically, that they offered increased opportunities for trade.
 11
  
We see here the presence of the classic themes of the British Empire: Anglo-Saxon 
imperial unity; defence; and trade.  
 
Notwithstanding the abrupt increase in imperial sentiment in 1898 it was not 
sustained; Koebner and Schmidt also identify 1898 as the year in which ‘revulsion 
against imperialism began… [reaching] its climax in the Boer War’.12  This 
statement is not contradictory; growth in sentiment can be followed by its immediate 
decline. As Trevor Lloyd has observed, however, the level of imperial sentiment at 
the time was capable of exaggeration and interest in the Empire was not 
‘commonplace’.13 Analysis of the creation of new imperial activist groups in the 
years between 1898 and 1914 may help in understanding the fluctuating nature of 
imperial sentiment at that time. Arguably the higher level of imperial sentiment 
attained in 1898, with its new interest in Africa and Asia, was widespread but not 
deeply rooted and not of great interest to imperial activist groups.  
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None of the ten groups formed in that period and discussed in Chapter 1 had 
a predominant interest in Africa or Asia. Their main area of interest was in the self-
governing colonies.  It may therefore be that the new imperial acquisitions were 
simply noted but not seen as areas about which any particular practical action or 
interest need be taken by activists. It seems clear that the primary focus of imperial 
groups remained the self-governing colonies and how they might be integrated with 
Britain in terms of governance, defence or trade. In addition to these themes, 
education and sentiments of kith and kin were developed, the former by 
organisations such as The League of the Empire and the Empire Day Movement and 
the latter by the Overseas Club and The Patriotic League of Britons Overseas. Nor 
was it always mere indifference to Africa and Asia. The Victoria League, as noted in 
Chapter 1, was uncomfortable about dealing with Indian matters. Conversely, for 
example, Joseph Chamberlain argued that the British Empire was more than ties of 
kith and kin. Britain, he believed, had a civilising mission in its ‘backward’ 
territories as well as important trading opportunities.  These ideas, however, do not 
appear to have formed a significant part of the agenda of imperial activist groups in 
the Edwardian era even in the Tariff Reform League, founded in 1903, in which 
Chamberlain played a leading role. The Empire Parliamentary Association, founded 
in 1911, confined its membership to the Dominions, only later admitting members 
from India, Ceylon and Southern Rhodesia, for example. The Round Table also 
concentrated its affairs on the Dominions; they were the powers who would pursue 
the ‘master theme’ of developing an imperial defence and foreign policy. All these 
new groups’ priorities are evidence that at the beginning of the twentieth century the 
meaning of ‘British Empire’ from the perspective of imperial activists remained 
predominantly Anglo-Saxon.  Is it possible to reconcile the apparent divergence 
between a general surge in imperial sentiment about the British Empire, with its 
newly acquired territories, and the particular emphasis of activist groups on the 
Empire’s Anglo-Saxon areas? 
 
‘Hot’ and ‘banal’ imperialism 
The degree to which different elements of society were aware of the Empire, 
reacted to events related to it, and cared about it are factors that determine the 
salience of imperial sentiment. Thus, for example, those who were aware of the 
Empire but were uninterested in it, or indifferent to it, would be less likely to 
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participate in any surge in imperial sentiment. However, an increase in imperial 
sentiment would be capable of arising from the section of the population which had a 
mild or latent, supportive, interest in the Empire. Incidents like those at Omdurman 
and Fashoda would be capable of increasing their awareness of empire and arousing 
imperialistic patriotic feelings.  They may result in displays of ‘hot’ imperialism 
analogous to what Michael Billig has called ‘hot’ nationalism.14 As the topicality and 
intensity of an incident fades so people return to ‘banal’ imperialism and, in the 
examples given, Africa fades from general public imperial consciousness. Such 
attenuation of imperial sentiment does not apply so strongly to imperial activist 
groups; they continue to pursue their imperial objectives but a few of them, however, 
are exponents of ‘banal’ imperialism. The concept of ‘banal nationalism’ has been 
developed by Michael Billig in his eponymous book and arguably his idea is capable 
of extension to imperialism. This may be particularly apposite if the form of the 
imperialism is one in which the predominant perception of empire is that of Britain 
and its Dominions. The Junior Imperial League, founded in 1906, is an example of 
this.  
 
In Chapter 4 the discussion of the strength of the JIL’s imperialism 
concentrated mainly on the manifest, open examples of its imperialism. It was 
suggested, however, that Empire was so much a given part of the JIL’s ethos that it 
became such an accepted and understood element of members’ beliefs that it did not 
need to be referred to often in the course of the League’s everyday activities. 
‘Empire’ for many JIL members was thus commonplace, or ‘banal’. Billig’s work on 
the banality of nationalism helps to understand the nature of the JIL’s imperialism. 
He draws attention to the underlying, ‘mundane’ activities and signals that denote 
the almost unnoticed presence of nationalism. They are the ideological habits, he 
writes, that ‘reproduce’ or sustain nationalism. However, understandably, he does 
not extend his analysis beyond nationalism.  
 
One cannot here attempt a comprehensive enquiry into the nature and 
meaning of nationalism and its use as a basis for connecting it to imperialism. 
However, the definition provided by Ernest Renan provides an analytical framework: 
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‘to have had common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have 
accomplished great things together, to wish to do so again, that is the essential 
condition for being a nation’.15 It looks back to a common, imagined, past of shared 
experiences that binds people together even if, or perhaps because, they are 
dispersed. This idea need not apply exclusively to a nation. It is also relevant to 
groups of people at sub-national level such as a village, county or region. Thus if it is 
capable of such extension down the scale of social groups, then might it not also 
apply to an empire, or at least parts of an empire populated by people with strong 
common features such as race, language and religion? Within the British Empire the 
clear example of this is Britain and the Dominions; in the late-nineteenth century 
expressions such as ‘Greater Britain’ and the ‘Expansion of England’ described this 
extended nationalism. Renan’s elements of a nation may thus, wittingly or not, have 
been present in the minds of those who sought imperial unity: Greater Britain could 
be, they perceived, an extended nation. Such a perception helps to explain why the 
great majority of imperial interest groups placed emphasis in their imperial 
objectives and activities on the Dominions. An Anglo-Saxon, metropolitan 
individual living in a strongly national environment could perceive an affinity with 
another Anglo-Saxon individual living in, say, Australia or Canada more readily than 
with an Ashanti gold miner, for example, although, once again, one has to overlook 
non-Anglo-Saxon minorities in doing so.
16
 A people that sees itself as having 
common ethnicity, however diffusely spread, may generally have a greater chance of 
experiencing feelings of a common past than a geographically compact multi-racial 
group. Thus, it is as if the ties of common experience and ethnicity, even when 
located in non-contiguous areas can be more strongly bound together by the notion 
of an empire-state than by the idea of a nation-state; national unity is replaced, or at 
least extended, by imperial unity. The words of perhaps the most popular of all 
British imperial songs express this: ‘land of hope and glory…wider still and wider 
may thy bounds be set’. It follows, therefore, that Billig’s ‘banal nationalism’ can be 
extended to ‘banal imperialism’ and help to explain what was referred to in Chapter 
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4 as the JIL’s weak imperialism.17 The term ‘weak’ can now be replaced by ‘banal’ 
in the case of the JIL. What, however, does Billig mean by ‘banal’ and how does the 
JIL illustrate its meaning in an imperial context?  
 
Billig uses the idea of ‘waved’ and ‘unwaved’ flags in both a literal and 
metaphorical sense. Nationalism, he argues, is not simply an extreme or aggressive 
concept. It can exist in everyday ways that are almost unnoticed to the extent that its 
‘flaggings’, that is, its clear, as well as its subtle, manifestations, ‘continually remind 
us that we are ‘us’ and, in so doing, permit us to forget that we are being 
reminded’.18 Such a process brings about the reproduction, the long-term sustaining, 
of the nation. He describes the wide range of meanings that can be assigned to ‘we’ 
and ‘us’ and the ways in which groups identify with these pronouns. If one sets this 
idea alongside that of Benedict Anderson, the imagined community, one can 
postulate that it is possible that a form of banal imperialism can apply to a 
geographically diffuse group of people with a perceived common ancestry such as 
the populations of Great Britain and her Dominions. It is an imperialism which 
focuses on this particular geographical configuration but does so in everyday, 
unnoticed ways; in other words, ways that are taken for granted within the group. 
Thus, ‘[b]anal nationalism possesses a low key, understated tone…[with] routine 
practices’.19 This quotation, if ‘nationalism’ is replaced with ‘imperialism’, describes 
the JIL. Certainly, the JIL also had its incidents of ‘hot’ imperialism such as its 
campaign against the reform of Indian governance but banal imperialism was its 
normal condition. It is this that clearly distinguishes it from all the other groups 
discussed in this thesis, with the exception of the Primrose League. The 
characteristics that define the two organisations are that their activities were strongly 
social, not exclusively political, and that they had a general, not specific, interest in 
the British Empire. Other groups were far more political in their imperial beliefs and 
tended to focus ‘hotly’ and persistently on their particular imperial objectives. 
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The banal imperialism of the JIL was evident in the activities of its members 
in its branches. It was there that the continual, almost unnoticed, reminding (to use 
Billig’s terms) of Empire occurred. Members of branches had interests in a mixture 
of social and political activities and the exact proportions varied from branch to 
branch, sometimes controversially, as discussed in Chapter 4. It is reasonable to 
assume, however, unless they set out deliberately to misrepresent themselves, that 
despite these multifarious activities, about which they could be selective, members 
had a common, almost mandatory, belief in Conservative and Unionist principles.  
They were, after all, required on joining the League to declare their acceptance of 
them. One such key principle was the preservation of the British Empire. 
Furthermore the JIL badge contained the motto ‘For Empire’, a constant reminder of 
the League’s imperial ethos. It is worth noting that these aspects of the JIL were 
similar to those of the Primrose League which also exhibited banal imperialism. Its 
slogan was Imperium et Libertas and it sought to exclude from membership those 
who were hostile to the British Empire. It too had a strong social element to its 
activities and the JIL demonstrated its kindred nature when it adopted the Primrose 
League’s song book for use at its social events. Songs such as ‘Soldiers of the 
Queen’, and ‘The Bold Menelaus’ (by Henry Newbolt)20, with their references to 
‘ruling the waves’ and ‘a famous fighting race’, were tuneful expressions of British 
imperial power and military might. Together with membership being conditional on 
acceptance of imperialism, and with slogans and badges, they were the everyday, 
barely noticed, manifestations of banal imperialism. To borrow Billig’s words, 
members of the JIL thus recalled the Empire almost ‘without conscious awareness… 
[whilst] doing other things’, 21 a form of anoetic imperialism perhaps that follows in 
the tradition of Macaulay, in whose five volume history of England, published in the 
middle of the nineteenth century, the British Empire is ‘scarcely mentioned’  because 
it is  a ‘fundamental but unstated assumption’.22 
 
It would be wrong to conclude that the JIL was solely banal in its 
imperialism. It also had its moments of ‘hot’ imperialism but these were much more 
likely to occur at central meetings rather than in the branches. The speeches by 
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Baldwin to JIL rallies in 1924 and 1928, discussed in Chapter 4, illustrate this. 
Renderings of Land of Hope and Glory and other patriotic songs, the mass waving of 
red, white and blue placards and the loud cheers that greeted Baldwin’s assertion that 
the League was ‘not afraid of the word Empire’ are powerful evidence of this. Such 
events were certainly not without conscious awareness. They were full-blooded, 
stirring, imperial events, quite unlike the everyday activities in JIL branches, at 
which the British Empire was emotionally and whole-heartedly celebrated. The 
contrast with branch activity may help to explain the normal, banal expression of 
members’ imperialism. Membership of the League in its branches was a pastime, a 
relatively small part of members’ everyday lives and therefore the Empire was not 
something that preoccupied their minds. Such circumstances are conducive to the 
quiet, low key celebration of Empire. Members did not generally use their time with 
the League in trying to reform or exploit the Empire, as did, for example, the 
activists of the Tariff Reform League. In general, they wanted to enjoy and celebrate 
the Empire, not to change it. There were exceptions to this, however. Campaigns in 
favour of imperial preference and against Indian self-governance in the 1930s were 
certainly not banal but were manifestations of the League’s ‘hot’ imperialism. The 
relative rarity of such militancy in the JIL’s activities, however, helps to reinforce 
the conclusion that the JIL’s normal mode was one of ‘banal’ imperialism. 
 
It is the banal imperialism of the JIL that makes it important not to overlook 
it in assessing the nature of imperialism in Britain in the twentieth century. Bernard 
Porter has warned against exaggerating ‘the imperialization of British society and 
culture by…ignoring the bare patches and bunching the imperial ‘finds’ together’.23 
Conversely, however, it is equally important not to ignore imperial activity because 
of its banality, as historians have done in the case of the JIL.  To do so leads to over-
emphasis on ‘hot’ imperialism and thus a distorted understanding of the full nature 
and limits of imperial activism. Within the spectrum of imperial activism, the JIL 
represents what might be termed infra-imperialism, as distinct from the upper-limit, 
of ultra-imperialism, set by the League of Empire Loyalists, of which more later. It is 
this aspect of the JIL and its banal imperialism that make it important in the study of 
the salience of imperialism in Britain in the twentieth century. Together, the JIL and 
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the LEL delimit the full spectrum of imperial activism. Before, however, considering 
the way in which the LEL performs this role, the next part of the chapter returns to 
the chronological discussion of imperial groups within the context of changing 
meanings of empire. 
 
Later imperial activist groups and the meaning of empire 
The Women’s Guild of Empire was formed in 1914. The significance of the 
WGE in imperial activism is that it was a working-class organisation, not that it 
involved women; they had already been active in the Primrose League and the 
Victoria League for some years previously. Although the exact nature of its activities 
is obscure it claimed a membership of 40,000 and is valuable evidence of working-
class interest in the Empire. Historians, such as Richard Price, have argued that the 
working class was not much interested in the Empire.
24
 That the WGE was the only 
imperial group with a predominantly working-class membership supports this view 
but the size of its membership was substantial relative to that of most imperial 
groups and shows that active working-class interest in the Empire cannot be 
completely ignored.  Many working-class people voted Tory, the party of the 
Empire, and it may well be that their absence from organised imperial groups was 
due to lack of money and leisure time. They may even have been discouraged from 
joining by the attitudes, for example, of middle-class members in groups such as the 
JIL, discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Many of the imperial groups formed before the First World War continued to 
exist during (and beyond) it and some combined in welcoming and assisting  the 
hundreds of thousands of troops from the Empire who came to Britain. Some gave 
direct military assistance: the British Empire League raised a cavalry regiment (the 
2
nd
 King Edward’s Horse) and equipped five army units; another raised funds to 
finance the building of a warship. This was imperial defence in practice, not 
theorising about how the defence of the Empire could be formally financed and 
integrated, one of the early themes of imperial groups’ campaigning.   Furthermore, 
in a period of intense military conflict, one might expect that the defence of the 
British Empire and the practicalities of war would crowd out new campaigns to 
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reform it but this was not the case.  Three imperial groups were founded during the 
First World War: the Empire Resources Development Committee, the British 
Commonwealth Union and the British Empire Union. They were small or medium-
sized political pressure groups mainly interested in trade in the Empire and adjusted 
their policies to the context of the war: the BEU was racially anti-German and the 
ERDC saw imperial trade as a means of reducing the war debt.  The idea of greater 
cooperation in imperial trade was a persistent one and was the most long-lived of all 
the imperial themes. It is perhaps significant that Lord Curzon felt it necessary to 
challenge this dominant role in imperial activism in 1907 when he rejected the idea 
that imperialism could be identified with commercial activities.
25
  The perceived 
necessity of denial can sometimes signal that what is being denied is indeed the case.  
By 1918 the concept of imperial unity was a dead question: the Dominions had 
attained a new geo-political sense of independent national maturity as exemplified 
by their attendance at the Versailles peace conference. The question of more 
integrated imperial defence was no longer a matter of theoretical debate; the reality 
of war had seen the Dominions acting in concert just as they had done in the Boer 
War, an outcome that had delighted Joseph Chamberlain and helped to motivate his 
drive for tariff reform. After 1918, economic imperialism was an established fact
26
 
and it was a major part of imperial activism in Britain in the inter-war years.  
 
Immediately after the First World War the British Empire reached its greatest 
geographical spread; it had acquired mandated territories and not yet granted 
independence to Ireland.  This coincided, however, with a widespread agreement in 
global political thinking that ‘imperialism’ was now a ‘condemnatory’ word in ‘the 
struggle against capitalism…Anglo-Saxon domination, and…white, colonial 
power’.27  Furthermore, two of the pre-war imperial themes, imperial federation and 
institutionalised long-term cooperation in defence matters, were dead issues after the 
war. The First World War had shown that the Dominions were capable of responding 
to the war effort without any need for pre-arranged formal imperial structures: a 
million men enlisted from the Dominions. Their participation also brought greater 
maturity in international affairs as, for example, when they demanded, and achieved, 
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their own representatives at the Paris peace talks.
28
 Elsewhere, domination and 
power were certainly issues in the drive between the wars for greater autonomy for 
India and two new imperial groups created in the interwar period, the Indian Empire 
Society and the India Defence League, considered British power as paramount in 
their campaigns against greater Indian autonomy. Three other new groups, the 
Empire Development Union, the Empire Industries Association and the Empire 
Crusade had imperial trade as their principal interest. As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
IES and IDL were small, short-lived political organisations. They were illustrative of 
specialised, particular imperial interests but were unable to divert the trend towards 
Indian independence.  They are an early example of imperial activism opposing the 
emerging ‘meaning’ of the British Empire, the growing desire for independence, that 
was to be so virulently and more widely pursued by the League of Empire Loyalists 
after the Second World War. None of these organisations campaigned successfully. 
The EIA and Empire Crusade, however, were more effective organisations and 
pursued the last and most persistent of the themes of imperial activism, imperial 
preference in trade.   
 
It would be wrong to attempt to be too definitive in attempting to summarise 
the nature of the specific issues and activities that imperial activists valued, and the 
manner in which their interests changed over time within the context of the changing 
meanings of the British Empire.  One can, however, suggest some characteristics of 
organised interest in the British Empire that are more apparent than others.  
 
Organised interest was low until the 1880s and grew rapidly between then 
and 1914. The Edwardian period was the most fertile period for the creation of 
imperial activist groups.  The British Empire mattered to people more in that period 
than in any other in the twentieth century and it did so in all its specific themes of 
governance, defence, trade, and education as well as in more general ways that 
sought to enjoy and celebrate the Empire.  Immediately after the First World War, 
imperial activism reached a peak both in terms of the number of organisations and 
their membership, although the largest organisation, the Primrose League, claiming 
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800,000 members in 1914,
29
 was in decline by the 1920s. Despite this peak of 
interest, the range of imperial themes was beginning to narrow. The notion of any 
form of imperial federation, which had been so dominant in the 1880s and 1890s, 
was now moribund. As Denis Judd has noted, a resolution passed by the Imperial 
War Conference in 1917, calling for a special conference after the war that would 
grant ‘full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations…spelt the end of the 
dreams of imperial federation’.30 It was, however, for some activists, a long time 
expiring; the Round Table did not accept that the idea of imperial unity was 
‘untenable’ until the late 1940s.31 The organisation of defence that permanently 
integrated the military resources of Britain and its Dominions was also of much less 
interest after the First World War.  The decline of interest in these two imperial 
themes may have been because integrated governance and defence were difficult 
policies to pursue without creating supra-national organisations and pooling 
sovereignty. Like imperial federalism, they were too ‘abstract and undefined’32 to be 
realisable. This was not true, however, of trade relations and this is perhaps one 
reason why a desire for closer relations with the Dominions turned more strongly 
towards imperial preference in the 1920s. Certainly, emphasis on the Dominions was 
a continuation of the pre-war policy of the tariff reformers who ‘saw the empire in 
terms of the settler colonies’.33 In 1931 imperial preference became a reality, albeit 
more because of the needs of the global economic situation than imperial activism.  
 
A new topic of organised imperial activism, the campaign against increased 
self-governance for India, emerged briefly in the 1930s but failed to prevent the 
enactment of the India Bill in 1935. By now imperial activism was in decline and 
took on a more ‘general’ appreciation of the Empire rather than the persistent desire 
to reform or integrate it. Four groups ceased to exist in the 1930s and a further three 
in the 1940s, a decade in which no new groups were founded, the first time this had 
occurred since the 1870s. After the Second World War more groups were dissolved 
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and those that remained had either a general interest in the Empire or were pursuing 
specific imperial educational matters in an administrative way rather than seeking 
reform. The period in which the Empire had mattered a great deal, the Edwardian 
years, and the inter-war years during which the earlier ideas of closer imperial union 
were seen to be chimerical, were followed by independence for India in 1947 and 
Macmillan’s post-war pronouncement of the ‘wind of change’ in Africa in 1961. 
Having failed to integrate Britain and her Dominions more closely, those who cared 
about the Empire were thus made more pointedly aware of its further disintegration. 
Interest in the Empire remained among the general public but it depended on class: a 
survey in 1948 had shown that whereas only 15 per cent of unskilled workers had ‘a 
high level of interest in the colonial matters’, this rose to ‘54 per cent of the middle 
classes’.34 It was early in these post-war years that the middle-class League of 
Empire Loyalists emerged anachronistically in 1954.  
 
Table 15. Analysis of imperial activist groups by date and interest 
 1860-
1880s 
1890s 1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 
No. 
founded 
3 4 6 6 2 2 0 1 0 0 
Dissolved 0 0 2 1 1 4 3 2 1 3 
Cum. total 3 7 11 16 17 15 12 11 10 7 
Area of 
interest: 
          
General 2 2 4 7 7 7 6 6 6 4 
Governance 1 2 1 0 0 2 2  0 0 0 
Trade 0 1 1 2 4 2 1 1 1 1 
Defence 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Trade and 
defence 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Governance 
and defence 
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Education 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
‘Kith and 
kin’ 
0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Cum. total 3 7 11 16 17 15 12 11 10 7 
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Apart from the Expanding Commonwealth Group, an association of a few 
Conservative backbench MPs briefly described in Chapter 5, the LEL, led by A.K. 
Chesterton, was the only imperial activist group to be founded after the Second 
World War. As discussed in Chapter 6, the League’s model of imperialism was old-
fashioned and embedded in the imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  Its activist tactics, however, which were unlike those of any other 
imperialist group, identified it as an ultra-imperialist group.  The pre-planned use of 
disruptive tactics at public meetings exploited the presence of the press and 
television in order to draw attention to the League’s political message and was quite 
unlike the methods other imperial activist groups used to promulgate their policies. 
 
Billig describes how certain national events, such as national days, 
coronations and thanksgiving days, can interrupt the banality of nationalism. The 
attention of the people is briefly drawn to its national identity and ‘sentiments of 
patriotic emotion…surge forth’ in ‘hot’ nationalism.35  If one accepts the idea that 
imperialism can be a transcendent form of nationalism leading to the notion of ‘banal 
imperialism’, then it follows that Billig’s ‘hot nationalism’ becomes ‘hot 
imperialism’ in the context of the British Empire. Although the activities of the LEL 
occurred long before the exposition of such terminology, Chesterton was, without 
being aware of the expression, an exponent of ‘hot imperialism’. The numerous ‘hot’ 
events that the League organised, discussed in Chapter 5, were designed to draw the 
attention of people to their imperial identity. Chesterton used ‘propaganda by deed’ 
and the ‘politics of disruption’ to create ‘hot imperialism’ and thereby gain publicity. 
He was a master of disruptive political deeds in attempting to promulgate his 
imperial messages. No other imperial activist group used such tactics. Certainly, 
other imperial groups had their ‘hot’ events: the Empire Day Movement’s annual 
celebration and the JIL’s mass rallies are examples. No group, however, relied so 
heavily and persistently on ‘hot imperialism’ as did the LEL. It is this that 
differentiates it and places it at the extreme, ultra-imperialist, end of the imperial 
activist spectrum, far removed from the ‘banal imperialism’ of the JIL at the other 
end of the spectrum.  
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The LEL was active between 1953 and 1967, a period of rapid decolonisation 
in which the traditional imperial themes of governance, defence and trade were 
becoming increasingly irrelevant to the public. As Porter has observed about 
decolonisation: ‘[t]here was not much thought…given to what had gone, the old 
empire’.36 Nor was much thought given even to the new Commonwealth. Evidence 
of such a trend can be seen in a speech in 1981 by S.S. Ramphal, the Commonwealth 
Secretary General in which he argued that Britain seemed to be ‘associated’ with the 
Commonwealth but ‘not of it’.37 Thus any organisation, like the LEL, campaigning 
against this trend would seem to many people to be out-dated, irrational and 
fanatical. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that all imperial groups in 
existence after the war fitted this description. In the 1960s, the Royal 
Commonwealth Institute, the Primrose League, the Victoria League, the League of 
the Empire, the Round Table Group, the Empire Parliamentary Association and the 
Empire Industries Association were still active. All except the EIA had been founded 
before the First World War but had adapted to the changing imperial situation. Thus, 
for example, the Round Table Group, reviewing its circumstances in 1970, 
concluded that whereas its founders had sought to develop the increasing cohesion of 
‘political, military and economic order’ in the Empire, now its task was to cultivate 
‘modest’ associational relationships within the Commonwealth.38 There is a paradox, 
therefore, in the fact that the newest imperial organisation, the LEL, never 
considered adapting to the times. Its beliefs were grounded in the Edwardian period 
and this magnified the extreme fanaticism it needed to gain public attention in 
imperial matters. To what extent, however, was the British public concerned with the 
British Empire? The total membership of imperial activist groups is very relevant to 
this question. 
 
Assessing the membership of imperial activist groups 
The variety of imperial groups in the period 1900 to 1970, delimited by such 
greatly different organisations as the JIL and the LEL, complicates a discussion of 
who joined imperial activist groups and why they did so.  Perhaps for this reason, the 
membership of imperial activist groups has not been examined extensively by 
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historians. There are difficulties in doing so because information is patchy and some 
organisations, such as the Primrose League, may have exaggerated membership 
numbers. It is important, nevertheless, to address the issue because those who joined 
imperial activist groups were a self-selecting body of people who cared about the 
British Empire and analysing how numerous they were, and who they were, provides 
useful information about how widespread interest in the Empire was among the 
people of Britain. Table 16 (below) provides some information about the 
membership of imperial activist groups drawn from various sources. (See Chapter 1.) 
 
Table 16. Membership of imperial activist groups 
Activist group No. of members Date Source 
RCI 13,700 1910 Reese, p134 




Pugh, p168  
Pugh, p168 
IFL    
IF(D)C ‘rather small’ 1894 Pollock, ‘Imperial 
Organisation’, 11 
BEL    
UETL 5,100 1890s The Times 24 June 1892 
ISAA    
Victoria League 6,500 1915 Riedi,  HJ p577 
League of the Empire 23,000 1906  
Empire Day Movement    
TRL Over 200,000 1913 Derived from Thompson 






HLRO CPA CCO506/1/1 
JIL Annual Report 
1928/29 
Round Table Group    








Smith The Royal Over-






Derived from Grey 
(passim.) 
ERDC Less than 1000 1920s Derived from Bigland, 
p221 
BCU About 20 1917 Turner p535 in EHR 
BEU About 20,000 c.1919 Derived from BEU 
Monthly Record 
WGE 40,000 1925 ODNB entry for Flora 
Drummond 
EDU ‘tiny’ 1920s Marrison p361 
EIA ‘small’ 1920s Marrison pp378-80 
Empire Crusade 250,000 1929 The Crusader No 1 July 
1930 
IES 1,400 1933 The Times 19 January 
1933 
IDL About 10,000 1933 Derived from The Times 8 
December 1934 
ECG 18 1950s Biggs-Davison papers, 
HLRO BD/1/53  





It is clear that the Primrose League was, by a wide margin, the largest of the 
groups. The exactness of the figure for its membership in 1910 (656,269) is the 
result of an audit of its active membership at that time as distinct from its official 
number of enrolments since its inception in 1884, stated in 1910 to be 2,053,019.
39
 
This latter figure included branch members who had died, resigned or moved away 
as well as the entire membership of defunct branches. One may conclude, therefore, 
that during a twenty-six year period over one million people who had at some point 
joined the Primrose League ceased to sustain an active part in its affairs. 
Furthermore, although Primrose League membership increased in the years 
immediately prior to the beginning of the First World War, reaching 800,000 by 
1914
40
 and suggesting a net annual average increase of about 40,000, such growth 
was not sustained in the inter-war years. In 1922, for example, the League reported 




The great majority of the membership of the League, about 92 per cent, was 
classified as Associates; the remaining 8 per cent, who led the League, were termed 
Knights and Dames. These latter were likely to be from the upper strata of society 
whereas the Associates were more likely to be middle and working class people. 
There are perhaps three main reasons why people joined the Primrose League: to 
support Tory politics; to show that they cared about the British Empire; and to enjoy 
social activities. Whatever relative importance one might assign to these motives, it 
is clear that the League’s membership is evidence of caring about the Empire in all 
the social classes in Britain.  
 
At the end of the Edwardian period, the two largest groups, after the Primrose 
League, were the Tariff Reform League and the Junior Imperial League with a 
combined membership of over 300,000.  The membership in Britain of a third large 
group, the Overseas Club, is less certain because it had overseas members and also 
seems to have conflated people it referred to as its supporters and subscribers with its 
formal members.  According to Richard Jebb, the first chairman of the Club, it had 
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130,000 ‘members’ in 1915 but it seems more likely that the true membership figure 
was much less than this; Smith records only 32,506 members in 1922.
 42
  All the 
other eight imperial activist groups still extant at the outbreak of the war in 1914 had 
memberships of less than about 10,000 except for the League of the Empire which 
claimed 23,000. One can reasonably conclude therefore that the total number of 
people belonging to imperial activist groups in 1914 was between one and one and a 
half million, of which more than half belonged to the Primrose League. Clearly any 
subsequent movement in the Primrose League’s membership would have had a 
disproportionate effect on the totality of imperial activism; as already noted, after the 
First World War its membership declined.  
 
The demise of the Tariff Reform League in 1922, even though its members 
were encouraged to join the Empire Development Union, is a further important 
factor in the changing nature of imperial activist membership after 1918. Although 
new imperial activist groups emerged in the inter-war years, they were relatively 
small with memberships usually much less than 20,000.  Conversely, membership of 
the Junior Imperial League grew to 250,000 by 1929 and Beaverbrook’s Empire 
Crusade claimed 250,000 members in 1930. These figures, however, should be 
interpreted cautiously as indicators of the level of commitment to imperial activism. 
Tensions between the political work and social activities in JIL branches increased as 
the latter grew, and although its banal imperialism continued, it emerged more 
strongly as an electoral resource and political training ground for the Tory party thus, 
arguably, blurring its imperial focus.   Beaverbrook’s claim is specious: 
‘membership’ meant completing and returning, without a subscription, a coupon 
published in his national newspapers thereby supporting his campaign for imperial 
preference. In sum, therefore, it is probably right to conclude that the peak of 
imperial activist membership occurred in the period between 1914 and 1922. This 
appears to be inconsistent with the suggestion made earlier that the Edwardian period 
saw most interest in the empire but two factors help to reconcile the two statements. 
First, even though several organisations were formed in the period, reflecting strong 
imperial enthusiasm, it may have taken them some years to build membership. 
Secondly, it is important to note that claimed membership figures do not necessarily 
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correlate with the level of active interest in the empire. Thus, for example, the 
reported membership of the TRL in 1913 was over 200,000 and yet by 1922 it was 
defunct. Although it suggested to its members that they join the Empire 
Development Union, few did. Thus one may conclude that a substantial number of 
activists in the early 1920s ceased to belong to an imperial organisation and that the 
peak of imperial activist membership had passed. With declining membership of the 
Primrose League also a substantial factor, it is likely that total activist membership 
between the wars never exceeded one and a half million. How significant, however, 
in the nation’s affairs was the total membership of imperial activist groups in 
Britain? A brief comparison with labour and women’s organisations of a political or 
quasi-political nature may be helpful in setting it in the context of the total adult 
population of the United Kingdom in the interwar period of approximately 30 
million. 
 
In the 1920s trade union membership was just under two million and rose to 
almost three million by 1939.
43
 Total membership of major women’s groups in the 
1930s was of the same order: Labour Party Women’s Section (250,000); Mothers’ 
Union (538,000); National Union of Townswomen’s Guilds (54,000); National 
Federation of Women’s Institutes (238,000); Women’s Co-operative Guild (90,000) 
and Women’s Unionist Movement (940,000), together totalling just over 2 million.44 
Numerical equivalence does not necessarily imply equality in any other respect, 
particularly in gaining publicity or impact for a particular cause. The above 
comparison of membership does, however, provide some indication of the salience 
of imperial activism in Britain. Furthermore, awareness of the trade union 
movement, of women’s interests and of imperial activism was not confined to 
members; their families and friends would also have had their attention drawn to 
these organisations. However, awareness of imperial matters is not the same as 
caring about them. John Julius Norwich recalled the 1920s when he wrote that 
‘Empire was all around us, celebrated on our biscuit tins, chronicled in our cigarette 
cards, part of the fabric of our lives.’ He is arguably wrong, however, to conclude 
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from this that ‘we were all imperialists then’.45 It was the million or so people who 
belonged to imperialists groups at that time who were more definitely the 
imperialists in society, whether they ate biscuits or not. 
 
It is important, therefore, in assessing to what extent the British Empire 
mattered to people in Britain, to distinguish between being aware of it, interested in 
it, and actively caring about it. As noted earlier, members of imperial activist groups 
were drawn from all social classes with the working classes being particularly 
evident in the Primrose League, the Women’s Guild of Empire and the Junior 
Imperial League. Although overall membership of the JIL grew in the inter-war 
years, the falling membership of the Primrose League and the demise of the WGE 
suggest a decline in the number of working-class imperial activists. This does not 
necessarily mean, however, a decline in interest in, or awareness of, the Empire. For 
example, as John Mackenzie has noted, 27 million people visited the Wembley 
Exhibition in 1924 and 1925. He attributes this in part to the announcement of the 
construction of ‘a great national sports [football] ground’ at the site, thus drawing the 
attention of working class people, through their love of football, to the Exhibition.
46
 
A day spent at the British Empire Exhibition at Wembley, however, lacks the strong 
evidence of actively caring about the Empire that membership of an imperial activist 
group provides. Such membership was a deeper experience because it was repetitive, 
not a single event like a day at an exhibition, or celebrating Empire Day once a year. 
As Rose has observed, ‘working-class memoirs frequently mention Empire Day 
[but] they also reveal that these celebrations did little to enhance awareness of the 
colonies’.47 The view, therefore, that working class people in the twentieth century 
‘generally brought a healthy apathy to imperial issues’ [emphasis added]48 seems 
correct, even though there may have been a substantial number of them in the 
Primrose League, and Beaverbrook’s campaign elicited a notable response from his 
Express readers, for example.  
 
One of the difficulties of identifying working class interest in the British 
Empire is that they lack prominence in the records of the time. The ordinary member 
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of an imperial interest group, of whatever class, received little personal publicity and 
this can lead to a distorted understanding of the levels of participation in imperial 
activism of different social classes. There is, however, clear evidence of the 
involvement of upper and middle class people in imperial activism because they 
were the founders and leaders of imperial activist organisations and thus are readily 
identified in the reports and publications of activist groups and in the press.  
 
From the latter years of the nineteenth century until at least immediately after 
the First World War the leadership of many imperial activist groups was permeated 
by peers. These included, for example, Lord Bury (Royal Colonial Institute), Lord 
Randolph Churchill (Primrose League), Lord Rosebery (Imperial Federation 
League), Lord Avebury (British Empire League), the Duke of Westminster (ISAA) 
and the Duke of Sutherland (Tariff Reform League). Many of the groups also had 
Members of Parliament in leadership roles: W.E. Forster (Imperial Federation 
League) and James Lowther (UETL), for example. It would be wrong, however, to 
over-emphasise the predominance of peers and MPs in initiating imperial activism. 
The founders of several groups were not parliamentarians. For example, the Victoria 
League was founded by ‘socially and politically elite’ women: Mrs Ord Marshall, 
the widow of a senior civil servant, founded the League of the Empire; the Round 
Table was established by young alumni of Oxford University; Evelyn Wrench, a 
journalist, began the Overseas Club; Howard d’Egville, a barrister, was an important 
figure in the Imperial Federation (Defence) League and the ERDC; and Frederick 
Pollock, lawyer and academic, was highly influential in the IFL and League of the 
Empire.  These people were from the middle class, not the peerage.  
 
The leadership of activist groups was upper or middle class even where their 
memberships included working class people. The Primrose League is a clear 
example. Another is the Junior Imperial League whose founding members were 
aspiring middle class men but although some working class people joined, more 
especially in the inter-war years, their central leadership remained largely a 
combination of peers, MPs and middle class administrators, with aristocrats such as 
Lord Windsor, Lord Stanley and Lord Burghley at the highest level. However, 
working class people, such as Bernard Braine and Patricia Hornsby- Smith did 
emerge as senior figures in the organisation of the League in the 1930s, first at a 
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branch and then at a regional level. A notable exception to upper class leadership 
was the Women’s Guild of Empire; its leaders, of a working class membership, were 
middle class suffragettes. The British Commonwealth Union was also middle class 
in its leadership. One can reasonably conclude, therefore, that although working 
class people were members of some imperial activist groups they had little part in the 
leadership of them, especially before the First World War.  
 
In conclusion, membership of imperial activist groups was drawn from all 
classes with upper and middle class people providing leadership. Those, of whatever 
class, who formed and led imperial activist groups and those who simply joined 
them as ordinary members did so for a number of basic reasons. The main ones 
included active attempts to change the governance, defence or trade relationships of 
the Empire; expressions of general feelings of support for it; and simple celebration 
of its existence. Some who joined groups such as the India Defence League, the 
Indian Empire Society and the League of Empire Loyalists, sought to prevent 
change. Others joined groups as much for the social activities as the political ones 
that were available, particularly in the cases of the Primrose League and the Junior 
Imperial League. All these reasons for being a member of a group were expressed 
with varying intensity and ranged between ‘hot’ and ‘banal’ imperialism. 
Furthermore, the interest of groups in imperial ideas varied over time. Thus greater 
unity of governance and the formal integration of defence fell away in the period 
between the late Victorian years and the end of the First World War, leaving the idea 
of imperial preference as the most sustained of the political imperial themes. The 
geographical focus of imperial activists, within the vast diversity of the Empire, was 
narrow; great and sustained interest was shown in the Dominions, much less in India 
until the 1930s, and little in the dependencies (with the exception of the League of 
Empire Loyalists after the Second World War). This concentration on relations 
between Britain and the Dominions suggests that nineteenth century idea of a 
Greater Britain of the United Kingdom and the Dominions lingered persistently, 
even if unwittingly, in the minds of imperial activists at least until the Second World 
War. 
 
How much the Empire mattered to the British public has been extensively 
debated by historians. In discussing in this chapter the closely related question of 
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who cared about the Empire, it has been suggested that the totality of those who 
cared most about the Empire, that is, activists who belonged to groups, probably 
never exceeded one and a half million people. This is a substantial body of people 
and comparable to the size of the contemporary trades union and women’s 
movements. However, whatever the number of people in Britain who cared about the 
Empire, it is important to recognise that many activists did so only in particular ways 
and about particular geographical parts of it. The question of how much the Empire 
mattered, therefore, is not readily susceptible to a general answer. One needs to 
consider, as has been attempted in this chapter, which part of the Empire mattered, 
which particular imperial issues motivated imperial activists, the intensity of their 





This thesis has surveyed twenty-seven twentieth century imperial activist 
groups and builds on the work of Andrew Thompson, John Mackenzie, Andrew 
Marrison and Matthew Hendley, all of whom have looked at multiple imperial 
activist groups, though without investigating particular ones in great depth. The main 
content is a detailed analysis of the Junior Imperial League and the League of 
Empire Loyalists. The JIL has been studied little by historians, a significant 
oversight because it was a substantial political organisation. The LEL has been 
examined mainly by those who are interested in its apparently fascist qualities rather 
than its specifically imperial dimension.  
The thesis has shown that the JIL was an important, imperially-minded 
political organisation, increasingly integrated into the Conservative party, and one 
that expressed its imperialism in commonplace, ‘banal’ ways. It was significant in 
electoral politics, being effective in supporting the Conservatives  at local elections, 
by-elections and general elections. At the 1929 general election, for example, it 
assembled over 100,000 members throughout the country to assist in the campaign. 
It provided a training ground for young politicians, male and female, and provided 
them with opportunities to become local and national politicians. It did not confine 
its activities to politics but offered a wide range of social activities as a means of 
drawing young people into politics. Although its central leadership was generally 
patrician in composition, its membership, which had grown to about 250,000 by the 
early 1930s, was drawn from all classes with a substantial proportion from the 
working class. It provided a sound foundation for the Young Conservatives 
immediately after the Second World War. 
In contrast, the LEL, an organisation whose largely middle-class membership 
never exceeded a few thousand, opposed the leadership of the Conservative party. 
This thesis has argued that it should not be seen simply as an extreme right-wing, 
even fascist, organisation. Its imperialism was a key element of its politics. It 
believed that the Empire was an essential part of Britishness and used disruptive 
publicity-seeking stunts to try to bring pressure to bear on politicians by alerting the 
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British public to what it saw as the acute need to preserve Britain’s Empire, 
sovereignty and global power. It was ineffective, not only because of its 
marginalised relationship with the Conservative party but also because, after the 
Second World War, only a small part of society, mainly drawn from the upper-
middle classes, cared much about the Empire. Furthermore, its imperialism was 
anachronistic, rooted in late-Victorian imperialism and imbued with extreme racism. 
The belief that the ‘white’ Dominions were a superior part of the Empire and that 
dependencies were incapable of self-government became untenable. In pursuing its 
out-dated ideas, the LEL was an exponent of ‘hot’ imperialism in the post-war period 
that was very different from the ‘banal’ imperialism of the JIL in the inter-war years.  
In addition to these findings about the JIL and LEL, important in themselves, 
the thesis has also extended the debate about the awareness of the British Empire in 
British society by setting them in the context of imperial activism and the debate 
about the awareness of the British Empire in British society. Other methods for 
assessing the effect of the Empire on British society have been used by historians 
and the conclusions they reach vary greatly. The so-called minimalists say it had 
very little impact; the ‘maximalists’, that it was ubiquitous. It has been argued here 
that these approaches set up a false polarity. The debate over the significance of 
empire in British society is more subtle than a straightforward choice between the 
omnipresence of empire and its near-absence. The very fact that a gallimaufry of 
imperial activist groups existed, including the JIL and the LEL with their contrasting 
natures, shows that many people in Britain in the first half of the twentieth century 
cared about the British Empire in diverse and multivalent ways. Membership of 
imperial activist groups reached between one and two million during the period, a 
figure comparable to those of trades unions and women’s groups.  Furthermore, we 
need to understand how this awareness of the Empire mattered, to whom, and in 
what ways. Imperial activist groups and those who belonged to them are an 
important source for considering these issues. Neither in the sense of their social 
characteristics nor in their concerns with the Empire were they a homogeneous, 
monolithic body of people; the thesis has described this diversity.  
The thesis has argued that many imperial activists had a perception of Empire 
that was narrowly Anglo-Saxon in character. Extensive and sustained interest was 
shown in the Dominions, much less in India until the 1930s, and little in the 
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dependencies, with the exception of the League of Empire Loyalists after the Second 
World War. Thus for many imperial activists, ‘the Empire’ meant the Dominions. 
This focus on the Dominions had been evident in the late nineteenth century when 
the idea of integrating Britain and the Dominions politically, emerged under the 
sobriquet ‘Greater Britain’. By 1918, however, political integration in practice was a 
dead issue but nevertheless the Dominions remained the principal focus of imperial 
activist groups and can still be seen in the ideology of the LEL as late as the 1950s. 
Thus, although it would be wrong to ignore the dependencies entirely in telling the 
story of imperial activism, Andrew Thompson’s conclusion that in late Victorian and 
Edwardian times interest in the Empire was ‘skewed…towards the settler colonies’ 
can be extended to the middle of the twentieth century.
 1
  
The emphasis on the Dominions was also apparent in defence matters. The 
Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee, the Round Table and the British Empire 
League illustrate this, although they were not large organisations. The Committee 
disbanded in 1906 and although the BEL lasted until 1955, broadening its remit, the 
feasibility of formally and permanently integrating the defence of Britain and her 
Dominions had greatly diminished after the end of the First World War. Defence was 
thus a relatively short-lived and weak strain of imperial activism.  
Trade, however, was a much stronger and more long-lasting concern of 
imperial activists than defence. It emerged in imperial activism in the 1890s when 
some members of the defunct IFL formed the United Empire Trade League; was 
carried forward from 1903 into the 1920s by the Tariff Reform League and its 
successor the Empire Development Union; and was the principal purpose of the 
British Commonwealth Union, the Empire Industries Association and Beaverbrook’s 
confrontational Empire Crusade in the 1920s and 1930s. Trade, with the Dominions, 
was therefore the most notable of the six main topics that activists cared about. By 
comparison, education, expressed by the League of the Empire and the Empire Day 
Movement, and concern with Anglo-Saxon issues of ‘kith and kin’, favoured by the 
Overseas Club and the Patriotic League of Britons Overseas, were relatively minor 
issues. The former two organisations operated from the early years of the twentieth 
                                                 
1
 Thompson, ‘Thinking Imperially?’, p351. 
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century until after the Second World War, but the latter, founded in Edwardian 
times, had both disappeared by 1922.  
This thesis has described the division of imperial activist groups into pressure 
groups and interest groups, and has drawn attention to the social nature of some 
groups. Groups which expressed concern with the specific areas of governance, 
defence, trade, and education were invariably pressure groups, that is, they sought to 
change some aspect of the Empire, and sometimes to resist change, in the cases of 
the India Defence League, the Indian Empire Society and the League of Empire 
Loyalists. They were, not surprisingly, therefore political groups, rather than social 
ones. Groups with a non-specific, general concern for imperial matters were usually 
interest groups, that is, they sought to celebrate and enjoy the Empire, not to change 
it. Such groups included the Royal Colonial Institute, the Primrose League, the 
Victoria League and the Empire Parliamentary Association. They tended to be more 
long-lived than pressure groups with specific concerns, perhaps because the latter 
had unachievable plans or sometimes, as in the case of the ISAA, saw their ideas 
become reality. Generally speaking, pressure groups were political groups; interest 
groups were social groups. 
There were exceptions to this, most notably the Primrose League, which was 
an interest group with both political and social elements, and the Junior Imperial 
League, which was also both political and social, and, though largely an interest 
group, applied pressure in the inter-war years to the Conservative party over India 
and imperial preference. The JIL, this thesis has argued, displayed ‘banal’, or 
commonplace, imperialism in which its purpose was mainly to celebrate and enjoy 
the Empire. It also illustrates that groups were active in areas that were not directly 
imperial; it became an effective resource for the Conservative Party in elections and 
as a training ground for young Tory politicians. The JIL was not alone among 
imperial activist groups in being close to the Conservative Party but it was 
particularly so, and the thesis draws attention to its significance in Tory politics and 
to the relevance of the Empire to Tory policy.  
In contrast, the League of Empire Loyalists, which both attacked and courted 
the Conservatives, was an exponent of ‘hot’ imperialism. The thesis has argued that 
the pre-occupation with the fascisant qualities of the LEL should not be allowed to 
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mask its imperialism and its significant place in the spectrum of imperial activist 
groups. Thus, taken together, the JIL and the LEL delimit the two extremes of 
intensity of imperial feeling that may be designated respectively as ‘infra-
imperialism’ and ‘ultra-imperialism’. They demonstrate the importance, when 
assessing attitudes to the Empire, of understanding the different ways in which 
imperialism was expressed. 
The thesis has also considered the question of the social classes in imperial 
activism. Almost all groups were led by an elite, that is, people possessing a 
combination of wealth, status or power. Such people were often drawn from the 
aristocracy, from those who had been elected or appointed to parliament, from 
businessmen and professionals. Imperial activist groups, however, had members 
drawn from all social classes. It has long been understood that the Primrose League 
had working-class members but this thesis has shown that this is also true of the 
Junior Imperial League. It is interesting to note that these two organisations were 
larger than any other imperial activist groups and also, unusually, were interest 
groups with a strong social element. Perhaps it is the case that working-class 
imperialists preferred to celebrate the Empire, in a social setting, rather than to set 
about changing it through political campaigning. 
This thesis has argued that imperialism was neither ubiquitous nor absent in 
British society from 1900 to 1967. The evidence in this thesis has been assembled 
from the organised activities of more than one million people who felt strongly 
enough about the Empire, albeit in various ways and with a range of intensity of 
feeling, to give up their own time and money to pursue an imperial cause. That they 
did so in diverse ways is demonstrated in this thesis by its survey of twentieth 
century imperial activist groups and the detailed examination of the JIL and the LEL, 
two organisations whose ‘banal’ and ‘hot’ imperialism lay at the opposite extremes 
of imperial activism: the former was permeated by Empire but not dominated by it; 
the latter, was extremist and obsessed with the belief that without the Empire there 
could be no satisfactory form of Britishness.  
Appendix 1. Officers of the Junior Imperial League 
 
President 
Lord Castlereagh  (1906-1921)   later Lord Londonderry 
Lord Windsor  (1921-1933)   later Earl of Plymouth 
Lord Stanley  (1933-1938) 
Lord Burghley  (1938- 
 
Chairman 
Arthur du Cros  (1906-1907) 
Henry Imbert-Terry (1907-1927)  later knighted 
Lord Stanley  (1927-1933) 
Lord Burghley  (1933-1937) 
Lord Dunglass  (1937-1945)  later Sir Alec Douglas-Home 
 
Hon. Secretary 
A.E. Southall  (1906-1907) 
G.O. Borwick  (1907-1908) 
Herbert Browne (1909) 
H.I.P. Hallett (1909-1939) 
 
Hon. Treasurer 
C.H. Hoare  (    -1908) 
S.G. Sampson  (1909)   (joint) 
F. Danford Thomas  (1909-1936) 
Viscount Hinchingbrooke   
N. Ker Lindsay  (1936-    ) 
 
Organising Secretary 
W. Kiddell Moore  (1909-1911) 
H.H. Cannell  (1912-1926) 




Appendix 2. Members of the National Council and Executive Committee of the 
League of Empire Loyalists, 1955/56 
 
Andrews, Sir Ernest H. KB CBE  (1873-1961) Mayor of Christchurch, New 
Zealand in 1940s; ed. Ashburton Public School and Canterbury University College, 
Christchurch. 
Armstrong, T. Resident in New Zealand. 
Athoe, G.B.J., Major. A.Inst. N.A.  M.Inst.R.A. 
Attenborough, B.M. Mrs. 
Belam, l. Mrs. 
Belfrage, C. Mrs. Resident in Kenya. 
Blake, M.A. Resident in Australia. 
Bridges, T.W. Lt. Com. RNR (retd.) Resident in Canada. 
W.Austen Brooks. Son of W.Collin Brooks (1893-1959) who was editor of Truth 
(1940-1952); ed. Balliol College, Oxford. Journalist. 
Buchan, 15th Earl. (1878-1960) Ed. Harrow. Formerly Lieut. in Scots Guards; 
served in South Africa 1899-1902 and in First World War in Egypt, Salonica and 
Palestine. President of the Service for Economic Action (‘working to establish the 
supremacy of the people over their institutions’ (Conservative Party Archive, 
CCO3/4/75)).  
Burdett-Coutts, Martin. 
Butler, Eric D. Resident in Australia. Journalist with Melbourne Argus; editor of 
New Times of Melbourne. Director of the Australian League of Rights. Secretary of 
the Social Credit Organisation. Author. 
Butt, T.B. Lt-Col. Commanding officer (1936-39) of 2nd battalion KOYLI. 
Byng-Morris, Mrs. I. 
Chambers-Hunter, W.K.A.J. Leading BUF activist in Aberdeen in nineteen-
thirties. Author of British Union and Social Credit. 
Clarkson, M. Mrs. (c.1894- ) 
Clifford, Frank. Journalist. Detained under Defence Regulation 18B. Deputy 
Chairman of the National Front. 
Collis, Guy. Local government councillor. 
Couchman, V. Miss  Resident in South Africa. 
Cowper-Essex, C.S.  JP. 
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Creagh-Scott, J. Lt-Col. DSO OBE. Chairman, The Farmers’ Action Council. 
Author of Hidden Government. Advisory Chairman of the Service for Economic 
Action.  
Elliott-Smith, C.H. Air Commodore AFC. (1889-1994) (sic) Resident in South 
Africa. Retired in 1944. Ed. Bedford School. Army officer (1914-15) before 
transferring to the RFC. Served in Mesopotamia in First World War and South 
Africa in Second World War.  
Fraser Harris, D.S., Lt-Col. 
Elizabeth, Lady Freeman. (c.1911-?) Daughter of Ernest Richmond, director of 
antiquities in Palestine (1927-37). Widow of Sir Wilfrid Freeman (1888-1953) who 
was ed. Rugby School and RMC Sandhurst and who worked (1942-45) at Ministry 
of Aircraft Production under Lord Beaverbrook. 
Geneve, C. Resident in Southern Rhodesia. 
Gough, Hubert, General Sir Ed. Eton and RMC Sandhurst. Fought at Ladysmith in 
1900; involved in the Curragh incident in 1914. Commanded Fifth Army at Ypres 
1917. Commander of London zone of Home Guard in Second World War. 
Gray, N.W.H. Resident in Singapore. 
Greene, M.C. Miss. MA. Organising secretary of the LEL. Daughter of Ben Greene, 
a cousin of Graham Greene, who left the Labour Party in 1938 and helped the Duke 
of Bedford to set up the British Peoples Party. Graham Greene’s father was 
headmaster of Berkhamstead, the public school A.K. Chesterton attended 
contemporaneously with Ben Greene (1913-15). 
Hartley, J. Resident in New Zealand. 
Heanley, C.M., MB. Resident in Southern Rhodesia. 
Holbrook, J.R. 
Holden, Joseph. FNICS. Local government councillor. 
Jeune, R.D. 
Jordan, Colin. MA.  Midlands organiser of the LEL. Resigned in 1957 to found the 
White Defence League. 
Klassen, A.T.   Resident in Canada. 
Lazarus, David. 
Leather, R.T. Gp-Capt. Commander of No.150 and No. 103 RAF squadrons in 
1939. 




Mackey, Aiden. Journalist. 
Mackesy, P.J. Maj.-Gen. CB DSO MC. (1883-1956) Retired from the army in 1940 
after controversial involvement in the Narvik campaign. Ed. St. Paul’s School and 
RMA Woolwich. Served in South Africa in the First World War, Murmansk (1919), 
India (1927-30) and Palestine (1937). 
Marriott, Peter. (c.1924- ) Ed. Eton and Magdelene College, Oxford. Founded the 
New Conservative Movement. 
Mew, Mrs. Joyce. Chairman of the Housewives’ League. 
Nesbit, C Mrs. Resident in Canada. 
Noakes, A.W. Resident in Australia. 
Oddie, G.S. (ca 1896-?) Air Commodore. DFC AFC (1895-1984). Ed. Wimbledon 
College and University of London. Served in the army in First World War before 
joining the Royal Flying Corps. Won the DFC in India in 1919. Commander, Empire 
Central Flying School (1942-44).  
Ogilvie, G. FRIBA. Resident in Kenya. 
Palmer, Sir Richmond, (1877-1958) Ed. Oundle and Trinity College, Cambridge. 
Barrister. Governor and C-in-C Gambia (1930-33) and Cyprus (1933-39)  
Pile, George. 
Raven, Alice Miss. 
Roberts, B.P. Major. Resident in Kenya. 
Rogers, A. Capt. OBE. 
Stevens, F.W. Resident in Nee Zealand. 
Stewart, T.S. 
Stokes, L.A. APCA. 
Tillett, George. 
Tozer, Derek.  
Waring, J.M.E. Tea planter in Ceylon. 
Wemyss, I.B. Mrs. Resident in Southern Rhodesia. 
Young, L. Wing Commander. 
 
Note: These brief biographical details have been compiled mainly from Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Who Was Who, The Times and the Conservative 
Party Archive at the Bodleian Library.  
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Appendix 3. Conservative Backbenchers 
 
Identifying the extreme Empire Stalwarts (ultra-imperialists) 
 
Finer, Berrington and Bartholomew considered the following EDMs, one or more of 
which was signed by 64 Empire Stalwarts: 
 
EDM 101A/1955  Anti-Common Market Amendment.   
EDM 28A/1956  Anti-European unity Amendment. 
EDM 110/1955  Increased Empire preference. 
EDM 5/1957  (actually EDM4) Empire trade before Free Trade Area.  
 
EDM 101A and EDM 28A were ‘more extreme’ in terms of support for Empire; 
EDM 110 and EDM 4 were ‘less extreme’. 
 
They state that ‘Nine MPs signed at least one of these two Amendments [i.e 101A 
and 28A] and eight of them can be regarded as constituting the ultra-imperialist wing 
of the Conservative party in the House of Commons’.1  By examining the EDMs we 
can establish that only two MPs (Legge-Bourke and Green) signed 101A and seven 
signed 28A (Legge-Bourke, Harvey, Lucas, Tufton-Beamish, Biggs-Davison, 
Williams and McAdden). Finer et al tell us only that the group was led by Legge 
Bourke and we may reasonably conclude therefore that these are the eight ultra-
imperialists.   
 




Beamish, Major Tufton Victor Hamilton, MC. Son of Rear Adm. T.P.H. 
Beamish. Born 1917; ed. Stowe and RMC Sandhurst. Served in Palestine 1938-39 
and in France, Belgium, Far East, N.Africa and Italy 1939-45. Honorary colonel in 
TA since 1951. Director of companies. MP since 1945. 
Biggs-Davison, John.  Son of Major J.N.Biggs-Davison. Born 1918; ed. Clifton 
College and Magdelene College, Oxford. Commissioned in Royal Marines 1939; 
                                                 
1
 Finer, Berrington and Bartholomew, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 1955-59  p186. 
2
 Dod’s Parliamentary Companion 1955 (London: Business Directories Ltd, 1955)  
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Indian Civil Service 1942; Liaison officer Cox’s Bazaar; Commandant Border 
Military Police 1946-48. MP since 1951. 
Green, Alan. Son of Edward Green. Born 1911; ed. Brighton College. Served in 
Royal Artillery as Private, later Major, 1940-46. Director of companies. MP since 
1955. 
Harvey, Air Commodore Arthur Vere, CBE. Son of Arthur William Harvey. Born 
1906; ed. Framlingham College. Served with RAF 1925-30. Hon. Major-General 
Southern Chinese Airforce 1934. MP since 1945. 
Legge-Bourke, Major Edward Alexander Henry. Son of the late N.W.H.Legge-
Bourke and Lady Victoria Forester. Born 1914; ed. Eton and RMC. Royal Horse 
Guards; served in Greece 1941 and Western desert 1942; ADC to British 
Ambassador in Cairo 1941-42.MP since 1945. 
Lucas, P.B. DSO DFC.  Son of P.M.Lucas; ed. Stowe and Pembroke College, 
Cambridge. Formerly journalist now company director. Served with RAF 1939-46 
reaching rank of Wing-Commander. Awarded Croix de Guerre. MP since 1950. 
McAdden, Stephen James. Son of William John McAdden. Born 1907; ed. 
Salesian School, Battersea. Export sales manager. MP since 1950. 
Williams, Paul. Son of Sam. O.Williams. Born 1922; ed. Marlborough and Trinity 
Hall, Cambridge. Exporter, travelled in Canada, USA, South Africa, Europe and 




Appendix 4: Biographical details
3
 of members of the Expanding 
Commonwealth Group 
(all were MPs in the 1955-59 Parliament except Charles Longbottom) 
 
Hon. Patrick Maitland (Chairman) Son of W.W.Maitland CVO OBE. Born 1903; 
ed. Royal Naval College and Dartmouth. Lt-Commander, retired 1934 , recalled 
1939. Gunnery officer on Staff of Admiral Commanding Submarines. JP. War 
correspondent, Eastern Europe and Far East. 
(Henry Frederick) Lawrence Turner (Hon.Treasurer) Son of late G.F. Turner, 
architect. Born 1905; ed. Radley. Director of five companies. PoW Far East. 
John Biggs-Davison ( Hon. Secretary) See Appendix 2. 
William Aitken Son of Joseph Mauns Aitken of Toronto. Born 1905; married 
daughter of Lord Rugby. Served in Second World War as RAF fighter pilot 
Sir Albert Braithwaite DSO MC Son of Albert Braithwaite, Lord Mayor of Leeds 
1921. Born 1893; ed. Woodhouse Grove School and Leeds University. Engineer and 
Company Director. Served in Second World War. 
Bernard Braine Son of Arthur Ernest Braine. Born 1914. National Vice Chairman 
Junior Imperial League 1938-45. N. Staffordshire Regiment 1940. Major 1943. 
Served in W.Africa, N.W.Europe, S.E.Asia. Lt-Col 1946; on staff of Lord 
Mountbatten. Journalist and Company Director. 
Anthony Fell Son of late Cmdr. David Mark Fell RN. Born in Britain 1914 but ed. 
Tauranga District High School NZ. Engineer. 
Viscount Hinchingbrooke Son of 9th Earl of Sandwich. Born 1906; ed. Eton and 
Trinity College, Cambridge. Served in France 1940, Major 1942. Treasurer Junior 
Imperial and Constitutional League (1934-35) Company Director. 
Hon.Greville Howard Son of 19th Earl of Suffolk. Born 1909; ed. Eton and 
Sandhurst. Lt-Commander RNVR, served at sea in destroyers throughout 1939-45 
war. Mayor of Westminster 1946-7. 
Hon. James Lindsay Son of late (27th) Earl of Crawford and Balcarres. Ed. Eton 
and Magdelene College, Oxford. Farmed in South Africa before Second World War; 
travelled in Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda. Served in KFRC and as Major in 
Commando Corps; invalided 1944. 
Charles Longbottom Prospective parliamentary candidate.  
                                                 
3
 Compiled from Dod’s Parliamentary Companion 1957 (London: Business Directories Ltd., 1957) 
and the Biggs-Davison Papers, House of Lords Record Office 
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Angus Maude Economist and writer. Ed. Rugby and Oxford. Served in RASC in N. 
Africa 1939-45 (PoW for 3 years). 
Sir Roland Robinson Son of Roland Walkden Robinson, Solicitor. Born 1907; ed. 
Trinity Hall, Cambridge. Barrister. Wing-Commander RAFVR 1943. 
Ronald Russell Son of J.Stanley Russell. Born 1904; ed. Haileybury and Caius 
College, Cambridge. Author and journalist. Served in Second World War. Editor of 
Empire and Commonwealth Year Book. 
Sir James Henderson Stewart  Bt. Son of late Matthew Deas Stewart. Born 1897; 
ed. Morrison’s Academy and University of Edinburgh. Capt Royal Artillery (TA) 
retd. Served with BEF 1917-19and Royal Artillery 1940-41.  
John Tilney Son of Col.R.H.Tilney DSO. Born 1907; ed. Eton and Magdelene 
College, Oxford. Served overseas 1939-45. Commander 359 Med. Regiment Royal 
Artillery, TA. 
Major Patrick Wall MC Son of Henry Benedict Wall. Born 1916; ed. Downside. 
Served with Royal Marines 1935-50, and with US Navy.  
Paul Williams Ed. Marlborough and Trinity Hall, Cambridge. Served in RAF in 
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